Sovereign Rights of the State and the Scope of their Implementation in the Context of Development of the International Human Rights Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 164
Author(s):  
Iryna PROTSENKO ◽  
Кostiantyn SAVCHUK

In the contemporary science of international law, the state sovereignty issue lacks adequate treatment. In particular, the list and essence of sovereign rights and duties of the state are not defined, although these are referred to in some international legal instruments and resolutions of international courts and arbitrations. In addition, particular circumstances are being under development, which require if not precise outlining of the catalogue of fundamental rights of states, then at least determining the essence of some of these rights and the scope of their implementation. It goes about developing the practice to limit specific sovereign rights of the state to ensure the implementation of human rights (notably, the ones not directly related to the respective rights of the state). In this very way, the state is limited in its right to determine its own immigration policy. The fact is that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has ruled in some of its judgments that by implementing this right, the state violates the right to respect for private and family life provided for by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR). This resulted in ECtHR`s practice to be somewhat considered in the draft articles on the expulsion of aliens elaborated by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 2014. The examples from ECtHR`s practice analyzed in this paper provide the basis for the conclusion that the development of the International Human Rights Law is gradually narrowing the scope of the internal sovereign rights of the state.

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3.30) ◽  
pp. 182
Author(s):  
Syafiq Sulaiman ◽  
Salawati Mat Basir ◽  
Mohd Zamre Mohd Zahir

The protection of the right to life and the duty to rescue persons in distress at sea are the fundamental obligations under two specialized international law regimes which are the international human rights law and the law of the sea. These rules when read together form a strong protection of the human rights of the asylum-seekers stranded at sea. However, often states failed to honour this obligation for various reasons ranging from national security to economic reasons. This article will analyse Malaysia’s responsibilities as regards the right to life and the duty to rescue of these asylum-seekers. It will also identify the existing international and domestic legal framework relevant to the application of these obligations upon Malaysia and whether it has acted in breach of such obligations. The article then proceeded with suggestions for further improvement that Malaysia can adopt in order to better perform its obligations. This study is a pure doctrinal legal research which is qualitative in nature. The data used in this research is collected from library-based resources. These data were then analyzed by using methods of content analysis as well as critical analysis. The article found that Malaysia has a duty to protect the right to life under international human rights law. Additionally, Malaysia is also bound under the law of the sea to perform its duty to rescue. In view of Malaysia’s failure to perform these duties in two occasions in the past consequently had resulted in a violation of international law. Therefore, it is suggested that Malaysia should initiate a revision of its national laws and policies regarding treatment of asylum-seekers stranded at sea to be in line with Malaysia’s duty under international law. Besides, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency is call upon to comply with the international standards of treatment of persons in distress at sea which includes the asylum-seekers.  


Author(s):  
Paul David Mora

SummaryIn its recent decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that Italy had failed to respect immunities enjoyed by Germany under international law when the Italian courts allowed civil actions to be brought against Germany for alleged violations of international human rights law (IHRL) and the law of armed conflict (LOAC) committed during the Second World War. This article evaluates the three arguments raised by Italy to justify its denial of immunity: first, that peremptory norms of international law prevail over international rules on jurisdictional immunities; second, that customary international law recognizes an exception to immunity for serious violations of IHRL or the LOAC; and third, that customary international law recognizes an exception to immunity for torts committed by foreign armed forces on the territory of the forum state in the course of an armed conflict. The author concludes that the ICJ was correct to find that none of these arguments deprived Germany of its right under international law to immunity from the civil jurisdiction of the Italian courts.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Munafrizal Manan

This paper discusses the right of self-determinationfrom  international  law  and international human rights law perspective. It traces the emergence and development of self-determination from political principle to human right. It also explores the controversy of the right of self-determination. There have been different and even contradictory interpretations of the right of self-determination. Besides, there is no consensus on the mechanism to apply the right of self-determination. Both international law and international human rights law are vague about this.


Author(s):  
Melanie Studer ◽  
Kurt Pärli

In Switzerland, the participation in certain work programmes is an eligibility criterion to social assistance benefits and the constitutionally granted right to the financial means required for a decent standard of living. This chapter examines whether the implementation of these programmes is in accordance with fundamental rights and more precisely, whether they respect the normative framework elaborated in Chapter 4. As will be shown, the right to financial assistance when in need has close links to human dignity. Therefore, the evaluation of the mentioned work programmes against the human rights background leads to some critical conclusions on their compatibility with international human rights law in general and human dignity in particular. Especially, the authors argue that the Swiss Federal Supreme Court’s case law lacks a comprehensive approach for the evaluation of human rights infringements in this context.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 924-939
Author(s):  
Pierre Thielbörger

