Kollektive Güter und individuelle Verantwortung

1989 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Leist
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Threshold Effects ◽  
Large Groups

AbstractIn acting within large groups the single actor typically suffers from the symptom of irrelevance of his contribution. A single contributory effect may be extremely small or, due to ‘threshold effects’, even non-existent. Given such conditions not only self-interested action, also purely altruistically motivated contribution seems to be rendered irrational. The article reasons that the famous ‘principles of generalization’ are of no help on this problem. However, a ‘principle of division’ could be used in showing, that in many situations of collective action altruistically motivated contribution is rationally sound.

Collective Action and the Fallacy of the Liberal Fallacy

1981 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Kimber
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Net Benefit ◽  
Large Group ◽  
Large Groups ◽  
Interested Individual

The problem of whether the rational, self-interested individual will voluntarily subscribe to a large group providing collective benefits is examined, using the perspectives of Hardin's application of game theory and Olson's application of economic theory. The arguments in each case are held to be unsatisfactory, and the same analysis cannot automatically be applied to all problems involving collective action. The subscription to large groups normally represents a distinct sub-class of problems, the solution to which, contrary to the established wisdom, is that the rational, self-interested individual with a net benefit (together, perhaps, with the irrational one with a net loss) will voluntarily subscribe to a group providing a collective good.

Group Size and Collective Action

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARUN AGRAWAL ◽  
SANJEEV GOYAL
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Distinctive Aspect ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Large Groups

This article examines the hypothesis that group size is inversely related to successful collective action. A distinctive aspect of the article is that it combines the analysis of primary data collected by the authors with a game-theoretic model. The model considers a group of people protecting a commonly owned resource from excessive exploitation. The authors view monitoring of individual actions as a collective good and focus on third-party monitoring. We argue that the costs of monitoring rise more than proportionately as group size increases. This factor along with lumpiness in the monitoring technology yields the following theoretical conclusion: Medium-sized groups are more likely than small or large groups to provide third-party monitoring. The authors find that the empirical evidence is consistent with this theoretical result.

scholarly journals Public good provision by large groups – the logic of collective action revisited

2019 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 348-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Weimann ◽  
Jeannette Brosig-Koch ◽  
Timo Heinrich ◽  
Heike Hennig-Schmidt ◽  
Claudia Keser
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Large Groups

scholarly journals SISTEMA DE TUTELA JURISDICCIONAL CIVIL COLECTIVO

2019 ◽  
pp. 129-139
Author(s):  
VICTOR MAMANI OLIVERA
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Res Judicata ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
Adequate Representation ◽  
Collective Process ◽  
Large Groups ◽  
Modelo Económico ◽  
Legal Consequences

Teniendo en cuenta el modelo económico-comercial actual, que tiene entre algunas de sus características, ser global, transnacional y estar orientado a vincularse de forma directa o indirecta con grandes grupos o colectividades (masas) y generar consecuencias jurídicas de carácter colectivo, es fundamental que el Derecho Civil se oriente a brindar tutela material y jurisdiccional colectiva; Por tal motivo, corresponde revisar (conceptualmente)el Sistema de Tutela Jurisdiccional peruano, caracterizado por ser personalista que no resulta suficiente para atender situaciones jurídicas de carácter colectivo. Una alternativa importante viene a ser El Sistema de Tutela Jurisdiccional Civil Colectivo, que permite recurrir a instancia judicial ejercitando la acción colectiva, la representación adecuada, un proceso colectivo y un pronunciamiento que al adquirir la calidad de cosa juzgada tiene efectos expansivos –erga omnes–. Taking into account the current economic-commercial model, which has among some of its characteristics, being global, transnational and oriented towards linking directly or indirectly with large groups or collectivities (masses) and generating legal consequences of a collective nature, it is essential that the Civil Law is oriented to provide collective material and jurisdictional protection; For this reason, it is appropriate to review (conceptually) the PeruvianJurisdictional Guardianship System, characterized by being a personalist that is not sufficient to address collective legal situations. An important alternative is the Collective Civil Jurisdictional Guardianship System, which allows recourse to judicial action exercising collective action, adequate representation, a collective process and a pronouncement that when acquiring the quality of res judicata has expansive effects –erga omnes–.

scholarly journals Sustaining Scholarly Infrastructures through Collective Action: The lessons that Olson can teach us

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cameron Neylon
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Side Effect ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Political Economics ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
The Political ◽  
Effective Number ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Large Groups

AbstractInfrastructures for data, such as repositories, curation systems, aggregators, indexes and standards are public goods. This means that finding sustainable economic models to support them is a challenge. This is due to free-loading, where someone who does not contribute to the support of the infrastructure nonetheless gains the benefit of it. The work of Mancur Olson (1974) suggests there are only three ways to address this for large groups: compulsion (often as some form of taxation) to support the infrastructure; the provision of non-collective (club) goods limited to those who contribute as a side-effect of providing the collective good; or mechanisms that lower the effective number of participants in the negotiation (oligopoly).In this paper I use Olson’s framework to analyze existing scholarly infrastructures and proposals for the sustainability of new infrastructures. I argue that the focus on sustainability models prior to seeking a set of agreed governance principles is the wrong approach. Rather we need to understand how to navigate from club-like to public-like goods. We need to define the communities that contribute and identify club-like benefits for those contributors. We need interoperable principles of governance and resourcing to provide public-like goods and we should draw on the political economics of taxation to develop this.

Challenges for Society

2021 ◽  
pp. 145-169
Author(s):  
Harvey Whitehouse
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Scientific Interest ◽  
Global Issues ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Positive Action ◽  
Intergroup Conflicts ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Climate Crisis ◽  
Large Groups

The theories laid out step by step in the preceding chapters are not only of intrinsic scientific interest; they are also potentially of great practical use. Using the UK government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic as an example, this chapter begins by exploring various ways in which attention to our three kinds of interacting landscapes might enable us to tackle various collective action problems more effectively. It then considers how insights from the study of imagistic group bonding could be used to prevent or resolve intergroup conflicts, whether by defusing groups bent on violence or by rechannelling their extreme loyalty to the group in more peaceful and consensual ways. Moving from this to the problems posed by populism and polarization in large groups, attention then turns to the role of the doctrinal mode in fuelling dissent and the breakdown of cooperation, but also its potential to help us coordinate positive action on global issues, such as the climate crisis, more effectively than ever before.

Ideas and Leaders in Contentious Politics: One Parish Priest in El Salvador's Popular Movement

2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (01) ◽  
pp. 76-101
Author(s):  
PETER M. SANCHEZ
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
El Salvador ◽  
Liberation Theology ◽  
Contentious Politics ◽  
Religious Leaders ◽  
Political Movement ◽  
Parish Priest ◽  
Historical Moment ◽  
Resource Mobilisation ◽  
The Church

AbstractThis paper examines the actions of one Salvadorean priest – Padre David Rodríguez – in one parish – Tecoluca – to underscore the importance of religious leadership in the rise of El Salvador's contentious political movement that began in the early 1970s, when the guerrilla organisations were only just beginning to develop. Catholic leaders became engaged in promoting contentious politics, however, only after the Church had experienced an ideological conversion, commonly referred to as liberation theology. A focus on one priest, in one parish, allows for generalisation, since scores of priests, nuns and lay workers in El Salvador followed the same injustice frame and tactics that generated extensive political mobilisation throughout the country. While structural conditions, collective action and resource mobilisation are undoubtedly necessary, the case of religious leaders in El Salvador suggests that ideas and leadership are of vital importance for the rise of contentious politics at a particular historical moment.

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