scholarly journals Universal Human Rights? Historical and Contemporary Comments

Politeja ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2(71)) ◽  
pp. 3-17
Author(s):  
Bogdan Szlachta

The concept of human rights, supposedly of universal importance, is usually derived from the tradition referred to as “Western”. Although the “classic approaches” – Greek, Roman and Christian, refer to the norms of natural law, making them the basis or limits of the rights of individuals, in modern approaches the relation is reserved, in the manner that rights become primary to norms. Although liberals of the 17th and 18th centuries consider the law of nature as a tool for their protection, starting from the 19th century, the rights (already called human rights) have been increasingly perceived as positive abilities to articulate own, subjective preferences of individuals. This evolution needs to be accounted for in the studies carried out by representatives of various cultures, since the comprehension of an individual (and even a “human person”) as an essentially culturally unconditioned one, is its ineradicable element.

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-129
Author(s):  
Bogdan Szlachta

The concept of human rights, supposedly of universal importance, is usually derived from the tradition referred to as ‘Western’. Although the ‘classic approaches’ – Greek, Roman and Christian, refer to the norms of natural law, making them the basis or limits of the rights of individuals, in modern approaches the relation is reserved, in the manner that rights become primary to norms. Although liberals of the 17th and 18th centuries consider the law of nature as a tool for their protection, starting from the 19th century, the rights (already called human rights) have been increasingly perceived as positive abilities to articulate own, subjective preferences of individuals. This evolution needs to be accounted for in the studies carried out by representatives of various cultures, since the comprehension of an individual (and even a ‘human person’ as in contemporary Catholic social teaching) as an essentially culturally unconditioned one, is its ineradicable element.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewan McGaughey

Will the internet, robotics and artificial intelligence mean a ‘jobless future’? A recent narrative, endorsed by prominent tech-billionaires, says we face mass unemployment, and we need a basic income. In contrast, this article shows why the law can achieve full employment with fair incomes, and holidays with pay. Universal human rights, including the right to ‘share in scientific advancement and its benefits’, set the proper guiding principles. Three distinct views of the causes of unemployment are that it is a ‘natural’ phenomenon, that technology may propel it, or that it is social and legal choice: to let capital owners restrict investment in jobs. Only the third view has any credible evidence to support it. Technology may create redundancies, but unemployment is an entirely social phenomenon. After World War Two, 42% of UK jobs were redundant but social policy maintained full employment, and it can be done again. This said, transition to new technology, when markets are left alone, can be exceedingly slow: a staggering 88% of American horses lost their jobs after the Model T Ford, but only over 45 years. Taking lessons from history, it is clear that unemployment is driven by inequality of wealth and of votes in the economy. To uphold human rights, governments should reprogramme the law, for full employment, fair incomes and reduced working time, on a living planet. Robot owners will not automate your job away, if we defend economic democracy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 119-136
Author(s):  
Stuart Banner

This chapter discusses the rapid proliferation of case reporting that took place in the 19th century. There were few published court opinions available to lawyers in the early part of the century. Lawyers necessarily grounded their arguments on broad principles, including principles of natural law. But by the century’s end, lawyers complained that they were drowning in reported cases. It was a common observation in the second half of the century that the glut of published opinions had changed the nature of law practice. Precedents had pushed principles aside. Natural law accordingly began to play a smaller role in litigation.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-175
Author(s):  
Hadley Arkes

The city of Cincinnati, we know, can be an engaging place, but federal judge Arthur Spiegel also found, in the mid-'90s, that it could be quite a vexing place. The city council of Cincinnati had passed what was called the Human Rights Ordinance of 1992, which barred virtually all species of discrimination—including discrimination on the basis of “Appalachian origin.” But the bill also encompassed a bar on discrimination based on “sexual orientation.” This kind of bill, in other places, had been turned into a club to be used against evangelical Christians who might refuse, on moral grounds, to rent space in their homes to gay or lesbian couples. And so a movement arose in Cincinnati, modeled on a similar movement in Colorado, to override the ordinance passed by the council: this would not be a referendum merely to repeal the law, but a move to amend the charter of the municipal government and remove, from the hands of the local legislature, the authority to pass bills of this kind. In effect, this was an attempt to override an ordinary statute by changing the constitution of the local government. The amendment did not seek to make homosexual acts the grounds for criminal prosecutions; it sought, rather, to bar any attempt to make gay and lesbian orientation the ground for special advantages, quotas, or preferential “minority status” in the law. The framers of the amendment objected to the tendency to treat gays and lesbians on the same plane as groups that have suffered discrimination based on race, religion, or gender. The proposal, known as Issue 3, drew wide support and passed in a referendum in 1993. It was, of course, challenged in the courts, which is why it found its way into the hands of Judge Spiegel.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 19-31
Author(s):  
Paul R. DeHart ◽  

In Why Liberalism Failed, Patrick Deneen contends that the American founding is fundamentally Hobbesian and that the Constitution is the application of the Hobbesian revolution concerning liberty and anthropology. I contend that Deneen fundamentally mischaracterizes the American founding. The founders and framers affirmed the necessity of consent for political authority and obligation. But they also situated the necessity of consent in the context of a morally and metaphysically realist natural law, maintained that an objective good of the whole constitutes the final end of political association, and described liberty as subjection to the law of nature and the government of God. To be determined by one’s base passions was to be a slave. Moreover, their constitutional thought and the institutional design of the constitutions they built rejected Hobbes’s theory of sovereign power and the metaphysical ground on which it rests.


Author(s):  
Arthur Hutcheson Bailey ◽  
Archibald Day

In a note in the introduction to Milne's Treatise on Annuities, the author remarks—“There can, I think, be no doubt but that the mortality is greater among the higher than the middle classes of society. They form too small a proportion of the population to have any sensible effect here; but it would be of importance to the Life Offices to determine the law of mortality among them.” Since the publication of this work, forty-six years ago, some attempts have been made to test the accuracy of this assertion, and to supply the desideratum; but none with which we are acquainted are by any means conclusive.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 558-563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Fellman

In the 19th century, a series of international statistical congresses introduced common rules for the national demographic registers. This activity contributed to the genesis of statistical research. During the history of twin research, Hellin's law has played a central role because it is an approximately correct association between the rates of multiple maternities. However, it has been mathematically proven that Hellin's law cannot hold exactly. The majority of all studies of Hellin's law are based on empirical rates of multiple maternities. Such studies can never confirm the law, but only identify errors too large to be characterized as random. It is of particular interest to examine why the rates of higher multiple maternities are sometimes too high or too low when Hellin's law is used as a benchmark. However, divergences from the law are often difficult to explain and/or eliminate. Different improvements to the law have been proposed. In this article, we study the seasonality of multiple maternities. We apply Hellin's law to compare the seasonality of twin and triplet rates.


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