Ontology and the Foundations of Mathematics

This Element looks at the problem of inter-translation between mathematical realism and anti-realism and argues that so far as realism is inter-translatable with anti-realism, there is a burden on the realist to show how her posited reality differs from that of the anti-realist. It also argues that an effective defence of just such a difference needs a commitment to the independence of mathematical reality, which in turn involves a commitment to the ontological access problem – the problem of how knowable mathematical truths are identifiable with a reality independent of us as knowers. Specifically, if the only access problem acknowledged is the epistemological problem – i.e. the problem of how we come to know mathematical truths – then nothing is gained by the realist notion of an independent reality and in effect, nothing distinguishes realism from anti-realism in mathematics.

Transformative Experience and the Problem of Religious Disagreement

Chapter 6 considers how peer disagreement over religion presents an epistemological problem: How can confidence in any religious claims including their negations be epistemically justified? Here, it is shown that the transformative nature of religious experience poses a further problem: to transition between religious belief and skepticism is not just to adopt a different set of beliefs, but to transform into a different version of oneself. It is argued that this intensifies the problem of pluralism by adding a new dimension to religious disagreement, for we can lack epistemic and affective access to our potential religious, agnostic, or skeptical selves. Yet, access to these selves seems to be required for the purposes of decision-making that is to be both rational and authentic. Finally, the chapter reflects on the relationship between the transformative problem and what it shows about the epistemic status of religious conversion and deconversion, in which one disagrees with one’s own transformed self.

Bridging the epistemological gap

Despite Cognitive Translation Studies’ (CTS) interest in didactic applications, the actual impact of research on training programs has been modest in comparison with the advances made in terms of methodology, theoretical sophistication and expansion of the object of study. It is argued that the modest impact of CTS on training originates, on the one hand, in an epistemological problem – one of mild incommensurability – and, on the other, on the difficulty of developing realistic cognitive task models. Adopting constructs and models in CTS and didactics that share an embodied, extended view on cognition may contribute to fitting empirical data and describing skill development. To that end, a sketch of a template to develop translation task models is presented for discussion.

The Puzzle of the Sophist

The many definitions of sophistry at the beginning of Plato’s Sophist have puzzled scholars just as much as they puzzled the dialogue’s main speakers: the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus. The aim of this paper is to give an account of that puzzlement. This puzzlement, it is argued, stems not from a logical or epistemological problem, but from the metaphysical problem that, given the multiplicity of accounts, the interlocutors do not know what the sophist essentially is. It transpires that, in order to properly account for this puzzle, one must jettison the traditional view of Plato’s method of division, on which divisions must be exclusive and mark out relations of essential predication. It is then shown on independent grounds that, although Platonic division in the Sophist must express predication relations and be transitive, it need not be dichotomous, exclusive, or express relations of essential predication. Once the requirements of exclusivity and essential predication are dropped, it is possible to make sense of the reasons that the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus are puzzled. Moreover, with this in hand, it is possible to see Plato making an important methodological point in the dialogue: division on its own without any norms does not necessarily lead to the discovery of essences.

Problems of empirical solutions to the theory-ladenness of observation

Recent years have seen enticing empirical approaches to solving the epistemological problem of the theory-ladenness of observation. I group these approaches in two categories according to their method of choice: testing and refereeing. I argue that none deliver what friends of theory-neutrality want them to. Testing does not work because both evidence from cognitive neuroscience and perceptual pluralism independently invalidate the existence of a common observation core. Refereeing does not work because it treats theory-ladenness as a kind of superficial, removable bias. Even if such treatment is plausible, there is likely no method to ascertain that effects of this bias are not present. More importantly, evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that a deeper, likely irremovable kind of theory-ladenness lies within the perceptual modules.

The History, Landscapes, Metaphors and Ghosts Around the Concept of Specificity

The confusion between objects/processes and the language which describes them, leads to theories of doubtful verisimilitude about reality, inappropriate in time and even false, which distance us from the knowledge of perceived reality. In biology there are many examples of this kind of epistemological problem. Here we examine those related with specificity: a theoretical entity of enormous importance for biology and science in general. It sinks its roots beneath the evolutionary duality species-specificity, associated with the Linnean-Darwinist tradition that explains organized life in a discrete and hierarchical way. It conceptualizes the individual as an isolated agent fighting for survival as the foundation of a warrior vision of the immune system. Microorganisms are understood as inferior beings which should be eliminated in accordance with the self/not-self distinction. The use of these metaphors outside of historical context traces a map that guides the recognition of the Self and of the other according to the dialectic of Western biopolitics.

PLATO AND THE DANGEROUS PLEASURES OF POIKILIA

A significant strand of the ethical psychology, aesthetics and politics of Plato's Republic revolves around the concept of poikilia, ‘fascinating variety’. Plato uses the concept to caution against harmful appetitive pleasures purveyed by democracy and such artistic or cultural practices as mimetic poetry. His aim, this article shows, is to contest a prominent conceptual connection between poikilia and beauty (kallos, to kalon). Exploiting tensions in the archaic and classical Greek concept, Plato associates poikilia with dangerous pleasures to redirect admiration toward a distinctly philosophical pursuit of the nature of beauty. This is to displace a prominent and problematic cultural sensibility—the aesthetics of poikilia—not to deny that fascinating variety, even in mimetic poetry, may be beautiful. Rather, Plato's cultural critique lays bare an epistemological problem in the ethical psychology of beauty: since they cannot be distinguished from what seems beautiful, how should one respond to fascinating yet dangerous attractions?

The limits of gamification

Gamification faces an epistemological problem of game transversality presenting limits from the playfulness. However, describing these limits is difficult if there is no interpretive model that explain the transition between the game and the gamification. This work proposes a systemic game–gamification model to understand the phenomenon of the gamification procedure. This structural-functionalist and systemic model can respond to different fields interested in gamification under the same elements and assume to serve as an interpretation only for this phenomenon’s social reality from the complexity. Some risks of gamification are highlighted, such as isolating and considering only some elements that do not even belong to the game, as is frequently the case with the competition system, an issue that, in analogy with game-sport, becomes sportification.

The Epistemic Advantage of Lost Autographic Tokens of the Bible

I address an epistemic and related ontological dificulty with the doctrine of biblical inerrancy. The ontological problem: If biblical inerrancy applies to the original autographs, why would God allow these to disappear from the scene? The epistemological problem: Given that the original autographs are gone, we lack a way to know exactly what the original writings were. The first problem is solved by distinguishing text types and tokens, and claiming that semantic meaning and inerrancy are underivative features types. The second is resolved by claiming that in the actual world, we are epistemically better off with the original tokens gone.