Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Match and Its Solution

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 366-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuichiro Kamada ◽  
Fuhito Kojima
Keyword(s):  
Japanese Government ◽  
Medical Residents ◽  
Alternative Mechanism ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Matching Market ◽  
New System ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Real matching markets are subject to constraints. For example, the Japanese government introduced a new medical matching system in 2009 that imposes a “regional cap” in each of its 47 prefectures, which regulates the total number of medical residents who can be employed in each region. Based on Kamada and Kojima (2011), this paper studies matching markets with such constraints by examining in great detail the Japanese medical matching market. Specifically, we show that the new system introduced in 2009 has problems in terms of stability and strategy-proofness, and provide an alternative mechanism that does better.

Disruption and the matching market for new multifamily housing in Melbourne, Australia

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 160-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Gayle Sharam
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Revolution ◽  
Digital Technologies ◽  
Housing Development ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Multifamily Housing ◽  
Fourth Industrial Revolution ◽  
Matching Market ◽  
The Cost ◽  
System Impact

A key area of system impact of the fourth industrial revolution (4IR) is the radical improvement in the functioning of matching markets. Matching markets are markets in which agents seek to be paired with someone or something with the criteria for matching often highly specific. Traditionally, the cost and difficulty in matching means many of these markets have not functioned well. Uber and Airbnb are examples of new matching market matchmakers that have been ‘turbo-charged’ by new digital technologies, resulting in what Parker et al. describe as a ‘platform revolution’. In this article, we examine the traditional, but poorly functioning, matching market for new multifamily housing development in Melbourne, Australia, and the potential for disruption offered by a new platform, Nightingale Housing Ltd. (NHL). Improved matching has been critical to the model and the Internet has been central to this. The NHL model has the potential for systems impact as outlined by Schwab in his conception of 4IR.

scholarly journals Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Romero-Medina ◽  
Matteo Triossi
Keyword(s):  
Minimal Condition ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Proof Rule ◽  
Stable Mechanism ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Abstract We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.

scholarly journals The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design

1999 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 748-780 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alvin E Roth ◽  
Elliott Peranson
Keyword(s):  
Design Process ◽  
Convergence Result ◽  
Economic Design ◽  
Computational Experiments ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Strategic Manipulation ◽  
Matching Market

We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians. Because the market has complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not apply directly. However, computational experiments show the theory provides good approximations. Furthermore, the set of stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are surprisingly small. A new kind of “core convergence” result explains this; that each applicant interviews only a small fraction of available positions is important. We also describe engineering aspects of the design process. (JEL C78, B41, J44)

New System Targets Rotors for AF Ablation

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 20-21
Author(s):  
BRUCE JANCIN
Keyword(s):  
Af Ablation ◽  
New System
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