On James Buchanan's Public Choice Enterprise

2013 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-75
Author(s):  
Francesco Forte
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
The Political ◽  
James Buchanan ◽  
Classical Sense ◽  
Gordon Tullock ◽  
Natural Progression ◽  
Directed Research ◽  
The University

Abstract James Buchanan came to Italy in 1955 as Fulbright visiting professor until July 1956 and made his research at the library of the Bank of Italy. He visited the University of Pavia, a quite famous center for public finance studies, still directed by Benvenuto Griziotti. On that occasion I became acquainted with professor Buchanan and our longlasting friendship started soon. On his itinerary from the political economy perspective to public choice that James Buchanan did undertake, after the Italian 1955-56 visit, he has written: «After Italy I was prepared, intellectually, psychologically and emotionally to join in an entrepreneurial venture with my Virginia colleague Warren Nutter, a venture aimed at bringing renewed emphasis to ‘political economy’ in a classical sense. And from these beginnings, the more directed research spin-off into the ‘economics of politics’ initiated jointly with my colleague Gordon Tullock, now seems a natural progression»

On the Political Economy of Economic Policy

1989 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-123
Author(s):  
Gebhard Kirchgässner
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Political ◽  
Gordon Tullock

Abstract Il limite delle tradizionali teorie macroeconomiche, sia neo-keynesiane che neo-classiche, è costituito dalle loro ipotesi idealistiche sul comportamento del governo, che non tengono conto delle istituzioni politiche.La teoria macroeconomica può, invece, essere utilizzata nel modo migliore quando si voglia indagare sui risultati che si possono attendere dalle diverse istituzioni politiche, anche se è comunque necessario tener conto del fatto che le stesse aspettative degli « operatori economici » (categoria che include non soltanto i consumatori ed i produttori, ma anche gli elettori, i burocrati ed i politici) sono influenzate dalle politiche economiche perseguite.Ciò mette in evidenza l’importanza della Public Choice, la cui analisi delle interazioni politico-economiche è tuttavia ancora inadeguata per una utilizzazione nell’ambito della teoria macroeconomica, soprattutto per quanto riguarda il ruolo dei gruppi d’interesse, che soltanto di recente, attraverso la teoria del « rent-seeking » di Gordon Tullock, vengono considerati nei modelli che tengono conto dei meccanismi politici.

scholarly journals The political economy of capital gains taxation in South Africa - Part I: The public finance of capital gains taxation

2001 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Zane A. Spindler
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
South Africa ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Capital Gains ◽  
The Political ◽  
Capital Gains Tax ◽  
Tax System ◽  
The Public

Public Finance and Public Choice principles are used to analyze the ideological and practical basis for the proposed introduction of a Capital Gains Tax into the income tax system of South Africa. The paper concludes that this is a flawed tax whose time has passed - especially for countries like South Africa.

IR, the Critic, and the World: From Reifying the Discipline to Decolonising the University

2020 ◽  
pp. 030582982093706
Author(s):  
Isaac Kamola
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Critical Theory ◽  
The Political ◽  
Scholarly Work ◽  
Disciplinary Knowledge ◽  
The World ◽  
The University

Why does IR scholarship seem so resistant to travel into other disciplinary spaces? To answer this question, I look at the tendency for scholars within our discipline to talk to the discipline, about the discipline, and for the discipline. We obsess over ‘IR’ and, in doing so, reify IR as a thing. I turn towards Edward Said’s arguments about the worldliness of texts, and how reification shapes how ideas travel. I then provide two illustrations of how scholars have reified IR as a thing: Robert Cox’s approach to critical theory and Amitav Acharya’s call for a ‘Global IR’. In both cases, contrary to expectation, the authors reify IR as a thing, portraying the discipline as distinct from the world. IR is treated as something with agency, ignoring how disciplinary knowledge is produced within worldly institutions. I conclude by looking at three strategies for studying worldly relations in ways that refuse to reify the discipline: showing disloyalty to the discipline, engaging the political economy of higher education, and seeking to decolonise the university. Rather than reifying IR, these strategies help us to engage our scholarly work in a way that prioritises worldly critical engagements within our disciplinary community, and the world.

The Political Economy of Trust

2019 ◽  
pp. 627-648
Author(s):  
Christian Bjørnskov
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Social Trust ◽  
The Political ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Reverse Causality ◽  
Quality Of Institutions

This chapter provides a selective survey of the literature on social trust in public choice and political economy. It outlines the empirical evidence and discusses theoretical channels through which social trust can affect the quality of institutions and policies, and the conditions under which such mechanisms are likely to work. It also addresses the discussion of reverse causality, that is, whether good institutions or policies actively create trust. It then discusses whether trust can be created or destroyed by activist government policy or accidental institutional changes. Its main focus is on the set of theories and evidence of the association between social trust and institutions of governance.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy

2019 ◽  
pp. 519-541
Author(s):  
Luna Bellani ◽  
Heinrich Ursprung
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Relationships ◽  
The Public ◽  
Generic Models ◽  
Redistribution Policy ◽  
Choice Analysis ◽  
Beliefs And Attitudes

The authors review the literature on the public-choice analysis of redistribution policies. They restrict the discussion to redistribution in democracies and focus on policies that are pursued with the sole objective of redistributing initial endowments. Since generic models of redistribution in democracies lack equilibria, one needs to introduce structure-inducing rules to arrive at a models whose behavior realistically portrays observed redistribution patterns. These rules may relate to the economic relationships, political institutions, or to firmly established preferences, beliefs, and attitudes of voters. The chapter surveys the respective lines of argument in turn and then present the related empirical evidence.

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