A New Binary Programming Formulation and Social Choice Property for Kemeny Rank Aggregation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yeawon Yoo ◽  
Adolfo R. Escobedo

Rank aggregation is widely used in group decision making and many other applications, where it is of interest to consolidate heterogeneous ordered lists. Oftentimes, these rankings may involve a large number of alternatives, contain ties, and/or be incomplete, all of which complicate the use of robust aggregation methods. In particular, these characteristics have limited the applicability of the aggregation framework based on the Kemeny-Snell distance, which satisfies key social choice properties that have been shown to engender improved decisions. This work introduces a binary programming formulation for the generalized Kemeny rank aggregation problem—whose ranking inputs may be complete and incomplete, with and without ties. Moreover, it leverages the equivalence of two ranking aggregation problems, namely, that of minimizing the Kemeny-Snell distance and of maximizing the Kendall-τ correlation, to compare the newly introduced binary programming formulation to a modified version of an existing integer programming formulation associated with the Kendall-τ distance. The new formulation has fewer variables and constraints, which leads to faster solution times. Moreover, we develop a new social choice property, the nonstrict extended Condorcet criterion, which can be regarded as a natural extension of the well-known Condorcet criterion and the Extended Condorcet criterion. Unlike its parent properties, the new property is adequate for handling complete rankings with ties. The property is leveraged to develop a structural decomposition algorithm, through which certain large instances of the NP-hard Kemeny rank aggregation problem can be solved exactly in a practical amount of time. To test the practical implications of the new formulation and social choice property, we work with instances constructed from a probabilistic distribution and with benchmark instances from PrefLib, a library of preference data.

2006 ◽  
Vol 359 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 455-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liviu P. Dinu ◽  
Florin Manea

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 100-106
Author(s):  
Jack Birner

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to give an outline of the main topics of an introductory course in complexity and social sciences. Design/methodology/approach – This paper consists of a survey of the main issues and some of the classical literature for an audience with no background in philosophy of science, social philosophy, the literature on complex systems and social choice. Findings – In the didactical framework of the article, it would be more accurate to speak of learning objectives rather than findings. The learning objectives are the acquisition of the basic knowledge for understanding the features, the possibilities and the limitations of scientific explanations and predictions and their applications in the long-term perspective of complex social systems. Research limitations/implications – Again, the implications are didactic. The basic knowledge that constitutes the learning objective of the course serves to give students the instruments for recognizing the main opportunities and obstacles in social forecasting. Practical implications – The practical implications of this paper include making students aware of complexity-related problems in their working environment and of the opportunities and constraints involved in solving them. Social implications – Operators who are aware of the main issues involved can contribute to a more balanced approach to social forecasting: avoiding to raise unrealistic expectations and making more efficient use of the available instruments. Originality/value – This paper summarizes an original combination of elements from the philosophy of science, epistemology, social philosophy and social choice.


2007 ◽  
Vol 189 (2) ◽  
pp. 1847-1858 ◽  
Author(s):  
Farzad Didehvar ◽  
Changiz Eslahchi

2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 1185-1200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierluigi Contucci ◽  
Emanuele Panizzi ◽  
Federico Ricci-Tersenghi ◽  
Alina Sîrbu

Author(s):  
Hanrui Zhang ◽  
Yu Cheng ◽  
Vincent Conitzer

In the societal tradeoffs problem, each agent perceives certain quantitative tradeoffs between pairs of activities, and the goal is to aggregate these tradeoffs across agents. This is a problem in social choice; specifically, it is a type of quantitative judgment aggregation problem. A natural rule for this problem was axiomatized by Conitzer et al. [AAAI 2016]; they also provided several algorithms for computing the outcomes of this rule. In this paper, we present a significantly improved algorithm and evaluate it experimentally. Our algorithm is based on a tight connection to minimum-cost flow that we exhibit. We also show that our algorithm cannot be improved without breakthroughs on min-cost flow.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 1982-1989
Author(s):  
Hugo Gilbert ◽  
Tom Portoleau ◽  
Olivier Spanjaard

In this paper, we advocate the use of setwise contests for aggregating a set of input rankings into an output ranking. We propose a generalization of the Kemeny rule where one minimizes the number of k-wise disagreements instead of pairwise disagreements (one counts 1 disagreement each time the top choice in a subset of alternatives of cardinality at most k differs between an input ranking and the output ranking). After an algorithmic study of this k-wise Kemeny aggregation problem, we introduce a k-wise counterpart of the majority graph. It reveals useful to divide the aggregation problem into several sub-problems. We conclude with numerical tests.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew D. Adler

Abstract:Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. ‘Ideal-advisor’ accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem: namely, aggregating the advisors’ moral preferences. Do we have reason to believe that the advisors, albeit idealized, can still diverge in their rankings of a given set of alternatives? If so, what are the moral facts (in particular, the comparative moral goodness of the alternatives) when the advisors do diverge? These questions are investigated here using the tools of Arrovian social choice theory.


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