Natural Law, Human Rights, the Law of Nature: Towards a Revived Modernity

Politeja ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2(71)) ◽  
pp. 3-17
Author(s):  
Bogdan Szlachta

The concept of human rights, supposedly of universal importance, is usually derived from the tradition referred to as “Western”. Although the “classic approaches” – Greek, Roman and Christian, refer to the norms of natural law, making them the basis or limits of the rights of individuals, in modern approaches the relation is reserved, in the manner that rights become primary to norms. Although liberals of the 17th and 18th centuries consider the law of nature as a tool for their protection, starting from the 19th century, the rights (already called human rights) have been increasingly perceived as positive abilities to articulate own, subjective preferences of individuals. This evolution needs to be accounted for in the studies carried out by representatives of various cultures, since the comprehension of an individual (and even a “human person”) as an essentially culturally unconditioned one, is its ineradicable element.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-175
Author(s):  
Hadley Arkes

The city of Cincinnati, we know, can be an engaging place, but federal judge Arthur Spiegel also found, in the mid-'90s, that it could be quite a vexing place. The city council of Cincinnati had passed what was called the Human Rights Ordinance of 1992, which barred virtually all species of discrimination—including discrimination on the basis of “Appalachian origin.” But the bill also encompassed a bar on discrimination based on “sexual orientation.” This kind of bill, in other places, had been turned into a club to be used against evangelical Christians who might refuse, on moral grounds, to rent space in their homes to gay or lesbian couples. And so a movement arose in Cincinnati, modeled on a similar movement in Colorado, to override the ordinance passed by the council: this would not be a referendum merely to repeal the law, but a move to amend the charter of the municipal government and remove, from the hands of the local legislature, the authority to pass bills of this kind. In effect, this was an attempt to override an ordinary statute by changing the constitution of the local government. The amendment did not seek to make homosexual acts the grounds for criminal prosecutions; it sought, rather, to bar any attempt to make gay and lesbian orientation the ground for special advantages, quotas, or preferential “minority status” in the law. The framers of the amendment objected to the tendency to treat gays and lesbians on the same plane as groups that have suffered discrimination based on race, religion, or gender. The proposal, known as Issue 3, drew wide support and passed in a referendum in 1993. It was, of course, challenged in the courts, which is why it found its way into the hands of Judge Spiegel.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 19-31
Author(s):  
Paul R. DeHart ◽  

In Why Liberalism Failed, Patrick Deneen contends that the American founding is fundamentally Hobbesian and that the Constitution is the application of the Hobbesian revolution concerning liberty and anthropology. I contend that Deneen fundamentally mischaracterizes the American founding. The founders and framers affirmed the necessity of consent for political authority and obligation. But they also situated the necessity of consent in the context of a morally and metaphysically realist natural law, maintained that an objective good of the whole constitutes the final end of political association, and described liberty as subjection to the law of nature and the government of God. To be determined by one’s base passions was to be a slave. Moreover, their constitutional thought and the institutional design of the constitutions they built rejected Hobbes’s theory of sovereign power and the metaphysical ground on which it rests.


1974 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Tuck

Many English political theorists of the mid-seventeenth century reveal in their writings an awareness that new political terminologies were needed to cope with the apparent breakdown of traditional ideologies. Such an insight is of course famously displayed by Thomas Hobbes and the early Hobbists such as Dudley Digges, in their treatment of orthodox Natural Law doctrines - ‘if we looke backe to the Law of Nature, we shall finde that the people would have had a clearer and more distinct notion of it, if common use of calling it Law had not helped to confound their understanding, when it ought to have been named the Right of nature’ wrote Digges in 1643.


MOVE ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 37-56
Author(s):  
Richard Kent Evans

This chapter is a study of The Guidelines of John Africa, MOVE’s sacred text. John Africa dictated The Guidelines over a span of six years. Several different people helped him create the manuscript. The Guidelines of John Africa are an explanation for, and solution to, the problem of evil. John Africa called these forces of evil the “reformed world system,” or, more frequently, “the System.” John Africa’s worldview was dualistic; it understood the cosmos as a site of conflict that pitted forces of good against forces of evil. The force of good went by many names: the Law of Mama, the Law of Nature, God, Natural Law, and most frequently, Life. Natural processes, according to MOVE, are “coordinated” by this active force.


2021 ◽  
pp. 222-250
Author(s):  
Stuart Banner

This chapter examines the status of natural law in the legal system over the past century. In law schools, natural law never ceased to be a topic of study. This academic interest in natural law has had almost no effect on the working legal system, where natural law has been relied upon by only the most idiosyncratic of judges and lawyers. The history of our use of natural law has nevertheless continued to exert influence on the legal system, which still contains doctrines and practices that were once based on the law of nature.


1971 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. O. Aihe

The rights of the individual in the society have been conceived as natural rights—which in the modern state have no more than a moral force. In the context of a modern state which asserts absolute powers within its borders, it appears idle to suggest as in the traditional natural law theories that there is anything like a law of nature existing independently of and overriding positive law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-129
Author(s):  
Bogdan Szlachta

The concept of human rights, supposedly of universal importance, is usually derived from the tradition referred to as ‘Western’. Although the ‘classic approaches’ – Greek, Roman and Christian, refer to the norms of natural law, making them the basis or limits of the rights of individuals, in modern approaches the relation is reserved, in the manner that rights become primary to norms. Although liberals of the 17th and 18th centuries consider the law of nature as a tool for their protection, starting from the 19th century, the rights (already called human rights) have been increasingly perceived as positive abilities to articulate own, subjective preferences of individuals. This evolution needs to be accounted for in the studies carried out by representatives of various cultures, since the comprehension of an individual (and even a ‘human person’ as in contemporary Catholic social teaching) as an essentially culturally unconditioned one, is its ineradicable element.


2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-23
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Łuszczyńska ◽  
Artur Łuczyński

AUTHORITARIAN LAWS OF NATURE? SEVERAL NOTES ON THE NEGATIVE POTENTIAL OF POSITIVE CONCEPTSThe article presents authors’ reflection upon the problem of the law of nature. In the literature on the subject, there is adominant opinion that the natural law is atype of amatrix, which should be duplicated by the legislator in order to prevent unfair laws. Following the Latin maxim: “Lex iniusta non est lex” “Unfair law is not alaw”, legislator must take into account all non-specified norms of the higher order. According to the authors of this article, in the modern times the natural law rational­ism is rather apparent, and its religious foundations will not necessarily be accepted in the culturally plural [multicultural?] society.


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