Dynamical systems implementation of intrinsic sentence meaning

This paper proposes a model for implementation of intrinsic natural language sentence meaning in a physical language understanding system, where 'intrinsic' is understood as 'independent of meaning ascription by system-external observers'. The proposal is that intrinsic meaning can be implemented as a point attractor in the state space of a nonlinear dynamical system with feedback which is generated by temporally sequenced inputs. It is motivated by John Searle's well known (1980) critique of the then-standard and currently still influential Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), the essence of which was that CTM representations lack intrinsic meaning because that meaning is dependent on ascription by an observer. The proposed dynamical model comprises a collection of interacting artificial neural networks, and constitutes a radical simplification of the principle of compositional phrase structure which is at the heart of the current standard view of sentence semantics because it is computationally interpretable as a finite state machine.

Revisiting the Chinese Room: Looking for Agency in a World Packed with Archaeological Things

Posthumanist approaches in archaeology have given plenty of focus to things in the last decade. This focus on things is a reaction to the over-anthropocentric view of social life advanced by postprocessual archaeologists. Whereas agency of more than 10 years ago was about how individuals expressed purpose and identity, agency today is about how both humans and non-human objects affect one another in a symmetrical manner. It seems without doubt that Posthumanism has contributed greatly to new understandings of social reality, but in the process it has also forced archaeologists to sacrifice many topics of interest, namely those involving consciousness and purpose. But is this sacrifice really necessary? This is one of the central problems of Posthumanism: it disallows a compromise of ideas from more conventional social theory (e.g. norms, purpose, practice) with those of posthumanist theory. This paper revisits John Searle's ‘Chinese Room’ and reiterates what this thought-experiment meant to understanding consciousness and purpose. The thought-experiment highlighted the differences between humans and machines and demonstrated that, even if a machine could replicate human purpose, it would still not be considered human because, unlike mechanical processes, human purpose is based on ethics. The thought-experiment was the first step in debunking the computational theory of mind. In light of this thought-experiment, the paper argues that, in a world where things interact with humans, we should think of agency in terms of ethics and keep the focus on humans.

That Seventies Cult

This chapter assesses the unlikely mutuality of two very different seventies formations: the mind-control cult and the libertarian movement that arose out of a longer and more conflicted tradition of anarchism. It demonstrates that the cult's principles converge with those of libertarianism, particularly with respect to the prestige both cultists and libertarians assigned to expanded consciousness. L. Ron Hubbard bases Scientology on a premise not unlike libertarian paternalism: “What is true is what is true for you. No one has any right to force data on you and command you to believe.” Hubbard embraces the computational theory of mind with a fundamentalist zeal. Just as Hubbard shows us that cult libertarianism pairs well with the decade's resurgent antifoundationalism, so Scientology's techno-fetishism and celebrity centers remind us that seventies cults, breaking with an earlier generation's despair about mass media's atomizing effects, go all in on the euphoria of togetherness.

Computation and the Function of Consciousness

This chapter discusses the connection between computation and consciousness. Three theses are sometimes conflated. Functionalism is the view that the mind is the functional organization of the brain. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is the view that the whole mind—not only cognition but consciousness as well—has a computational explanation. When combined with the empirical discovery that the brain is the organ of the mind, CTM entails that the functional organization of the brain is computational. Computational functionalism is the conjunction of the two: the mind is the computational organization of the brain. Contrary to a common assumption, functionalism entails neither CTM nor computational functionalism. This finding makes room for an underexplored possibility: that consciousness be (at least partly) due to the functional organization of the brain without being computational in nature. This is a noncomputational version of functionalism about consciousness.

It’s in My Bones

When I point to an object, you and I can agree on what it is (a red, round cup). How does our brain (matter) represent such notions? And how do we (distinct material bodies) apparently converge so we can talk about the same things? Cognitive scientists and philosophers have long assumed that people share abstract concepts (e.g., a cup); to explain how such abstract concepts can give rise to thinking, they further proposed the computational theory of mind. But theories of “embodied cognition” assert that cognition is all “in people’s bones.” What we know as a cup is not an abstract notion but rather the bodily experiences of our sensory and motor interactions with a cup—its shiny color, how it feels in our hands, the smoothness of its surface, its weight, and shape. I suggest that “Embodiment” is alluring because it promises to resolve the mysteries of Dualism (how can material bodies encode the immaterial notion of a cup?) and the origins of ideas (how do we all converge on an understanding that allows us to talk about the same things?). The solution is strikingly simple—just remove the “mind” from the equation. If there is no (immaterial) knowledge, then we no longer need to worry about how knowledge arises from the body and how knowledge can be learned. As discussed in the previous chapter, people erroneously believe that “if it’s in my body” then “it’s inborn.” Dualism and essentialism thus explain some of the lure of embodied cognition.

tomsup: An implementation of computational Theory of Mind in Python

Computational implementations of Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to others, has been used to investigate a variety of issues. This includes the effect of framing effects on, or inter-species differences in, ability to do ToM (Devaine et al., 2014a, 2017), ToM in autists (d’Arc et al., 2018), or providing an explanation for the apparent limits on human ability to do ToM recursively (Devaine et al., 2014b). It has been implemented in the VBA package for Matlab (Daunizeau et al., 2014), but not in any free and open-source software. Therefore this thesis presents the Theory of Mind simulation using Python (tomsup) package.The tomsup package provides accessible tools for running agent-based models in a game theory context, and allows the implementation of a computational model of ToM, either in agent-based models or in interaction with a human player. The implementation of the ToM model was originally proposed by Yoshida et al. (2008), and was developed by drawing on the Free Energy Principle (Friston, 2010) to its current form as it is in Devaine et al. (2017), where it is generalized to any 2-player game which can be operationalized as a 2-by-2 payoff matrix. Importantly, the ToM implementation introduces a sophistication level k, which determines how many recursive simulations of its opponent it can perform, hereby assuming bounded rationality (Kahneman, 2003). An agent using the ToM model, denoted as k-ToM, uses a variational Bayes Laplace approximation (Daunizeau, 2017b) on a turn-by-turn basis to infer its opponent’s model parameters and sophistication level, based on which it predicts the opponent’s choice and acts accordingly.An agent-based model simulation using the competitive matching pennies game was done to perform a prelim- inary investigation of the behaviour of the k-ToM model. Most importantly, it was found that k-ToM’s prior beliefs about its opponent have a notable effect on its performance, even over many trials, warranting further research into how its priors should be formed. Various ways are suggested in which the tomsup package and the k-ToM model could be applied and developed further, as well as a discussion on how to make it broadly available, so as to scaffold future research using computational ToM models.

Causal determinism, computational theory of mind, and a totally global fatalism for the objective world from the third-person perspective of a dedicated personality state

An individual has no control even over her choices. Her choices are controlled by the neural substrate. The neural substrate is controlled by the physical laws. So, her choices are controlled by the physical laws. So, she is powerless to do anything other than what she actually does. This is the view of fatalism. Specifically, this is the view of a totally global fatalism, where people have no control even over their choices, from the third-person perspective. And I just argued for fatalism by appeal to causal determinism. The non-physical existence of mind or the non-physical existence of consciousness has no impact on the physical world, the choices, or the neural substrate of the non-physical existence of mind/consciousness.