scholarly journals The Archer and Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean

2013 ◽  
pp. 155-168
Author(s):  
Glen Koehn

It is sometimes claimed that Aristotle’s doctrine of the Mean is false or unhelpful: moral virtues are not typically flanked by two opposing vices as he claimed. However, an explicit restatement of Aristotle’s view in terms of sufficiency for an objective reveals that the Mean is more widely applicable than has sometimes been alleged. Understood as a special case of sufficiency, it is essential to many judgments of right and wrong. I consider some objections by Rosalind Hursthouse to Aristotle’s theory and argue that they are based on a misunderstanding. However, there is indeed a tension in Aristotle’s view of goodness, hinted at in his claim that the good is "said in many ways".

2021 ◽  
pp. 18-34
Author(s):  
Nathan L. King

This chapter explores the nature of intellectual character virtues, as a way of preparing the reader for the rest of the book, which explores individual virtues in detail. After providing a list of important intellectual virtues and some examples of these virtues “in action,” the chapter proceeds to discuss the structure of virtues. It identifies intellectual virtues as excellent traits of character involving thought, behavior, and motivation in relation to knowledge. The chapter then introduces a model for understanding intellectual virtues that parallels Aristotle’s account of the moral virtues. Specifically, many intellectual virtues stand as a mean between vices of deficiency and excess. After applying Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean to several intellectual virtues, the chapter closes by applying Aristotle’s metaphor of virtue as hitting a target. It suggests that our intellectual actions “hit the target” insofar as they involve our doing the right intellectual acts, at the right times, in the right ways, and for the right reasons.


Author(s):  
T. M. Rudavsky

Chapter 9 is concerned with social and political behavior. Even in the context of moral philosophy, Jewish philosophers discuss issues within the wider context of a rational scientific perspective. This chapter begins with specific moral codes developed by Jewish thinkers, focusing in particular upon the works of Ibn Gabirol, Baḥya ibn Paquda, Maimonides, and Crescas. Can there be ethical dictates independent of the commandments? The rabbis already worried whether there existed a domain of “right behavior” that pre-dates, or exists independently of, divine commandment. Does Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean apply to divine law? Furthermore, can all humans achieve intellectual perfection? Is the road the same, and open, to all? And is there only one road to ultimate felicity, or are there many routes? The chapter ends with a discussion of whether human felicity can be achieved in this life, and whether the prophet best represents the ideal model for such achievement.


DIALOGO ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-143
Author(s):  
Spyridon Stelios ◽  
Alexia Dotsi

In this paper, we investigate the political and religious projection of Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean. According to Aristotle and his virtue ethics theory, humans succeed the mean when they acknowledge in what they are physically inclined to. If someone knows towards where she is deviating, either in terms of exaggeration or understatement, then she can, at some point, achieve the mean as the end goal of ethical virtue. But what if these moral evaluations refer to collective processes, such as politics, culture and religion? In this case, the notion of “intermediate” could be paralleled with the notion of ‘optimized’. A way of locating the optimized point on the political or cultural public sphere is to acknowledge in what people are politically or culturally inclined to. This seems to be guided by their cultural traditions, political history and aims. In politics and modern democracies, the doctrine may be applied in virtues, such as justice. Excess in the administration of justice causes "witch hunts" and deficiency lawlessness. Respectively, in today’s religious-oriented societies - countries that could be ranked according to their religiosity – where there is little tolerance in their permissible cultural patterns, the application of Aristotle’s mean reveals interesting findings. More specifically, in the case of the virtue of honor, the excess may lead to honor crimes and deficiency to contempt.


Author(s):  
Paula Gottlieb

This chapter argues that Aristotelian virtue of character involves knowledge of one’s own abilities and qualities, forms of self-knowledge that are implicit in Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean and in his account of practical reasoning. Support is found in the description of truthful people in EN IV 7, who, in contrast to boasters, give true, unexaggerated reports of their own qualities. It is also found in Aristotle’s discussion of the magnanimous person, who has knowledge of their own worth. The good person, then, has both kinds of knowledge, while the bad person may have knowledge about his non-ethical abilities, but not about his character. It is unclear whether the akratic, the person who knows the better course but voluntarily takes the worse, lacks self-knowledge or is self-deceived. Self-knowledge about one’s own character also appears in some of Aristotle’s discussion of friendship.


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