Analytic Non-Labelled Proof-Systems for Hybrid Logic: Overview and a couple of striking facts

This paper is about non-labelled proof-systems for hybrid logic, that is, proof-systems where arbitrary formulas can occur, not just satisfaction statements. We give an overview of such proof-systems, focusing on analytic systems: Natural deduction systems, Gentzen sequent systems and tableau systems. We point out major results and we discuss a couple of striking facts, in particular that non-labelled hybrid-logical natural deduction systems are analytic, but this is not proved in the usual way via step-by-step normalization of derivations.

Proof Compression and NP Versus PSPACE II: Addendum

In [3] we proved the conjecture NP = PSPACE by advanced proof theoretic methods that combined Hudelmaier's cut-free sequent calculus for minimal logic (HSC) [5] with the horizontal compressing in the corresponding minimal Prawitz-style natural deduction (ND) [6]. In this Addendum we show how to prove a weaker result NP = coNP without referring to HSC. The underlying idea (due to the second author) is to omit full minimal logic and compress only \naive" normal tree-like ND refutations of the existence of Hamiltonian cycles in given non-Hamiltonian graphs, since the Hamiltonian graph problem in NP-complete. Thus, loosely speaking, the proof of NP = coNP can be obtained by HSC-elimination from our proof of NP = PSPACE [3].

Sequent Systems without Improper Derivations

In the natural deduction system for classical propositional logic given by G. Gentzen, there are some inference rules with assumptions discharged by the rule. D. Prawitz calls such inference rules improper, and others proper. Improper inference rules are more complicated and are often harder to understand than the proper ones. In the present paper, we distinguish between proper and improper derivations by using sequent systems. Specifically, we introduce a sequent system \(\vdash_{\bf Sc}\) for classical propositional logic with only structural rules, and prove that \(\vdash_{\bf Sc}\) does not allow improper derivations in general. For instance, the sequent \(\Rightarrow p \to q\) cannot be derived from the sequent \(p \Rightarrow q\) in \(\vdash_{\bf Sc}\). In order to prove the failure of improper derivations, we modify the usual notion of truth valuation, and using the modified valuation, we prove the completeness of \(\vdash_{\bf Sc}\). We also consider whether an improper derivation can be described generally by using \(\vdash_{\bf Sc}\).

The Rule of Existential Generalisation and Explicit Substitution

The present paper offers the rule of existential generalization (EG) that is uniformly applicable within extensional, intensional and hyperintensional contexts. In contradistinction to Quine and his followers, quantification into various modal contexts and some belief attitudes is possible without obstacles. The hyperintensional logic deployed in this paper incorporates explicit substitution and so the rule (EG) is fully specified inside the logic. The logic is equipped with a natural deduction system within which (EG) is derived from its rules for the existential quantifier, substitution and functional application. This shows that (EG) is not primitive, as often assumed even in advanced writings on natural deduction. Arguments involving existential generalisation are shown to be valid if the sequents containing their premises and conclusions are derivable using the rule (EG). The invalidity of arguments seemingly employing (EG) is explained with recourse to the definition of substitution.

Natural deduction

Natural deduction is a philosophically as well as pedagogically important logical proof system. This chapter introduces Gerhard Gentzen’s original system of natural deduction for minimal, intuitionistic, and classical predicate logic. Natural deduction reflects the ways we reason under assumption in mathematics and ordinary life. Its rules display a pleasing symmetry, in that connectives and quantifiers are each governed by a pair of introduction and elimination rules. After providing several examples of how to find proofs in natural deduction, it is shown how deductions in such systems can be manipulated and measured according to various notions of complexity, such as size and height. The final section shows that the axiomatic system of classical logic presented in Chapter 2 and the system of natural deduction for classical logic introduced in this chapter are equivalent.

Arithmetic Formulated Relevantly

The purpose of this paper is to formulate first-order Peano arithmetic within the resources of relevant logic, and to demonstrate certain properties of the system thus formulated. Striking among these properties are the facts that (1) it is trivial that relevant arithmetic is absolutely consistent, but (2) classical first-order Peano arithmetic is straightforwardly contained in relevant arithmetic. Under (1), I shall show in particular that 0 = 1 is a non-theorem of relevant arithmetic; this, of course, is exactly the formula whose unprovability was sought in the Hilbert program for proving arithmetic consistent. Under (2), I shall exhibit the requisite translation, drawing some Goedelian conclusions therefrom. Left open, however, is the critical problem whether Ackermann’s rule γ is admissible for theories of relevant arithmetic. The particular system of relevant Peano arithmetic featured in this paper shall be called R♯. Its logical base shall be the system R of relevant implication, taken in its first-order form RQ. Among other Peano arithmetics we shall consider here in particular the systems C♯, J♯, and RM3♯; these are based respectively on the classical logic C, the intuitionistic logic J, and the Sobocinski-Dunn semi-relevant logic RM3. And another feature of the paper will be the presentation of a system of natural deduction for R♯, along lines valid for first-order relevant theories in general. This formulation of R♯ makes it possible to construct relevantly valid arithmetical deductions in an easy and natural way; it is based on, but is in some respects more convenient than, the natural deduction formulations for relevant logics developed by Anderson and Belnap in Entailment.

From 2-Sequents and Linear Nested Sequents to Natural Deduction for Normal Modal Logics

We extend to natural deduction the approach of Linear Nested Sequents and of 2-Sequents. Formulas are decorated with a spatial coordinate, which allows a formulation of formal systems in the original spirit of natural deduction: only one introduction and one elimination rule per connective, no additional (structural) rule, no explicit reference to the accessibility relation of the intended Kripke models. We give systems for the normal modal logics from K to S4. For the intuitionistic versions of the systems, we define proof reduction, and prove proof normalization, thus obtaining a syntactical proof of consistency. For logics K and K4 we use existence predicates (à la Scott) for formulating sound deduction rules.

Curry–Howard–Lambek Correspondence for Intuitionistic Belief

This paper introduces a natural deduction calculus for intuitionistic logic of belief$$\mathsf {IEL}^{-}$$ IEL - which is easily turned into a modal$$\lambda $$ λ -calculus giving a computational semantics for deductions in $$\mathsf {IEL}^{-}$$ IEL - . By using that interpretation, it is also proved that $$\mathsf {IEL}^{-}$$ IEL - has good proof-theoretic properties. The correspondence between deductions and typed terms is then extended to a categorical semantics for identity of proofs in $$\mathsf {IEL}^{-}$$ IEL - showing the general structure of such a modality for belief in an intuitionistic framework.

The Calculus of Natural Calculation

The calculus of Natural Calculation is introduced as an extension of Natural Deduction by proper term rules. Such term rules provide the capacity of dealing directly with terms in the calculus instead of the usual reasoning based on equations, and therefore the capacity of a natural representation of informal mathematical calculations. Basic proof theoretic results are communicated, in particular completeness and soundness of the calculus; normalisation is briefly investigated. The philosophical impact on a proof theoretic account of the notion of meaning is considered.