scholarly journals Does ownership structure affect dividend policy? A panel data analysis for the French market

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Wissem Daadaa ◽  
Fathi Jouini
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Panel Data Analysis

Does Ownership Structure Influence Bank Performance?: Evidence from an Emerging Economy

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2_suppl) ◽  
pp. S282-S297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brijesh K Mishra ◽  
L. V. Ramana
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
Bank Performance ◽  
Return On Assets ◽  
Net Interest Margin ◽  
Interest Margin

Banks’ ownership and their performance form two important dimensions of the entire gamut of banking function. This article strives to establish a link between the two by studying commercial banks in India. Conducting a panel data analysis of 89 commercial banks over the period from 2008–2009 to 2012–2013, one could observe that ownership indeed mattered when net interest margin (NIM) or per-employee profitability was considered, but when return on assets (ROA) was considered, there was not much of a difference among banks when differentiated on ownership basis.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in the Presence of Controlling Shareholders

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 162
Author(s):  
Ricardo Rodrigues ◽  
J. Augusto Felício ◽  
Pedro Verga Matos
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Data Analysis ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms

Based on agency theory, we focused on the influence of corporate governance in the dividend policy of large listed firms with headquarters in continental Europe countries. Previous research focused on the influence of corporate governance on the performance and risk of listed firms, but the influence of corporate governance on the dividend policy has rarely been addressed despite the importance of dividends for shareholders and the implications on the free cash-flow, whose application may be a source of conflicts between managers and shareholders. In this paper, we study the influence of a set of governance mechanisms on the dividend policy over 12 years (2002 to 2013). The results, based on a panel data analysis, support the importance of governance mechanisms toward the protection of shareholders’ interests, and reveal that the decisions on whether to pay dividends and how much to pay are grounded on different antecedents.

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