scholarly journals A Market Impact Game Under Transient Price Impact

Author(s):  
Alexander Schied ◽  
Tao Zhang
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 28
Author(s):  
Witness MAAKE ◽  
Terence VAN ZYL

The research aims to investigate the role of hidden orders on the structure of the average market impact curves in the five BRICS financial markets. The concept of market impact is central to the implementation of cost-effective trading strategies during financial order executions. The literature is replicated using the data of visible orders from the five BRICS financial markets. We repeat the implementation of the literature to investigate the effect of hidden orders. We subsequently study the dynamics of hidden orders. The research applies machine learning to estimate the sizes of hidden orders. We revisit the methodology of the literature to compare the average market impact curves in which true hidden orders are added to visible orders to the average market impact curves in which hidden orders sizes are estimated via machine learning. The study discovers that: (1) hidden orders sizes could be uncovered via machine learning techniques such as Generalized Linear Models (GLM), Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Support Vector Machines (SVM), and Random Forests (RF); and (2) there exist no set of market features that are consistently predictive of the sizes of hidden orders across different stocks. Artificial Neural Networks produce large R2 and small Mean Squared Error on the prediction of hidden orders of individual stocks across the five studied markets. Random Forests produce the most appropriate average price impact curves of visible and estimated hidden orders that are closest to the average market impact curves of visible and true hidden orders. In some markets, hidden orders produce a convex power-law far-right tail in contrast to visible orders which produce a concave power-law far-right tail. Hidden orders may affect the average price impact curves for orders of size less than the average order size; meanwhile, hidden orders may not affect the structure of the average price impact curves in other markets. The research implies ANN and RF as the recommended tools to uncover hidden orders.


2020 ◽  
pp. 2050001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiangge Luo ◽  
Alexander Schied

We consider a market impact game for [Formula: see text] risk-averse agents that are competing in a market model with linear transient price impact and additional transaction costs. For both finite and infinite time horizons, the agents aim to minimize a mean-variance functional of their costs or to maximize the expected exponential utility of their revenues. We give explicit representations for corresponding Nash equilibria and prove uniqueness in the case of mean-variance optimization. A qualitative analysis of these Nash equilibria is conducted by means of numerical analysis.


2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (02) ◽  
pp. 1550008 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Donier ◽  
J. Bonart

We present a thorough empirical analysis of market impact on the Bitcoin/USD exchange market using a complete dataset that allows us to reconstruct more than one million metaorders. We empirically confirm the “square-root law” for market impact, which holds on four decades in spite of the quasi-absence of statistical arbitrage and market marking strategies. We show that the square-root impact holds during the whole trajectory of a metaorder and not only for the final execution price. We also attempt to decompose the order flow into an “informed” and “uninformed” component, the latter leading to an almost complete long-term decay of impact. This study sheds light on the hypotheses and predictions of several market impact models recently proposed in the literature and promotes heterogeneous agent models as promising candidates to explain price impact on the Bitcoin market — and, we believe, on other markets as well.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 237
Author(s):  
Samuel Drapeau ◽  
Peng Luo ◽  
Alexander Schied ◽  
Dewen Xiong

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In this study, we have analyzed a market impact game between <i>n</i> risk-averse agents who compete for liquidity in a market impact model with a permanent price impact and additional slippage. Most market parameters, including volatility and drift, are allowed to vary stochastically. Our first main result characterizes the Nash equilibrium in terms of a fully coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). Our second main result provides conditions under which this system of FBSDEs has a unique solution, resulting in a unique Nash equilibrium. </p>


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