AbstractWhile the “essence” of EU fundamental rights has received much attention following the CJEU’s Schrems decision, the concept of “essence” remains much less examined in international human rights law. Nonetheless, a concept of “essence” for human rights can also be found in international law. This Article discusses different aspects of the “essence” concept in international human rights law, namely non-derogability, non-restrictability, and minimum core, in three steps. First, the Article looks at civil political rights and socioeconomic rights separately and identifies two different approaches to the concept of essence for each of the two categories: While for civil and political rights the concept of essence is mainly linked to the notions of non-derogability and non-restrictability, for socioeconomic rights, the concept refers mainly to the states’ obligation to guarantee an essential level of protection independent of their resource limitations. Second, the Article continues by reading the two approaches together and identifies certain elements of an overarching “essence” concept. Finally, the Article discusses the relationship between the CJEU’s “essence” jurisprudence and the related concepts in international law and concludes with two theses: First, international law deserves more attention when reflecting on the EU’s concept of essence. It equally employs concepts of “essence” and also informs the development and interpretation of EU law. Second, when engaging with the question of whether the EU law should draw lessons from its international counterpart on the notion of “essence,” one must contemplate drawbacks for EU law that the concept has presented for international law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 109-130
Author(s):  
Michelle Jurkovich

This chapter considers the puzzling role of international law around the right to food and examines why the existing law has been unable to generate norms within the advocacy community. It explores the reasons why international anti-hunger organizations rarely legitimate the right to food in legal terms and how this case can challenge the understanding of the relationships between norms, human rights, and law. It also provides a conceptual discussion of the distinction between formal law and norms, underscoring the importance of not conflating the two concepts. The chapter argues that many international anti-hunger organizations still do not conceptualize food as a human right, making international human rights law less relevant. It looks at the hunger case that suggests there is nothing automatic about law generating norms among activists or society at large.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 306-332
Author(s):  
Annick Pijnenburg

Abstract Containment policies whereby destination States provide funding, equipment and training to transit States that intercept refugees on their behalf suggest that destination States try to circumvent the prohibition of refoulement and raise the question to what extent destination States can avoid responsibility for violations of the rights of migrants and refugees by cooperating with transit States. Answering this question requires broadening the analysis beyond the principle of non-refoulement, including not only international human rights law, especially the right to leave and the concept of jurisdiction, but also the law of State responsibility, notably the prohibition of complicity. This article argues that, although it remains debatable whether the principle of non-refoulement applies when transit States intercept migrants and refugees on behalf of sponsoring destination States, the wider network of international law rules constrains the latter’s ability to avoid responsibility when implementing cooperative migration control policies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-47
Author(s):  
Jochelle Greaves Siew

This paper seeks to examine whether the current framework of international human rights law formally grants the right to a healthy environment to future generations. There has been much debate regarding the effectiveness of international human rights law in guaranteeing environmental sustainability in particular without the consideration of future generations. The right to a healthy environment was specifically chosen both as a means of narrowing the scope of this research and given that future generations are a fundamental concept of international law relating to environmental sustainability. In Section II, all relevant concepts, including ‘future generations’, ‘intergenerational justice and ‘environmental sustainability’ will be defined and explored. In addition, a link will be established between intergenerational equity and sustainable development in light of current literature and scholarly discussion. The following section discusses how the link drawn between environmental protection, human rights protection and environmental sustainability provides for a common approach to fully handling current environmental issues. Subsequently, a positive analysis of present day international legal instruments, customary international law and case law will be conducted, to determine the current status of future generations regarding the right to a healthy environment. Use will also be made of academic literature on the subject, including extensive research carried out by scholars such as Edith Brown Weiss and Bridgit Lewis. To conclude, the findings of each section will be summarised, and a final conclusion will be drawn as to the state of future generations in international law and the potential for the right to a healthy environment to be accorded to them.


Author(s):  
Clooney Amal ◽  
Webb Philippa

This chapter addresses the right to counsel, an important, non-derogable right designed to prevent miscarriages of justice when a defendant faces a state that has greater resources, powers, and access to evidence. Under international human rights law, the right to counsel encompasses five main components: the right to be notified of the right to the assistance of counsel; the right to prompt access to qualified counsel, paid for by the state if the defendant is indigent; the right to choose counsel; the right to communicate confidentially with counsel; and the right to act as one’s own counsel. International bodies have defined the broad scope of protection that is afforded to defendants in broadly consistent terms, but the chapter highlights divergences relating to the right to represent oneself, and the circumstances under which international bodies will find that counsel has not been ‘effective’ in a given case.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Na'ama Carmi

Cultural rights of minority groups are recognized in international human rights law. These rights include the right of minority groups to adopt various measures to protect their cultural identity, which may include closure of the group’s community from outsiders. The state in which such groups reside has a concurrent duty to respect these rights and sometimes even to take positive measures to ensure their implementation. The consideration of demographic factors, then, is regarded as legitimate when designed to protect minority groups. The rights of majority groups, on the other hand, are often ensured by the mere fact that they constitute a majority within the state and as such do not require special measures.This state of affairs is challenged, however, in face of mass immigration that could change the relation existing between majority and minority groups within the state. Under these circumstances, does a majority have the right to preserve its own culture through an immigration policy that takes into account demographic factors? I argue that the duty of states under international human rights law to protect rights of minority groups might serve as an incentive to restrict immigration endangering the character of the state. This character—the state’s public culture—is the outcome of collective preferences of the majority of its citizens, which is assumed ought to be respected.


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