3. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATIONS AND CODE OF FAIR LABOR PRACTICES

Author(s):  
Tamara Kneese ◽  
Alex Rosenblat ◽  
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Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamara Kneese ◽  
Alex Rosenblat ◽  
danah boyd

Internet-enabled technologies allow people to connect in unprecedented ways. Although everyday social practices are widespread and well known, these same tools are reconfiguring key aspects of work. Crowdsourcing and distributed labor technologies increasingly allow companies to outsource everything from mundane tasks (e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk) to professional services (e.g., oDesk). Sharing economy – or peer economy – tools (e.g., Airbnb) allow people to barter goods or services or get paid for these exchanges outside of the dominant business framework. These services have enabled new forms of contract or freelance labor and reduced risk for companies; however, there is often an increase in risk for the associated laborers. At the same time, divisions between what constitutes work, hobby, and volunteerism get blurred, especially as many organizations rely on volunteer labor under the assumption that it’s mutually beneficial (e.g., blogs and journalistic enterprises that republish work or see the offer of a platform as valuable in and of itself). While all of these labor issues have unmediated precedents (e.g., free internships), technology magnifies the scale of these practices, minimizes the transactional friction, and increases the visibility of unpaid and freelance work. Collectively, this raises critical questions about what fair labor looks like in a networked world, where boundaries dissolve and existing mechanisms of labor protection do not address the varied work scenarios now available.


Author(s):  
Arthur B. Laby

This chapter examines the fiduciary principles governing investment advice. Fiduciary principles in investment advice are both straightforward and complex. They are straightforward because most investment advisers are considered fiduciaries and subject to strict fiduciary duties under federal and state law. Their complex nature arises from the fact that many individuals and firms provide investment advice but are not deemed investment advisers and, therefore, are not subject to a fiduciary obligation. This chapter first explains whether and when an advisory relationship gives rise to fiduciary duties by focusing on both federal and state law, as well as the individuals and firms that typically provide investment advice. In particular, it looks at certain persons and entities excluded from the definition of investment adviser and thus not subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, namely broker-dealers, banks, and family offices as well as accountants, lawyers, teachers, and engineers. The chapter also considers fiduciaries under ERISA, the Investment Company Act, and the Commodity Exchange Act before discussing the fiduciary duty of loyalty and how it is expressed and applied in investment advisory relationships; the fiduciary duty of care and how it differs from other standards of conduct, such as a duty of suitability; and other legal obligations imposed on investment advisers and how those obligations relate to an adviser’s fiduciary duty. Finally, the mandatory or default terms with regard to an investment adviser’s fiduciary duties are explored, along with remedies available for breach of fiduciary duty.


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