Who Shall Be Judge?: The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the Global Enforcement of Human Rights

2003 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamie Mayerfeld
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court

Human Rights versus National Interests: Shifting US Public Attitudes on the International Criminal Court

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 1065-1078 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelebogile Zvobgo
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Control Group ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
The Us

Abstract The United States—an architect of international criminal tribunals in the twentieth century—has since moderated its involvement in international justice. Striking to many observers is the United States’ failure to join the International Criminal Court—the institutional successor to the tribunals the nation helped install in Germany, Japan, the Balkans, and Rwanda. Interestingly, the US public’s support of the ICC increases yearly despite the government’s ambivalence about, and even hostility toward, the Court. Drawing on the US foreign policy public opinion literature, I theorize that human rights frames increase support for joining the ICC among Americans, whereas national interest frames decrease support. I administer an online survey experiment to evaluate these expectations and find consistent support. I additionally test hypotheses from the framing literature in American politics regarding the effect of exposure to two competing frames. I find that participants exposed to competing frames hold more moderate positions than participants exposed to a single frame but differ appreciably from the control group. Crucially, I find that participants’ beliefs about international organizations’ effectiveness and impartiality are equally, if not more, salient than the treatments. Thus, the ICC may be able to mobilize support and pressure policy change by demonstrating effectiveness and impartiality.

scholarly journals AMERICA’S OBJECTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

1969 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric D. Smaw
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Protective Measures ◽  
History Of ◽  
The U.S

In what follows, I present a combination of philosophical and political perspectives on human rights and the establishment of an international criminal court. I present the United States’ pragmatic objections to establishing an international criminal court. Contrary to the United States’ pragmatic objections, I argue in favor of an international criminal court. Ultimately, I attempt to illustrate that the international criminal court will have protective measures designed to prevent political abuses of justice. When working properly, these protective measures will satisfy the U.S.’s pragmatic concerns. Thus, I conclude, the U.S. ought not abandon its longer history of supporting the establishment of an international criminal court.

The United States, the International Criminal Court, and Afghanistan: The Rupturing of Mutual Accommodation

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1068-1107
Author(s):  
Kevin S. Robb ◽  
Shan Patel
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Strategic Approach ◽  
Chief Prosecutor ◽  
The U.S

Abstract In September 2018, then U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered a speech that ushered in a new, more aggressive era of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court (icc). Washington’s disapprobation over the icc’s interest in the alleged crimes of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan has been seen as the cause for this change. While this is certainly partly true, little attention has been paid to Fatou Bensouda’s prosecutorial behaviour as an explanatory factor. Using the framework from David Bosco’s Rough Justice, this article demonstrates that a distinct shift in prosecutorial behaviour occurred when Fatou Bensouda took over as Chief Prosecutor. In contrast to Luis Moreno Ocampo’s strategic approach, avoidant of U.S. interests, Bensouda’s apolitical approach directly challenged the U.S. This shift in prosecutorial behaviour ruptured the ‘mutual accommodation’ that previously characterised the icc-U.S. relationship and, in turn, produced the shift in U.S. policy that now marginalises the Court.

The United States and the International Criminal Court: Avoiding Jurisdiction Through Bilateral Agreements in Reliance on Article 98

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Bogdan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Legislative History ◽  
Bilateral Agreements ◽  
General Obligation ◽  
History Of ◽  
Treaty Interpretation

AbstractState-parties to the International Criminal Court Statute have a general obligation to cooperate with the Court. The duty to cooperate represents the functional cornerstone of the Court's existence. A narrow exception to this duty is contained in Article 98 of the Statute, which provides for limited circumstances in which the Court must refrain from seeking a surrender of an individual to the Court. Following rules of treaty interpretation, as well as an examination of the legislative history of the ICC Statute, the article explores the scope of Article 98, the provision the United States relied on in concluding a series of bilateral agreements that are primarily aimed at preventing the surrender of any U.S. nationals to the ICC. The article considers the issue of what impact, if any, the agreements have in the context of extradition, and the U.S.' legal ability to fulfill the commitments made in the "Article 98" agreements.

Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUDITH KELLEY
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
International Commitments ◽  
The Creation

What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty, but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation of the International Criminal Court, the United States tried to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others not? Given United States power and threats of military sanctions, some states did sign. However, such factors tell only part of the story. When refusing to sign, many states emphasized the moral value of the court. Further, states with a high domestic rule of law emphasized the importance of keeping their commitment. This article therefore advances two classic arguments that typically are difficult to substantiate; namely, state preferences are indeed partly normative, and international commitments do not just screen states; they also constrain.

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