scholarly journals Fodor and demonstratives in LOT

Author(s):  
Una Stojnić ◽  
Ernest Lepore

In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution Fodor proposed to us, but offer a Fodor-friendly account of the demonstratives in the language of thought in its stead, building on our account of demonstrative pronouns in English.

Author(s):  
Roberto G. de Almeida

It is patent that the so-called cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 1960s was the result of ideas emerging at the confluence of psychology, linguistics, philosophy, computer science, and neuroscience—what became known as cognitive science. In the last 60 years or so, Jerry Fodor has been one of the most important exponents of this revolution. He has advanced key ideas on the foundations of cognitive science, in particular on the nature of mental representation and on mental processes seen as computations over symbols. Many of his contributions have been the subject of deep divides and have generated classical controversies. The chapter provides a rough guide to Fodor’s contributions to psycholinguistics, to the modularity of mind, to atomism as a theory of conceptual representation, to the language of thought hypothesis, and to cognitive architecture more broadly—topics that figure prominently in the present book.


What are the landmarks of the cognitive revolution? What are the core topics of modern cognitive science? Where is cognitive science heading? These and other questions are addressed in this volume by leading cognitive scientists as they examine the work of one of cognitive science’s most influential and polemical figures: Jerry Fodor. Newly commissioned chapters by Noam Chomsky, Tom Bever, Merrill Garrett, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Zenon Pylyshyn, Janet Fodor, Randy C. Gallistel, Ernie Lepore, Mary C. Potter, Lila R. Gleitman, and others, put in perspective Fodor’s contribution to cognitive science by focusing on three main themes: the nature of concepts, the modularity of language and vision, and the language of thought. This is a one-of-a-kind series of essays on cognitive science and on Fodor. In this volume, Chomsky contrasts his view of modularity with that of Fodor’s; Bever discusses the nature of consciousness, particularly regarding language perception; Garrett reassesses his view of modularity in language production; Pylyshyn presents his view of the connection between visual perception and conceptual attainment; Gallistel proposes what the biological bases of the computational theory of mind might be; and Piattelli-Palmarini discusses Fodor’s views on conceptual nativism. These and many other key figures of cognitive science are brought together, for the first time, to discuss their work in relation to that of Fodor’s, who is responsible for advancing many of cognitive science’s most important hypotheses. This volume—for students and advanced researchers of cognitive science—is bound to become one of the classics in the field.


1991 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frances Egan

In the appendix to Psychosemantics, entitled ‘Why There Still has to be a Language of Thought,’ Jerry Fodor offers several arguments for the language of thought thesis. The LOT, as articulated by Fodor, is a thesis about propositional attitudes. It comprises the following two claims: (1) propositional attitudes are relations to meaning-bearing tokens — for example, to believe that P is to bear a certain relation to a token of a symbol which means that P; and (2) the representational tokens in question are quasi-linguistic — in particular, they have the constituent structure appropriate to a language.


Author(s):  
Juliano Santos Do Carmo

A tese da universalidade da linguagem defendida por aprioristas, como Jerry Fodor (The Language of Thought), e inatistas, como Noam Chomsky (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax), tem sido contestada por diversos filósofos, linguistas e teóricos da Psicologia Cognitiva ao longo das últimas décadas. Aprioristas e inatistas em geral concordam que é necessário, de um ponto de vista explicativo, pressupor a existência de uma linguagem do pensamento ou de categorias inatas universais para explicar o processo de aquisição de uma linguagem natural. Neste trabalho, vou procurar mostrar que a noção de “treinamento ostensivo”, enquanto um elemento pré-linguístico para a aquisição de habilidades semânticas e cognitivas, pode oferecer uma resposta satisfatória ao problema da aquisição da linguagem natural, sem a necessidade de pressupor uma linguagem privada do pensamento ou categorias biológicas inatas.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
vernon thornton

A description of of the mind and its relationship to the brain, set in an evolutionary context. Introduction of a correct version of 'language-of-thought' called 'thinkish'.


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