A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply chain design with price and delivery lead time considerations

Facing competition from manufacturers' online direct channels, how retailers make sales channel decisions to increase consumer stickiness has become the core concern of the industry and academia. Empirical research showed that delivery lead time is a key factor that affects consumers' preference for online channels. To analyze the impact of consumer delivery time preference on channel selection and pricing strategy of retailers, consumer delivery lead time preference function was improved from a linear function to an exponential function and consumer demand under the mixed dual-channel supply chain of manufacturer and retailer was derived. Then, the Stackelberg game models under different channel strategies of retailer were established and solved. Results show that consumer preference for delivery lead time has four implications on the channel decision of retailers under manufacturer encroachment in the dual-channel supply chain. First, the dual retail channels strategy is the optimal choice for retailers, and the profit margins that a retailer obtains from dual retail channels supply chain and single online retail channel supply chain will increase as consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient increases. Second, the optimal pricing of online retail channel and offline retail channel is positively related to consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient. By contrast, the optimal pricing of online direct channel is negatively related to consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient. Third, the optimal pricing of online retail channel is higher than that of offline retail and online direct channels. Fourth, a retailer and a manufacturer can adopt a compensation-based whole price contract to address the conflict brought about by the optimal channel choice of the retailer. This study introduces consumer delivery lead time preference into retailer channel decision making and provides a theoretical reference for retailer's mixed channel construction in practice.

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Model Three-Level Dual-Channel Supply Chain pada Sistem Sentralisasi dengan Memertimbangkan Waktu Tunggu Pengiriman

d'CARTESIAN ◽

10.35799/dc.9.1.2020.27849 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 9 (1) ◽

pp. 72

Author(s):

Shinta Nur Pratiwi Ramadhani ◽

Ririn Setiyowati ◽

Titin Sri Martini

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Lead Time ◽

Nonlinear Function ◽

Optimal Solution ◽

Global Market ◽

Centralize System ◽

Dual Channel ◽

Total Profit ◽

Online Channel ◽

Dual Channel Supply Chain

AbstrakEra pasar global telah mengubah kebiasaan konsumen dalam membeli produk, sehingga konsumen dapat membeli produk melalui media online. Oleh karena itu, produsen mengembangkan media penjualannya melalui media online dan offline. Pada penelitian ini dikembangkan model three-level dual-channel supply chain dengan memertimbangkan waktu tunggu pengiriman pada penjualan melalui media online yang dilakukan oleh produsen serta mengembangkan media penjualan distributor sehingga distributor dapat menjual produk secara langsung ke konsumen. Konstruksi model bertujuan untuk mengoptimalkan keuntungan gabungan produsen, distributor, dan pengecer dengan sistem sentralisasi. Fungsi keuntungan gabungan merupakan fungsi nonlinear tanpa kendala dengan tiga variabel keputusan yaitu harga jual produsen pada media online, harga jual distributor langsung ke konsumen, dan harga jual pengecer ke konsumen. Selanjutnya, ditentukan solusi optimal model berdasarkan syarat perlu dan syarat cukup untuk fungsi multivariabel tanpa kendala. Berdasarkan simulasi numerik dan analisis sensitivitas dapat dilihat pengaruh faktor waktu tunggu pengiriman terhadap fungsi keuntungan gabungan yang optimal. Ditunjukkan bahwa lamanya waktu tunggu pengiriman sangat berpengaruh pada besarnya keuntungan optimal gabungan produsen, distributor, dan pengecer.Kata Kunci: Sentralisasi, Three-Level, Waktu TungguAbstractThe global market era changes the consumer behavior to shop the product, so the consumer can buy through online channel. Therefore, the producer develop the selling channel to sell their products through online channel and offline channel. In this research, we develop the three-level dual-channel supply chain by notice delivery lead time in the online channel used by the producer and develop selling channel from distributors so distributors can sell their product to consumer with direct selling. We construct the model with profit maximization motive of the system that consists producer, distributors, and retailer in the centralize system. The total profit function is nonlinear function without constrains with three decision variables. Furthermore, we determine the optimal solution of the model based on necessary and sufficient condition. Based on numerical simulations and sensitivity analysis we analyze the effect of delivery lead time strongly influences the optimal total profit system.Keywords: Centralize, Lead Time, Three-Level

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Managing a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Fairness and Channel Preference

Mathematical Problems in Engineering ◽

10.1155/2021/6614692 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 2021 ◽

pp. 1-10

Author(s):

Xianjin Du ◽

Weijie Zhao

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Wholesale Price ◽

Retail Price ◽

Supply Chain Design ◽

Operational Strategies ◽

Dual Channel ◽

Channel Preference ◽

Online Channel ◽

Set Up ◽

Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells the product via an offline retailer or online store. The manufacturer sets the wholesale and online price, and the retailer decides the retail price with the retailer’s fairness preference and consumer’s online channel preference. Through investigating the combined impacts of fairness preference and channel preference on the enterprises’ operational strategies, this paper obtains some meaningful results. If a manufacturer thinks over the fairness preference, he decreases the wholesale price to mitigate a loss of retailer and benefit the supply chain design. The manufacturer intends to set up the online channel with a lower acceptance as the fairness preference grows. However, the gains from enhanced online channel acceptance cannot compensate for the manufacturer’s loss by the fairness effect that benefits the retailer. Moreover, the manufacturer cannot neglect the retailer’s fairness preference generating a “lose-lose” case for both members.

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