Representation as Ontological Problem

Abstract In order to understand negation as such, at least since Aristotle’s time, there have been many ways of conceptually modelling it. In particular, negation has been studied as inconsistency, contradictoriness, falsity, cancellation, an inversion of arrangements of truth values, etc. In this paper, making substantial use of category theory, we present three more conceptual and abstract models of negation. All of them capture negation as turning upside down the entire structure under consideration. The first proposal turns upside down the structure almost literally; it is the well known construction of opposite category. The second one treats negation as a contravariant functor and the third one captures negation as adjointness. Traditionally, negation was investigated in the context of language as negation of sentences or parts of sentences, e.g. names. On the contrary we propose to negate structures globally. As a consequence of our approach we provide a solution to the ontological problem of the existence of negative states of affairs.

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Events, Ontology and Grammar

Philosophy ◽

10.1017/s0031819100056102 ◽

1982 ◽

Vol 57 (222) ◽

pp. 477-486 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

P. M.S. Hacker

Keyword(s):

New Species ◽

Donald Davidson ◽

Ontological Problem

In recent years philosophers have given much attention to the ‘ontological problem’ of events. Donald Davidson puts the matter thus: ‘the assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our common talk; or so, at any rate, I have been arguing. I do not know of any better, or further, way of showing what there is’. It might be thought bizarre to assign to philosophers the task of ‘showing what there is’. They have not distinguished themselves by the discovery of new elements, new species or new continents, nor even of new categories, although there has often been more dreamt of in their philosophies than can be found in heaven or earth. It might appear even stranger to think that one can show what there actually is by arguing that the existence of something needs to be assumed in order for certain sentences to make sense. More than anything, the sober reader will doubtlessly be amazed that we need to assume, after lengthy argument, ‘that there are events’.

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The ontological problem and the idea of philosophical research

Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy ◽

10.2307/j.ctvswx875.17 ◽

2007 ◽

pp. 124-129

Keyword(s):

Ontological Problem

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The Epistemic Advantage of Lost Autographic Tokens of the Bible

Philosophia Christi ◽

10.5840/pc202123115 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 23 (1) ◽

pp. 187-193

Author(s):

J. P. Moreland ◽

Keyword(s):

Actual World ◽

Original Writings ◽

Semantic Meaning ◽

Epistemological Problem ◽

The Bible ◽

Text Types ◽

Biblical Inerrancy ◽

Ontological Problem

I address an epistemic and related ontological dificulty with the doctrine of biblical inerrancy. The ontological problem: If biblical inerrancy applies to the original autographs, why would God allow these to disappear from the scene? The epistemological problem: Given that the original autographs are gone, we lack a way to know exactly what the original writings were. The first problem is solved by distinguishing text types and tokens, and claiming that semantic meaning and inerrancy are underivative features types. The second is resolved by claiming that in the actual world, we are epistemically better off with the original tokens gone.

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Effectual Contingency: The Ontological Problem of Modality in Hegel’s Science of Logic

Hegel, Logic and Speculation ◽

10.5040/9781350056381.ch-004 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Alessandro De Cesaris

Keyword(s):

Science Of Logic ◽

Ontological Problem

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The Megarian and the Aristotelian Concept of Possibility: A Contribution to the History of the Ontological Problem of Modality

Axiomathes ◽

10.1007/s10516-016-9315-1 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 27 (2) ◽

pp. 209-223 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Nicolai Hartmann ◽

Frédéric Tremblay ◽

Keith R. Peterson

Keyword(s):

History Of ◽

Ontological Problem

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On the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy ◽

10.5840/wcp20-paideia199819354 ◽

1998 ◽

pp. 32-36

Author(s):

Henrique de Morais Ribeiro

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Science ◽

Philosophy Of Mind ◽

Body Problem ◽

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Philosophy Of Cognitive Science ◽

Irreducible Elements ◽

Framework Model ◽

Mind And Body ◽

The Mind ◽

Ontological Problem

Psychophysical dualism — the distinction between mind and body — is the counterposition between essentially irreducible elements: the mind and body. Such a dualism implies the main ontological problem of the philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem (MBP). The dualism and the referred-to problem has been insistently discussed in the philosophical tradition and several solutions have been proposed. Such solutions are properly philosophical or require a scientific approach. First, I will expound the philosophical solution to the MBP proposed by Descartes, to be followed by an exposition of Ryle's criticisms to the solution. Second, from Ryle's criticism, I will deduce a scientific solution to the MBP related to the neural framework model of mind in cognitive science by means of what I call 'the principle of the embodiment of the mind.' Finally, I shall point out the philosophical difficulties that are to be found in using such a principle.

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