scholarly journals Another Look at Airport Congestion Pricing

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1970-1977 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven A Morrison ◽  
Clifford Winston

We study alternate approaches to implement congestion pricing at US airports. Conventional formulations toll all aircraft without determining whether a plane operated by a given airline delays other planes that it operates or planes operated by other airlines. Recent work points out optimal pricing calls for carriers to be charged only for the delay they impose on other airlines. We find a small difference between the net benefits generated by the two congestion-pricing policies because the bulk of airport delays are not internalized and because the efficiency loss from pricing internalized congestion is small. (JEL L11, L93, R41)

2005 ◽  
Vol 166 (1) ◽  
pp. 246-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel F. Anjos ◽  
Russell C.H. Cheng ◽  
Christine S.M. Currie

2011 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 595-604 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achim I. Czerny ◽  
Anming Zhang

2002 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 1357-1375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan K Brueckner

This paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic, showing how the results of the road-pricing literature are modified when the economic agents causing congestion have market power. The analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist, congestion is fully internalized, yielding no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions. Under a Cournot oligopoly, however, carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves. A toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion may then improve the allocation of traffic. The analysis is supported by some rudimentary empirical evidence.


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