Quantum Unconscious Pre-Space: A Psychoanalytic/Neuroscientific Analysis of the Cognitive Science of Elio Conte–The Hard Problem of Consciousness, New Approaches and Directions

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Lawrence Norman
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
New Approaches ◽  
The Hard Problem

Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 63-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Process Information ◽  
Conscious Mind ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Ice Cube ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind

In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection (Chalmers 1996, 4; 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem — also known astheproblem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995, 201) — is the problem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee,’ to ‘touch an ice cube,’ to ‘look at a sunset,’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it feel like anything at all?

scholarly journals The Hard Problem Of Content: Solved (Long Ago)

2015 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcin Miłkowski
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Double Standards ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Hard Problem Of Content

Abstract In this paper, I argue that even if the Hard Problem of Content, as identified by Hutto and Myin, is important, it was already solved in naturalized semantics, and satisfactory solutions to the problem do not rely merely on the notion of information as covariance. I point out that Hutto and Myin have double standards for linguistic and mental representation, which leads to a peculiar inconsistency. Were they to apply the same standards to basic and linguistic minds, they would either have to embrace representationalism or turn to semantic nihilism, which is, as I argue, an unstable and unattractive position. Hence, I conclude, their book does not offer an alternative to representationalism. At the same time, it reminds us that representational talk in cognitive science cannot be taken for granted and that information is different from mental representation. Although this claim is not new, Hutto and Myin defend it forcefully and elegantly.

Place and Environment in the Ongoing Evolution of Cognitive Neuroscience

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (10) ◽  
pp. 1837-1850 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis N. Irwin ◽  
Brian A. Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Brain Function ◽  
Experimental Designs ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Cognitive Characteristics ◽  
Science Approach ◽  
Species Comparisons ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Brain

Cognitive science today increasingly is coming under the influence of embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive perspectives, superimposed on the more traditional cybernetic, computational assumptions of classical cognitive research. Neuroscience has contributed to a greatly enhanced understanding of brain function within the constraints of the traditional cognitive science approach, but interpretations of many of its findings can be enriched by the newer alternative perspectives. Here, we note in particular how these frameworks highlight the cognitive requirements of an animal situated within its particular environment, how the coevolution of an organism's biology and ecology shape its cognitive characteristics, and how the cognitive realm extends beyond the brain of the perceiving animal. We argue that these insights of the embodied cognition paradigm reveal the central role that “place” plays in the cognitive landscape and that cognitive scientists and philosophers alike can gain from paying heed to the importance of a concept of place. We conclude with a discussion of how this concept can be applied with respect to cognitive function, species comparisons, ecologically relevant experimental designs, and how the “hard problem” of consciousness might be approached, among its other implications.

Zombies and Dolls

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.

scholarly journals Animal Evolution: The Hard Problem of Cartilage Origins

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (14) ◽  
pp. R685-R688 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thibaut Brunet ◽  
Detlev Arendt
Keyword(s):  
Hard Problem ◽  
Animal Evolution ◽  
The Hard Problem

Going Radical

2018 ◽  
pp. 94-116
Author(s):  
Daniel D. Hutto ◽  
Erik Myin
Keyword(s):  
Research Program ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Positive Research ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Conceptual Revolution ◽  
Hard Problem Of Content

E-approaches to cognition—enactive, embodied, ecological—conceive of minds as fundamentally relational and interactive. They are often heralded as offering a new paradigm for thinking about the mental. Yet only the most radical versions of E-approaches—those that seek not to complement but to replace traditional cognitivist accounts of mind—have any prospect of ushering in a truly revolutionary rethink of the nature of cognition. This chapter considers whether such a conceptual revolution might really be in the cards. It identities the major options proposed by E-theorists, rating each in terms of degree of radicality. It reminds readers of the hard problem of content and reviews the range of options for handling it. It argues that “going radical” is one of the most attractive ways of dealing with the hard problem of content and that it is worth exploring the positive research program that going radical opens up.

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