Chapter 5: Guarantees and Weaknesses in the Omani Dispute Settlement Mechanism with regard to Foreign Investment Disputes

2017 ◽  
pp. 221-248
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Investment ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

icsid’s Neoliberal Approach to Environmental Regulation in Developing Countries

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 401-442
Author(s):  
Antonius R. Hippolyte
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Foreign Investment ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
American States ◽  
Physical Environments ◽  
Hazardous Waste Landfills ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

Abstract With the intensification of their participation in the foreign investment regime, Latin American States are finding it difficult to implement measures beneficial to protecting their environments due to their obligations to third States. This governance deficit is further compounded by the regime’s neoliberal predisposition in favour of property protection, which has penetrated the system and implicated the system of investment treaty arbitration, the regime’s primary dispute settlement mechanism. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (icsid) has also been implicated. This is seen in the momentous diversity in investor-State disputes resolved by various icsid tribunals, which concern attempts by Latin American States to protect their physical environments such as the protection of wildlife or other matters such as the regulation of hazardous waste landfills and ensuring that citizens have access to clean water. Tribunals have approached such disputes primarily from a commercial standpoint, ignoring non-market alternatives such as environmental considerations.

scholarly journals China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Uncertain Experiment

2017 ◽  
pp. 673-711
Author(s):  
Gonzalo Villalta Puig ◽  
Sabrina Leung Tsam Tai
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
Foreign Investment ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Free Trade Zone ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
Management Method ◽  
Legal Uncertainty ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

The China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (PFTZ) is the first free trade zone of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It seeks to reform the national economy and open it up to foreign investment. This article argues that the suite of legal instruments that establish the PFTZ – the Framework Plan, the Negative List, the Decision, and the Management Method – are legally uncertain and that their legal uncertainty could cause disputes between PFTZ investors and the PRC. To address the problem of legal uncertainty, the article proposes, first, the adoption of a rational connection to the PFTZ as the test for jurisdiction of the PFTZ Court and the PFTZ Court of Arbitration; secondly, the enactment of the Negative List and the Decision as laws in order to clarify their legal status; and, thirdly, a reform of the PFTZ dispute settlement mechanism under the Management Method into an arbitral system.

The Legitimate Regulatory Distinction Test: Incomplete and Inadequate for the Particular Purposes of the TBT Agreement

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
JASON HOUSTON-MCMILLAN
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Technical Barriers To Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Special Circumstances ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

AbstractPrior to 2011, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade had been somewhat neglected as a dispute-settlement mechanism, due in part to the lack of previous interpretation of the Agreement by WTO DSB Panels. In 2012, the Appellate Body adjudicated on three TBT disputes:US–Clove Cigarettes, US–Tuna II, andUS–COOL, aiming to officially interpret and clarify Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Agreement by creating a distinct test for a measure's consistency with these Articles. This paper explores the relevant decisions of both the Panel and Appellate Body in the three disputes which led to the creation of the ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’ test. The substance behind this phrase, placed in context, is dissected along with the associated idea of ‘even-handedness’. The test attempts to simplify future interpretations regarding what will constitute unjustifiable discrimination, but at the cost of the necessary distinction between the GATT and the TBT Agreement being blurred. The result is a test which is incomplete and which fails to take account of the special circumstances surrounding the TBT Agreement.

EUROPEAN UNION IN WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (XX) ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Czermińska
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
World Trade Organisation ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Trade Conflicts ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Descriptive Method

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) serves as a forum for co-operation, currently for as many as 164 countries, and in addition, it allows for the resolution, also amicably, of trade conflicts between parties, consequently, settling disputes between them. One of essential provisions of the Uruguay Round (UR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) included the introduction of a new dispute settlement mechanism, that is to say, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which became effective on 1 January 1995. Member States of the European Union were not only actively involved in developing the rules of the international trade system, but they also influenced, to a large extent, the form of both such rules and of ongoing trade negotiations, as well as they assumed and still assume responsibility for the final arrangements. Hence, their role in the multilateral trade system is both active and passive. This paper aims to demonstrate the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and show the role which the European Union serves in this system. The Article employs an analytical and descriptive method. It draws on sources from the national and international literature and WTO’s databases.

“Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in the wto: National Security as an Issue of Competence

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 424-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes L. Schloemann ◽  
Stefan Ohlhoff
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Uruguay Round ◽  
Significant Shift ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Trade Law ◽  
International Trade Law ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

The 1994 Uruguay Round revision of the dispute settlement mechanism under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) has made it a forum both for traditional trade issues and for interests ranging from environmental protection to national security. The limits of GATT jurisdiction have become important issues of dispute settlement within the WTO, especially as the emergence of the WTO and its rule-based, quasi-obligatory dispute settlement system has spurred a significant shift toward legalism. Constitutional structures are developing much faster in international trade law than in any other area of international law and, in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round, are integrating ever more aspects of economic relations among states. Within the WTO regime the dispute settlement mechanism established by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) plays a prominent role in enforcing its rules and reconciling a wide array of the members’ interests. The limits of the reach of the dispute settlement mechanism, given its obligatory character, are, to a certain degree, the limits of the constitutionalization of the organization as a whole.

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