scholarly journals How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Fehrler ◽  
Niall Hughes

We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate, and vote. We study three levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted to affect behavior differently and test the model's key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model's predictions are largely borne out—transparency negatively affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts. (JEL C92, D72, D82, D83)

2000 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 328-354
Author(s):  
R. BRUCE ANDERSON

This article addresses the problem of the causes of party conflict in former one-party legislatures. Some argue that as the minority party gains ground in the legislature, partisan floor conflict will rise. Yet, literature on committees and the changing status of the committee system seems to suggest that conflict is lowered in chambers where the minority party participates in committee decision making. This study is based on tests of data from a 10-year time period. The author reports that the proportion of minority party membership on committees has a direct dampening effect on the level of conflict on the floor. This analysis also finds that the effect is variable by bill type and that the overall effect on conflict is greater than the effect of chamber share in determining the level of party conflict in the chamber.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. e001618 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Eccleston-Turner ◽  
Adam Kamradt-Scott

2011 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Ben-Yashar ◽  
Winston T. H. Koh ◽  
Shmuel Nitzan

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amrita Dhillon ◽  
Grammateia Kotsialou ◽  
Dimitris Xefteris

Recent developments in blockchain technology have made possible greater progress on secure electronic voting, opening the way to better ways of democratic decision making. In this paper we formalise the features of ``liquid democracy'' which allows voters to delegate their votes to other voters, and we explore whether it improves information aggregation as compared to direct voting. We consider a two-alternative setup with truth-seeking voters (informed and uninformed) and partisan ones (leftists and rightists), and we show that delegation improves information aggregation in finite elections. We also propose a mechanism that further improves the information aggregation properties of delegation in private information settings, by guaranteeing that all vote transfers are from uninformed to informed truth-seeking voters. Delegation offers effective ways for truth-seeking uninformed voters to boost the vote-share of the alternative that matches the state of the world in all considered setups and hence deserves policy makers' attention.


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