scholarly journals A Century of Economics and Engineering at Stanford

2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (S1) ◽  
pp. 85-111
Author(s):  
Beatrice Cherrier ◽  
Aurélien Saïdi

This article documents the disciplinary exchanges between economists and engineers at Stanford throughout the twentieth century. We outline the role of key scholars such as Kenneth Arrow and Robert Wilson, as well as engineers turned administrators like Frederick Terman. We show that engineers drew upon economic theories of decision and allocation to improve practical industrial management decisions. Reciprocally, economists found in engineering the tools that they needed to rethink production and growth theory (including linear programming, optimal control theory, an epistemology of “application” that emphasized awareness to institutional details, trials and errors and experiments). By the 2000s, they had turned into economic engineers designing markets and other allocation mechanisms. These cross-disciplinary exchanges were mediated by Stanford’s own institutional culture, notably its use of joint appointments, the development of multidisciplinary “programs” for students, the ability to attract a variety of visitors every year, the entrepreneurial and contract-oriented vision of its administrators, and the close ties with the industrial milieu that came to be called the Silicon Valley.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beatrice Cherrier ◽  
Aurélien Saïdi

This paper document the disciplinary exchanges between economists and engineers at Stanford throughout the 20th century. We also elucidate how this cross-fertlization was mediated by the institutional structure of the university. We outline the role of key scholars such as Kenneth Arrow and Robert Wilson, as well as engineers turned administrators like Frederick Terman. We show that engineers largely drew upon successive economic theories of decision and allocation with a view to improving practical industrial management decisions. Reciprocally, economists found in engineering the tools (from linear programming to optimal control theory) they needed to rethink production and growth theory, an epistemology of “application” that emphasized awareness to institutional details, trials and errors and experiments to improve the design of processes and machines, and all sorts of industrial settings to operationalize their theories of decision, strategic interaction and bargaining. By the 2000s, they had turned into economic engineers designing markets and other allocation mechanisms. These cross-disciplinary exchanges were mediated by Stanford’s own institutional culture, notably its use of joint appointments, the development of multidisciplinary “programs” for students, the ability to attract a variety of visitors every year, the entrepreneurial and contract-oriented vision of its administrators, and the close ties with the industrial milieu that came to be called the Silicon Valley.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 86-86
Author(s):  
Miki U. Kobayashi ◽  
Nobuaki Aoki ◽  
Noriyoshi Manabe ◽  
Tadafumi Adschiri

Author(s):  
V. Ya. Vilisov

The article proposes an algorithm for solving a linear programming problem (LPP) based on the use of its representation in the form of an antagonistic matrix game and the subsequent solution of the game by an iterative method. The algorithm is implemented as a computer program. The rate of convergence of the estimates of the solution to the actual value with the required accuracy has been studied. The software implementation shows a high speed of obtaining the LPP solution with acceptable accuracy in fractions or units of seconds. This allows the use algorithm in embedded systems for optimal control.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Savin Treanţă

A new class of differential variational inequalities (DVIs), governed by a variational inequality and an evolution equation formulated in infinite-dimensional spaces, is investigated in this paper. More precisely, based on Browder’s result, optimal control theory, measurability of set-valued mappings and the theory of semigroups, we establish that the solution set of DVI is nonempty and compact. In addition, the theoretical developments are accompanied by an application to differential Nash games.


2020 ◽  
pp. 108473
Author(s):  
Xiuquan Liu ◽  
Zhaowei Liu ◽  
Xianglei Wang ◽  
Nan Zhang ◽  
Na Qiu ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 168-179
Author(s):  
Jead M. Macalisang ◽  
Mark L. Caay ◽  
Jayrold P. Arcede ◽  
Randy L. Caga-anan

AbstractBuilding on an SEIR-type model of COVID-19 where the infecteds are further divided into symptomatic and asymptomatic, a system incorporating the various possible interventions is formulated. Interventions, also referred to as controls, include transmission reduction (e.g., lockdown, social distancing, barrier gestures); testing/isolation on the exposed, symptomatic and asymptomatic compartments; and medical controls such as enhancing patients’ medical care and increasing bed capacity. By considering the government’s capacity, the best strategies for implementing the controls were obtained using optimal control theory. Results show that, if all the controls are to be used, the more able the government is, the more it should implement transmission reduction, testing, and enhancing patients’ medical care without increasing hospital beds. However, if the government finds it very difficult to implement the controls for economic reasons, the best approach is to increase the hospital beds. Moreover, among the testing/isolation controls, testing/isolation in the exposed compartment is the least needed when there is significant transmission reduction control. Surprisingly, when there is no transmission reduction control, testing/isolation in the exposed should be optimal. Testing/isolation in the exposed could seemingly replace the transmission reduction control to yield a comparable result to that when the transmission reduction control is being implemented.


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