scholarly journals Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data analysis

2009 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phillip J. McKnight ◽  
Charlie Weir
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Data Analysis ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in the Presence of Controlling Shareholders

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 162
Author(s):  
Ricardo Rodrigues ◽  
J. Augusto Felício ◽  
Pedro Verga Matos
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Data Analysis ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms

Based on agency theory, we focused on the influence of corporate governance in the dividend policy of large listed firms with headquarters in continental Europe countries. Previous research focused on the influence of corporate governance on the performance and risk of listed firms, but the influence of corporate governance on the dividend policy has rarely been addressed despite the importance of dividends for shareholders and the implications on the free cash-flow, whose application may be a source of conflicts between managers and shareholders. In this paper, we study the influence of a set of governance mechanisms on the dividend policy over 12 years (2002 to 2013). The results, based on a panel data analysis, support the importance of governance mechanisms toward the protection of shareholders’ interests, and reveal that the decisions on whether to pay dividends and how much to pay are grounded on different antecedents.

ÖRGÜTLERDE ÖRGÜTSEL BOLLUĞUN GİRİŞİMSEL ORYANTASYON ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurdan Gürkan ◽  
Ahmet Ferda Çakmak
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Data Analysis ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Strategic Management ◽  
Significant Relationship ◽  
Entrepreneurial Orientation ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Organizational Slack ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
The Relationship

The concept of entrepreneurial orientation, which emerges with the development of strategic management, refers to entrepreneurship orientations of businesses. The businesses need resources in other words organizational slack in order to develop their entrepreneurial trends. The organizational slack consists of three slack type. These slack types are available slack, recoverable slack and potential slack. The purpose of this study is to examine whether organizational slack in the businesses has an effect on entrepreneurial orientation. The relationship between organizational slack and entrepreneurial orientation was investigated through 20 companies that were traded in Borsa Istanbul Corporate Governance Index for 2010-2014 period using panel data analysis method. The results of the study indicate the existence of a statistically significant relationship between and the available slack and the recoverable slack with the entrepreneurial orientation in the businesses. According to findings; there was no statistically significant relationship between potential slack and entrepreneurial orientation.

Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 658-681 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yousef Hassan ◽  
Rafiq Hijazi ◽  
Kamal Naser
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-financial companies. Design/methodology/approach Using substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48 nonfinancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used to identify the influence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the effectiveness of the AC after controlling for firm size, auditor type, industry type and profitability. Findings While AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and government ownership suggests substitutive relations. Research limitations/implications The main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines the influence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate governance mechanisms may, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The findings of the study can be used by companies’ managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system. Originality/value To the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the first evidence about the interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in Middle East and North African countries in general and Arab World in particular.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Codes and Intellectual Capital: Evaluating the Performance Impacts among Government-Linked Companies in Malaysia and Singapore – A Panel Data Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 124 ◽  
pp. 08004
Author(s):  
Yen Wen Chang ◽  
Ng Ching Yat David ◽  
Suet Cheng Low ◽  
Peck Ling Tee
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Data Analysis ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Intellectual Capital ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Corporate Governance Codes ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

The objective of this study was to examine and compare the effects of corporate governance (CG) and intellectual capital (IC) between Malaysia Government-Linked Companies’ (M-GLCs) and Singapore Government-Linked Companies’ (S-GLCs) firm performance (FP). Panel data analysis was employed to analyse the impact of CG’s variables and IC’s variables on FP. FP was measured by Return on Total Assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q and Earnings Per Share (EPS). Data was gathered from the website of Bursa Malaysia and the Stock Exchange of Singapore from 2005 to 2018. The sample size of this research was 60 GLCs which comprised of 34 M-GLCs and 26 S-GLCs. There were a total 840 firm year observations. Results indicated that CGs of S-GLCs have greater impact on FP when compared to M-GLCs while the findings of the IC of M-GLCs have greater impact on FP compared to S-GLCs. This research was helpful in offering further insights of CG practices and IC efficiency to the Government, Board of Directors, policy makers, shareholders and stakeholders.

scholarly journals Agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms in Indian state-owned companies and privately owned companies - A panel data analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 8-17
Author(s):  
Stuart Locke ◽  
Geeta Duppati
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Government ◽  
Suitable Reference ◽  
The Impact

This paper explores the impact of corporate governance reforms and changing ownership patterns of core public sector enterprises. A number of reforms were introduced by the Government of India in 1991, and intensified in 2004 with the aim of improving efficiency and financial performance across state owned enterprises. The core state enterprises provide a unique opportunity to consider two aspects of the reforms. First, did the reforms have an impact, and second, is there a distinguishable difference between wholly government owned and partially-public shareholding enterprises? The public listed companies provide a suitable reference point for comparison. A comprehensive dataset of 123 SOEs and matching listed public companies for 10 years was collected for the study. A regression approach is adopted with agency cost as the dependant variable and several corporation-specific governance variables. Size and industry are the independent variables. The findings of the study indicate that the agency costs for mixed ownership models tend to be lower than those of the concentrated state-owned firms because they operate in an open market with the market facing the regulatory framework of a competitive environment.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document