scholarly journals Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (5) ◽  
pp. 586-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Stephen Morris
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium

A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an “information designer” who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We describe a unifying perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We extend information design to many player and relate it to the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium.

scholarly journals Information Design: A Unified Perspective

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Stephen Morris
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Large Body ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Literal Interpretation ◽  
Uncertain Payoffs ◽  
Metaphorical Interpretation

Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. We provide an introduction to the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson 1991), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information. ( JEL C70, D82, D83)

scholarly journals Sequential Information Design

Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (6) ◽  
pp. 2575-2608
Author(s):  
Laura Doval ◽  
Jeffrey C. Ely
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Main Concept ◽  
Sequential Information

We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff‐relevant data but not the players' private information, nor the extensive form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive form with some information structure. We show how to specialize our main concept to capture the additional restrictions implied by extensive‐form refinements.

scholarly journals Information Design

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ina Taneva
Keyword(s):  
Information Structure ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Signal Distribution ◽  
Private Signals ◽  
Optimal Information

A designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments. We fully characterize it in a symmetric binary setting for a parameterized game. In this environment, conditionally independent private signals are never strictly optimal. (JEL C72, D78, D82, D83)

scholarly journals Information and Communication in Organizations

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 545-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inga Deimen ◽  
DezsÖ Szalay
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Communication In Organizations ◽  
Information And Communication ◽  
Optimal Information

We study a constrained information design problem in an organization. A designer chooses the information structure. A sender with preferences different from the decision-maker observes and processes the information before he communicates with the decision-maker. Information shapes conflicts within the organization: the optimal information structure essentially eliminates conflicts and serves as a substitute to the allocation of decision-making authority in the organization.

Information Design and Strategic Communication

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-66
Author(s):  
Daniel Krähmer
Keyword(s):  
Information Structure ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Strategic Communication ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Private Knowledge

I study sender-receiver games where the receiver can disclose information to the sender by designing an information structure. I show that by secretly randomizing over information structures, the receiver can virtually attain her complete information payoff even for large conflicts of interest. The key insight is that private knowledge of the information structure induces truthful communication because it allows the receiver to cross-check the consistency of the sender’s report. (JEL C72, D82, D83)

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