Optimal investment in power system for defending against malicious attacks through defender-attacker-defender model and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 354
Author(s):  
Ali Marjanian ◽  
Soodabeh Soleymani
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (20) ◽  
pp. 4395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weisheng Liu ◽  
Jian Wu ◽  
Fei Wang ◽  
Yixin Huang ◽  
Qiongdan Dai ◽  
...  

The increasing penetration of distributed generation (DG) brings about great fluctuation and uncertainty in distribution networks. In order to improve the ability of distribution networks to cope with disturbances caused by uncertainties and to evaluate the maximum accommodation capacity of DG, a multi-objective programming method for evaluation of the accommodation capacity of distribution networks for DG is proposed, considering the flexibility of distribution networks in this paper. Firstly, a multi-objective optimization model for determining the maximum accommodation of DG by considering the flexibility of distribution networks is constructed, aiming at maximizing the daily energy consumption, minimizing the voltage amplitude deviation, and maximizing the line capacity margin. Secondly, the comprehensive learning particle swarm optimization (CLPSO) algorithm is used to solve the multi-objective optimization model. Then, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is introduced to obtain the frontier solution with the optimal joint equilibrium value in the Pareto solution set. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is demonstrated with an actual distribution network in China. The simulation results show that the proposed planning method can effectively find the Pareto optimal solution set by considering multiple objectives, and can obtain the optimal equilibrium solution for DG accommodation capacity and distribution network flexibility.


2008 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 418-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEAN J. GABSZEWICZ ◽  
DIDIER LAUSSEL ◽  
MICHEL LE BRETON

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman M. Sheremeta

Abstract The attack-and-defense game is a game in which an attacker (a group of attackers) has an incentive to revise the status quo and a defender (a group of defenders) wants to protect it. The asymmetry in objectives creates incompatible interests and results in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, this equilibrium could be heavily impacted by behavioral considerations.


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