Towards a Politics of Restraint.

Public choice theory, an analysis of politics based on economic principles, is often considered to be one of the major innovations in economics and political sciences in the second half of the twentieth century. In its formulation by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, public choice is commonly understood as one of the major theoretical building blocks in the development of neoliberal thought. It was also remarkably popular with economists and political scientists within the Dutch Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid) in the mid-1970s. This latter fact is surprising since public choice was seemingly at odds with the Keynesian ideas around which the Labour Party had built its economic policy. This article investigates why and how public choice became popular in the Labour Party. In understanding the popularity of this theory, I will argue, it is important to see the popularity of neoliberal ideas not only in reaction to the economic tribulation of the period but also as a discussion on social planning and an expression of discontent with the democratization movement. Since the rise of neoliberalism in Dutch policymaking is often understood as coming from liberal and conservative channels, studying public choice within the Labour party will shed new light on the development of neoliberalism in the Netherlands.

James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and the “Radically Irresponsible” One Person, One Vote Decisions

James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock took a keen interest in the United States Supreme Court’s reapportionment decisions of the 1960s, which established a “one person, one vote” standard for state legislative apportionment. This paper traces the long arc of Buchanan and Tullock’s opposition to the “one person, one vote” standard. The Calculus of Consent offers a highly qualified efficiency argument against “one person, one vote,” but over time Buchanan and Tullock grew even more vocally critical of the decisions. Buchanan ultimately advocated a constitutional amendment overturning “one person, one vote” in a private set of recommendations to Congressional Republicans. This paper additionally assesses Tullock’s 1987 complaint that scholars and judges neglected The Calculus of Consent’s analysis of reapportionment. A review of the reapportionment literature between 1962 and 1987 demonstrates that while the book was frequently cited, the literature generally ignored its analysis of the efficiency of apportionment standards.

Public Choice

This chapter reviews the early contributions to public choice beginning with what might be called its antecedents. These include the works of the Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794), Jean-Charles de Borda (1733–1799), Charles L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) (1823–1898), Harold Hotelling (1895–1973), Knut Wicksell (1851–1926), and Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883–1950). The chapter dates the modern literature from 1948, starting with the work of Duncan Black (1908–1991). It defines the early modern literature as spanning the twenty-five years after Black’s first contributions (1948–1973). The chapter proceeds by chronicling the contributions of the leading figures in public choice over that period in addition to Black—James M. Buchanan (1919–2013), Kenneth J. Arrow (1921–2017), Kenneth O. May (1915–1977), Anthony Downs (1930–), Gordon Tullock (1922–2014), William Vickrey (1914–1996), William H. Riker (1920–1993), Mancur Olson (1932–1998), James S. Coleman (1926–1995), Amartya K. Sen (1933–), and William A. Niskanen (1933–2011). It offers some final thoughts on the early literature in the closing section.