scholarly journals Background Risk, Demand for Insurance, and Choquet Expected Utility Preferences

2000 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meglena Jeleva
2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 385-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark J Machina

Choice problems in the spirit of Ellsberg (1961) suggest that rank-dependent (“Choquet expected utility”) preferences over subjective gambles might be subject to the same difficulties that Ellsberg's earlier examples posed for subjective expected utility. These difficulties stem from event-separability properties that rank-dependent preferences partially retain from expected utility, and suggest that nonseparable models of preferences might be better at capturing features of behavior that lead to these paradoxes. (JEL D81)


2015 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-187
Author(s):  
Pascal Toquebeuf

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soheil Ghili ◽  
Peter Klibanoff

Consider a canonical problem in choice under uncertainty: choosing from a convex feasible set consisting of all (Anscombe–Aumann) mixtures of two acts f and g, [Formula: see text]. We propose a preference condition, monotonicity in optimal mixtures, which says that surely improving the act f (in the sense of weak dominance) makes the optimal weight(s) on f weakly higher. We use a stylized model of a sales agent reacting to incentives to illustrate the tight connection between monotonicity in optimal mixtures and a monotone comparative static of interest in applications. We then explore more generally the relation between this condition and preferences exhibiting ambiguity-sensitive behavior as in the classic Ellsberg paradoxes. We find that monotonicity in optimal mixtures and ambiguity aversion (even only local to an event) are incompatible for a large and popular class of ambiguity-sensitive preferences (the c-linearly biseparable class. This implies, for example, that maxmin expected utility preferences are consistent with monotonicity in optimal mixtures if and only if they are subjective expected utility preferences. This incompatibility is not between monotonicity in optimal mixtures and ambiguity aversion per se. For example, we show that smooth ambiguity preferences can satisfy both properties as long as they are not too ambiguity averse. Our most general result, applying to an extremely broad universe of preferences, shows a sense in which monotonicity in optimal mixtures places upper bounds on the intensity of ambiguity-averse behavior. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, decision analysis.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aurélien Baillon ◽  
Han Bleichrodt

This paper reports on two experiments that test the descriptive validity of ambiguity models using a natural source of uncertainty (the evolution of stock indices) and both gains and losses. We observed violations of probabilistic sophistication, violations that imply a fourfold pattern of ambiguity attitudes: ambiguity aversion for likely gains and unlikely losses and ambiguity seeking for unlikely gains and likely losses. Our data are most consistent with prospect theory and, to a lesser extent, α-maxmin expected utility and Choquet expected utility. Models with uniform ambiguity attitudes are inconsistent with most of the observed behavioral patterns. (JEL D81, D83, G11, G12, G14)


2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (2) ◽  
pp. 596-627
Author(s):  
Eric Bahel ◽  
Yves Sprumont

We model uncertain social prospects as acts mapping states of nature to (social ) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF ) assigns an act to each profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. An SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the states of nature or her valuation of the outcomes. It is unanimous if it picks the feasible act that all agents find best whenever such an act exists. We offer a characterization of the class of strategyproof and unanimous SCFs in two settings. In the setting where all acts are feasible, the chosen act must yield the favorite outcome of some ( possibly different) agent in every state of nature. The set of states in which an agent’s favorite outcome is selected may vary with the reported belief profile; it is the union of all states assigned to her by a collection of constant, bilaterally dictatorial, or bilaterally consensual assignment rules. In a setting where each state of nature defines a possibly different subset of available outcomes, bilaterally dictatorial or consensual rules can only be used to assign control rights over states characterized by identical sets of available outcomes. (JEL D71, D81, R53)


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