Collective Action and the Fallacy of the Liberal Fallacy

1981 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Kimber
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Net Benefit ◽  
Large Group ◽  
Large Groups ◽  
Interested Individual

The problem of whether the rational, self-interested individual will voluntarily subscribe to a large group providing collective benefits is examined, using the perspectives of Hardin's application of game theory and Olson's application of economic theory. The arguments in each case are held to be unsatisfactory, and the same analysis cannot automatically be applied to all problems involving collective action. The subscription to large groups normally represents a distinct sub-class of problems, the solution to which, contrary to the established wisdom, is that the rational, self-interested individual with a net benefit (together, perhaps, with the irrational one with a net loss) will voluntarily subscribe to a group providing a collective good.

Group Size and Collective Action

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARUN AGRAWAL ◽  
SANJEEV GOYAL
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Distinctive Aspect ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Large Groups

This article examines the hypothesis that group size is inversely related to successful collective action. A distinctive aspect of the article is that it combines the analysis of primary data collected by the authors with a game-theoretic model. The model considers a group of people protecting a commonly owned resource from excessive exploitation. The authors view monitoring of individual actions as a collective good and focus on third-party monitoring. We argue that the costs of monitoring rise more than proportionately as group size increases. This factor along with lumpiness in the monitoring technology yields the following theoretical conclusion: Medium-sized groups are more likely than small or large groups to provide third-party monitoring. The authors find that the empirical evidence is consistent with this theoretical result.

scholarly journals Sustaining Scholarly Infrastructures through Collective Action: The lessons that Olson can teach us

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cameron Neylon
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Side Effect ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Political Economics ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
The Political ◽  
Effective Number ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Large Groups

AbstractInfrastructures for data, such as repositories, curation systems, aggregators, indexes and standards are public goods. This means that finding sustainable economic models to support them is a challenge. This is due to free-loading, where someone who does not contribute to the support of the infrastructure nonetheless gains the benefit of it. The work of Mancur Olson (1974) suggests there are only three ways to address this for large groups: compulsion (often as some form of taxation) to support the infrastructure; the provision of non-collective (club) goods limited to those who contribute as a side-effect of providing the collective good; or mechanisms that lower the effective number of participants in the negotiation (oligopoly).In this paper I use Olson’s framework to analyze existing scholarly infrastructures and proposals for the sustainability of new infrastructures. I argue that the focus on sustainability models prior to seeking a set of agreed governance principles is the wrong approach. Rather we need to understand how to navigate from club-like to public-like goods. We need to define the communities that contribute and identify club-like benefits for those contributors. We need interoperable principles of governance and resourcing to provide public-like goods and we should draw on the political economics of taxation to develop this.

Pengembangan Bahan Ajar Matematika Bisnis Berbasis Komputer Untuk Mahasiswa Jurusan Akuntansi Politeknik Negeri Bali

Epigram ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-110
Author(s):  
I Made Wijana ◽  
Anak Agung Putri Suardani ◽  
I Gede Made Karma
Keyword(s):  
Small Group ◽  
Mathematics Teaching ◽  
Needs Analysis ◽  
Average Score ◽  
Teaching Materials ◽  
Initial Product ◽  
Large Group ◽  
Computer Based ◽  
Large Groups ◽  
Expert Validation

This research aims to produce prototype of computer-based business mathematics teaching materials to improve student achievement of Accounting Department, Politeknik Negeri Bali (PNB). In this research, to reach the target of teaching materials of computer-based business mathematics, the development using Borg and Gall method with some modifications into five steps: needs analysis and curriculum majoring in accounting, initial product development, education expert validation, small group trial , and large group trials. Trial of small group and large group by involving first semester student of Diploma IV Managerial Accounting Study Program, Accounting Department, PNB. Based on curriculum analysis and needs analysis, teaching materials are developed in the form of modules with Microsoft Excel application and the result of the initial product are five modules with topics of Formula, Linear and Non Linear Functions, Interest Calculation, Annuity, and Linear Programming. Education expert validation using five aspects resulted in an average score of 4.13 (good). Trial of the teaching materials by measuring student perceptions using three aspects for small groups resulted in an average score of 3.81 (good) and for large groups resulted in an average score of 4.23 (good). Furthermore, results of evaluation in large groups indicate a significant increase in mean of student scores from before and after using computer-based Business Mathematics teaching materials 

