scholarly journals Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Policies: A Strategic Analysis of Dual Channel Supply Chain Design

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 196-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongma Moon ◽  
Tao Yao ◽  
Terry L. Friesz
Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zonghuo Li ◽  
Wensheng Yang ◽  
Yinyuan Si

PurposeThis paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer offers coupons in the online channel and the retailer in the offline channel. The optimal pricing and coupon promotion policies are explored, and the brand image under different promotion scenarios is studied.Design/methodology/approachThree differential game models, namely no coupon is offered, coupons offered by the manufacturer and coupons offered by the retailer, are constructed.FindingsThe results show that the manufacturer and retailer intend to conduct coupon promotions under a large coupon redemption rate. Coupon promotion derives a higher price and profit for the issuers, and the manufacturer can free-ride on the retailer's coupon promotion. The retailer's profit in the retailer-promotion scenario may be lower than that in the manufacturer-promotion scenario in some special conditions. Besides, price, coupon face value, brand image and profit increase over time. After multiple cycles game, the operational strategy evolves to an optimal equilibrium status.Originality/valueThis paper provides guidance and advice for dual-channel supply enterprises to implement joint pricing and coupon promotion strategies under multiple sales seasons.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Xianjin Du ◽  
Weijie Zhao

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells the product via an offline retailer or online store. The manufacturer sets the wholesale and online price, and the retailer decides the retail price with the retailer’s fairness preference and consumer’s online channel preference. Through investigating the combined impacts of fairness preference and channel preference on the enterprises’ operational strategies, this paper obtains some meaningful results. If a manufacturer thinks over the fairness preference, he decreases the wholesale price to mitigate a loss of retailer and benefit the supply chain design. The manufacturer intends to set up the online channel with a lower acceptance as the fairness preference grows. However, the gains from enhanced online channel acceptance cannot compensate for the manufacturer’s loss by the fairness effect that benefits the retailer. Moreover, the manufacturer cannot neglect the retailer’s fairness preference generating a “lose-lose” case for both members.


2020 ◽  
Vol 147 ◽  
pp. 106579 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinsen Guo ◽  
Bin Cao ◽  
Wei Xie ◽  
Yuanguang Zhong ◽  
Yong-Wu Zhou

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