A Learning-based Innovized Progress Operator for Faster Convergence in Evolutionary Multi-objective Optimization

Learning effective problem information from already explored search space in an optimization run, and utilizing it to improve the convergence of subsequent solutions, have represented important directions in Evolutionary Multi-objective Optimization (EMO) research. In this article, a machine learning (ML)-assisted approach is proposed that: (a) maps the solutions from earlier generations of an EMO run to the current non-dominated solutions in the decision space ; (b) learns the salient patterns in the mapping using an ML method, here an artificial neural network (ANN); and (c) uses the learned ML model to advance some of the subsequent offspring solutions in an adaptive manner. Such a multi-pronged approach, quite different from the popular surrogate-modeling methods, leads to what is here referred to as the Innovized Progress (IP) operator. On several test and engineering problems involving two and three objectives, with and without constraints, it is shown that an EMO algorithm assisted by the IP operator offers faster convergence behavior, compared to its base version independent of the IP operator. The results are encouraging, pave a new path for the performance improvement of EMO algorithms, and set the motivation for further exploration on more challenging problems.

Incentive mechanism design for citizen reporting application using Stackelberg game

<p>The growing utilization of smartphones equipped with various sensors to collect and analyze information around us highlights a paradigm called mobile crowdsensing. To motivate citizens’ participation in crowdsensing and compensate them for their resources, it is necessary to incentivize the participants for their sensing service. There are several studies that used the Stackelberg game to model the incentive mechanism, however, those studies did not include a budget constraint for limited budget case. Another challenge is to optimize crowdsourcer (government) profit in conducting crowdsensing under the limited budget then allocates the budget to several regional working units that are responsible for the specific city problems. We propose an incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing based on several identified incentive parameters using the Stackelberg game model and applied the MOOP (multi-objective optimization problem) to the incentive model in which the participant reputation is taken into account. The evaluation of the proposed incentive model is performed through simulations. The simulation indicated that the result appropriately corresponds to the theoretical properties of the model.</p>