Groepsidentificatie en cognitie

2021 ◽  
Vol 113 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-361
Author(s):  
Marc Slors
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Function ◽  
Group Formation ◽  
Group Identification ◽  
Specific Behavior ◽  
Large Group ◽  
Dress Codes ◽  
Cultural Infrastructure ◽  
Large Groups ◽  
Shared Norms ◽  
Evolutionary Explanations

Abstract Group-identification and cognition: Why trivial conventions are more important than we think In existing (evolutionary) explanations for group formation and -identification, the function of cultural conventions such as social etiquette and dress codes is limited to providing group-markers. Group formation and identification itself is explained in terms of less arbitrary and more substantial phenomena such as shared norms and institutions. In this paper I will argue that, however trivial and arbitrary, cultural conventions fulfil an important cognitive function that makes them essential to the formation of and identification with large groups. Complex role-division, both informal and institutional, is important in the functioning of any large group of people. Shared conventions enable a virtually automatic understanding of signals, scripts and rules that regulate the interaction of divided roles. They provide a cultural infrastructure within which we perceive e.g. specific behavior and clothing as a range of social-cultural affordances for role-interactions. Shared familiarity with this infrastructure is the foundation for the basic kind of trust of in-group strangers that is a requirement for the formation of large groups. This non-intellectualist view on group formation and group identification can contribute to new ways of dealing with problems in multicultural societies.

Kollektive Güter und individuelle Verantwortung

1989 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Leist
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Threshold Effects ◽  
Large Groups

AbstractIn acting within large groups the single actor typically suffers from the symptom of irrelevance of his contribution. A single contributory effect may be extremely small or, due to ‘threshold effects’, even non-existent. Given such conditions not only self-interested action, also purely altruistically motivated contribution seems to be rendered irrational. The article reasons that the famous ‘principles of generalization’ are of no help on this problem. However, a ‘principle of division’ could be used in showing, that in many situations of collective action altruistically motivated contribution is rationally sound.

scholarly journals Characteristic of Dystrustepts in the Venezuelan Andes

2009 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 1777-1784
Author(s):  
Guido Ochoa ◽  
Jajaira Oballos ◽  
Juan Carlos Velásquez ◽  
Isabel López ◽  
Jorge Manrique
Keyword(s):  
Principal Component ◽  
Parent Material ◽  
Soil Taxonomy ◽  
Organic C ◽  
Discrimination Analysis ◽  
Large Group ◽  
The Us ◽  
Acid Reaction ◽  
Large Groups ◽  
Soil Groups

The majority (60 %) of the soils in the Venezuelan Andes are Inceptisols, a large percentage of which are classified as Dystrustepts by the US Soil Taxonomy, Second Edition of 1999. Some of these soils were classified as Humitropepts (high organic - C-OC-soils) and Dystropepts by the Soil Taxonomy prior to 1999, but no equivalent large group was created for high-OC soils in the new Ustepts suborder. Dystrusepts developed on different materials, relief and vegetation. Their properties are closely related with the parent material. Soils developed on transported deposits or sediments have darker and thicker A horizons, a slightly acid reaction, greater CEC and OC contents than upland slope soils. Based on the previous classification into large groups (Humitropepts and Dystropepts) we found that: Humitropepts have a slightly less acid and higher values of CEC than Dystropepts. These properties or characteristics seem to be related to the fact that Humitropepts have a higher clay and OC content than the Dystropepts. Canonical discrimination analysis showed that the variables that discriminate the two great soil groups from each other are OC and silt. Data for Humitropepts are grouped around the OC vector (defining axis 3, principal component analysis), while Dystropepts are associated with the clay and sand vectors, with significant correlation. Given the importance of OC for soil properties, we propose the creation of a new large group named Humustepts for the order Inceptisol, suborder Ustepts.

