scholarly journals Risk, Ambiguity, and the Rank-Dependence Axioms

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 385-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark J Machina
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Subjective Expected Utility ◽  
Choquet Expected Utility ◽  
Risk Ambiguity ◽  
Rank Dependence ◽  
Nonseparable Models ◽  
Utility Preferences

Choice problems in the spirit of Ellsberg (1961) suggest that rank-dependent (“Choquet expected utility”) preferences over subjective gambles might be subject to the same difficulties that Ellsberg's earlier examples posed for subjective expected utility. These difficulties stem from event-separability properties that rank-dependent preferences partially retain from expected utility, and suggest that nonseparable models of preferences might be better at capturing features of behavior that lead to these paradoxes. (JEL D81)

scholarly journals Strategyproof Choice of Social Acts

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (2) ◽  
pp. 596-627
Author(s):  
Eric Bahel ◽  
Yves Sprumont
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Choice Function ◽  
Social Choice Function ◽  
Subjective Expected Utility ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Social Acts ◽  
States Of Nature ◽  
Utility Preferences

We model uncertain social prospects as acts mapping states of nature to (social ) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF ) assigns an act to each profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. An SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the states of nature or her valuation of the outcomes. It is unanimous if it picks the feasible act that all agents find best whenever such an act exists. We offer a characterization of the class of strategyproof and unanimous SCFs in two settings. In the setting where all acts are feasible, the chosen act must yield the favorite outcome of some ( possibly different) agent in every state of nature. The set of states in which an agent’s favorite outcome is selected may vary with the reported belief profile; it is the union of all states assigned to her by a collection of constant, bilaterally dictatorial, or bilaterally consensual assignment rules. In a setting where each state of nature defines a possibly different subset of available outcomes, bilaterally dictatorial or consensual rules can only be used to assign control rights over states characterized by identical sets of available outcomes. (JEL D71, D81, R53)

Choquet expected utility with affine capacities

2015 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-187
Author(s):  
Pascal Toquebeuf
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Choquet Expected Utility

If It Is Surely Better, Do It More? Implications for Preferences Under Ambiguity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soheil Ghili ◽  
Peter Klibanoff
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Ambiguity Aversion ◽  
Upper Bounds ◽  
Maxmin Expected Utility ◽  
Weak Dominance ◽  
Choice Under Uncertainty ◽  
Tight Connection ◽  
Sales Agent ◽  
Utility Preferences ◽  
Sensitive Behavior

Consider a canonical problem in choice under uncertainty: choosing from a convex feasible set consisting of all (Anscombe–Aumann) mixtures of two acts f and g, [Formula: see text]. We propose a preference condition, monotonicity in optimal mixtures, which says that surely improving the act f (in the sense of weak dominance) makes the optimal weight(s) on f weakly higher. We use a stylized model of a sales agent reacting to incentives to illustrate the tight connection between monotonicity in optimal mixtures and a monotone comparative static of interest in applications. We then explore more generally the relation between this condition and preferences exhibiting ambiguity-sensitive behavior as in the classic Ellsberg paradoxes. We find that monotonicity in optimal mixtures and ambiguity aversion (even only local to an event) are incompatible for a large and popular class of ambiguity-sensitive preferences (the c-linearly biseparable class. This implies, for example, that maxmin expected utility preferences are consistent with monotonicity in optimal mixtures if and only if they are subjective expected utility preferences. This incompatibility is not between monotonicity in optimal mixtures and ambiguity aversion per se. For example, we show that smooth ambiguity preferences can satisfy both properties as long as they are not too ambiguity averse. Our most general result, applying to an extremely broad universe of preferences, shows a sense in which monotonicity in optimal mixtures places upper bounds on the intensity of ambiguity-averse behavior. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, decision analysis.

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