Place and Environment in the Ongoing Evolution of Cognitive Neuroscience

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (10) ◽  
pp. 1837-1850 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis N. Irwin ◽  
Brian A. Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Brain Function ◽  
Experimental Designs ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Cognitive Characteristics ◽  
Science Approach ◽  
Species Comparisons ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Brain

Cognitive science today increasingly is coming under the influence of embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive perspectives, superimposed on the more traditional cybernetic, computational assumptions of classical cognitive research. Neuroscience has contributed to a greatly enhanced understanding of brain function within the constraints of the traditional cognitive science approach, but interpretations of many of its findings can be enriched by the newer alternative perspectives. Here, we note in particular how these frameworks highlight the cognitive requirements of an animal situated within its particular environment, how the coevolution of an organism's biology and ecology shape its cognitive characteristics, and how the cognitive realm extends beyond the brain of the perceiving animal. We argue that these insights of the embodied cognition paradigm reveal the central role that “place” plays in the cognitive landscape and that cognitive scientists and philosophers alike can gain from paying heed to the importance of a concept of place. We conclude with a discussion of how this concept can be applied with respect to cognitive function, species comparisons, ecologically relevant experimental designs, and how the “hard problem” of consciousness might be approached, among its other implications.

Zombies and Dolls

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.

Epilogue: Missing Information?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel D. Hutto ◽  
Erik Myin
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Informational Content ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Missing Information ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Positioning Systems ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Hard Problem Of Content

The epilogue takes a last look at the possibility that REC may be leaving out something explanatorily important because it says nothing about how the brain processes informational content. Focusing on a prominent case, it is demonstrated that REC has the resources to understand the groundbreaking research on positioning systems in rat brains. It is argued that rat brains can be informationally sensitive without processing informational content. No explanatory power is lost in adopting REC’s deflated explanation; but much is gained by doing so since it avoids the Hard Problem of Content. The chapter concludes by showing how REC’s proposed vision of neurodynamics is wholly compatible with its dynamical and extensive account of cognition; a vision of cognition that opens the door to broader lines of research in the cognitive sciences that taking into account the ways in which culture can permeate cognition.

scholarly journals Principles for models of neural information processing

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kendrick N. Kay ◽  
Kevin S. Weiner
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Brain Function ◽  
Network Models ◽  
Neural Network Models ◽  
Specific Effects ◽  
Neural Information ◽  
Neural Information Processing ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Brain

AbstractThe goal of cognitive neuroscience is to understand how mental operations are performed by the brain. Given the complexity of the brain, this is a challenging endeavor that requires the development of formal models. Here, we provide a perspective on models of neural information processing in cognitive neuroscience. We define what these models are, explain why they are useful, and specify criteria for evaluating models. We also highlight the difference between functional and mechanistic models, and call attention to the value that neuroanatomy has for understanding brain function. Based on the principles we propose, we proceed to evaluate the merit of recently touted deep neural network models. We contend that these models are promising, but substantial work is necessary to (i) clarify what type of explanation these models provide, (ii) determine what specific effects they accurately explain, and (iii) improve our understanding of how they work.

Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 63-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Process Information ◽  
Conscious Mind ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Ice Cube ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind

In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection (Chalmers 1996, 4; 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem — also known astheproblem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995, 201) — is the problem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee,’ to ‘touch an ice cube,’ to ‘look at a sunset,’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it feel like anything at all?

scholarly journals Looping Effects and the Cognitive Science of Mindfulness Meditation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Neural Networks ◽  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Embodied Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Mindfulness Meditation ◽  
The Body ◽  
Cultural Environment ◽  
Directed Action ◽  
The Brain

Cognitive neuroscience tends to conceptualize mindfulness meditation as inner observation of a private mental realm of thoughts, feelings, and body sensations, and tries to model mindfulness as instantiated in neural networks visible through brain imaging tools such as EEG and fMRI. This approach confuses the biological conditions for mindfulness with mindfulness itself, which, as classically described, consists in the integrated exercise of a whole host of cognitive and bodily skills in situated and ethically directed action. From an enactive perspective, mindfulness depends on internalized social cognition and is a mode of skillful, embodied cognition that depends directly not only on the brain, but also on the rest of the body and the physical, social, and cultural environment.

Bio-centric Views of the Origin of Consciousness: The Search for the Solution to the Hard Problem

2018 ◽  
pp. 78-122
Author(s):  
Arthur S. Reber
Keyword(s):  
Distinct Type ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Human Consciousness ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Two strategies are used to review the many efforts to solve (or resolve or dissolve) the Hard Problem. One searches for the neurocorrelates of consciousness, the effort to answer the question: “How does the brain make the mind?” The other looks for the first appearance of true consciousness in phylogenesis. Both approaches are reviewed and found wanting. The reason is they all begin with human consciousness and use it as the basis for the explorations. This, it is argued, has lead to a “category error” where the H. sap. mind is treated as a distinct type and not as a token on the same existential continuum as other minds. It also reveals the existence of the “emergentist’s dilemma” or the difficulty of determining how consciousness could spring into existence when one cosmic moment before, it didn’t exist. The chapter ends by anticipating criticism of these arguments and of the CBC and providing prophylactic arguments.

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