scholarly journals Note historique sur les effets externes

2009 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 420-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Jacques Laffont
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Note ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Pecuniary Externalities ◽  
Artificial Markets ◽  
Technological Externalities ◽  
The Creation

Abstract This historical note describes from Sidgwick on the evolution of the concepts related to the interdependencies of economic agents outside markets. In a first section, we show how the concept of externality introduced by some precursors had later to reemerge from the confuse discussion of "empty boxes". The second sector clarifies the distinction between two avenues of research, the first one associated with pecuniary externalities, the other one associated with technological externalities. Coase's criticisms of Pigouvian policy are developed in section 3. In a last section we gather the main results obtained recently by economic theory in this field. In particular we discuss the difficulties of the creation of artificial markets, the second best approaches often needed in a Pigouvian policy, results of game theory in models with externalities, planning with externalities.

scholarly journals The Wisdom of the Market: Using Human Factors to Design Prediction Markets for Collective Intelligence

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 1471-1475
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Barberis Canonico ◽  
Christopher Flathmann ◽  
Nathan McNeese
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Machine Learning ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Human Factors ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Collective Intelligence ◽  
Human Intelligence ◽  
Prediction Markets ◽  
New Model ◽  
Large Groups

There is an ever-growing literature on the power of prediction markets to harness “the wisdom of the crowd” from large groups of people. However, traditional prediction markets are not designed in a human-centered way, often restricting their own potential. This creates the opportunity to implement a cognitive science perspective on how to enhance the collective intelligence of the participants. Thus, we propose a new model for prediction markets that integrates human factors, cognitive science, game theory and machine learning to maximize collective intelligence. We do this by first identifying the connections between prediction markets and collective intelligence, to then use human factors techniques to analyze our design, culminating in the practical ways with which our design enables artificial intelligence to complement human intelligence.

scholarly journals Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory

1999 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 1067-1082 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger B Myerson
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game Theory ◽  
History Of Social Science ◽  
History Of

John Nash's formulation of noncooperative game theory was one of the great breakthroughs in the history of social science. Nash's work in this area is reviewed in its historical context to better understand how the fundamental ideas of noncooperative game theory were developed and how they changed the course of economic theory.

scholarly journals Group augmentation, collective action, and territorial boundary patrols by male chimpanzees

2017 ◽  
Vol 114 (28) ◽  
pp. 7337-7342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin E. Langergraber ◽  
David P. Watts ◽  
Linda Vigilant ◽  
John C. Mitani
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Dominance Rank ◽  
Primate Species ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
High Dominance ◽  
Participation Costs ◽  
Low Costs

How can collective action evolve when individuals benefit from cooperation regardless of whether they pay its participation costs? According to one influential perspective, collective action problems are common, especially when groups are large, but may be solved when individuals who have more to gain from the collective good or can produce it at low costs provide it to others as a byproduct. Several results from a 20-y study of one of the most striking examples of collective action in nonhuman animals, territorial boundary patrolling by male chimpanzees, are consistent with these ideas. Individuals were more likely to patrol when (i) they had more to gain because they had many offspring in the group; (ii) they incurred relatively low costs because of their high dominance rank and superior physical condition; and (iii) the group size was relatively small. However, several other findings were better explained by group augmentation theory, which proposes that individuals should bear the short-term costs of collective action even when they have little to gain immediately if such action leads to increases in group size and long-term increases in reproductive success. In support of this theory, (i) individual patrolling effort was higher and less variable than participation in intergroup aggression in other primate species; (ii) males often patrolled when they had no offspring or maternal relatives in the group; and (iii) the aggregate patrolling effort of the group did not decrease with group size. We propose that group augmentation theory deserves more consideration in research on collective action.

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