scholarly journals Supply-side Effects of Pandemic Mortality: Insights from an Overlapping-generations Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Etienne Gagnon ◽  
Benjamin K. Johannsen ◽  
David López-Salido

Abstract We use an overlapping-generations model to explore the implications of mortality during pandemics for the economy’s productive capacity. Under current epidemiological projections for the progression of COVID-19, our model suggests that mortality will have, in itself, only small effects on output and factor prices because projected mortality is small in proportion to the population and skewed toward individuals who are retired from the labor force. That said, we show that if the spread of COVID-19 is not contained, or if the ongoing pandemic were to follow a mortality pattern similar to the 1918–1920 Great Influenza pandemic, then the effects on the productive capacity would be economically significant and persist for decades.

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (062) ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Neil Bhutta ◽  
Andreas Fuster ◽  
Aurel Hizmo ◽  
◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (060) ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Etienne Gagnon ◽  
Benjamin Johannsen ◽  
David López-Salido ◽  
◽  
...  

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 1198-1226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Bossi ◽  
Gulcin Gumus

In this paper, we set up a three-period stochastic overlapping-generations model to analyze the implications of income inequality and mobility for demand for redistribution and social insurance. We model the size of two different public programs under the welfare state. We investigate bidimensional voting on the tax rates that determine the allocation of government revenues among transfer payments and old-age pensions. We show that the coalitions formed, the resulting political equilibria, and the demand for redistribution crucially depend on the level of income inequality and mobility.


2020 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 2542-2567
Author(s):  
B Biais ◽  
A Landier

Abstract While potentially more productive, more complex tasks generate larger agency rents. Agents therefore prefer to acquire complex skills, to earn large rents. In our overlapping generations model, their ability to do so is kept in check by competition with predecessors. Old agents, however, are imperfect substitutes for young ones, because the latter are easier to incentivize, thanks to longer horizons. This reduces competition between generations, enabling young managers to go for larger complexity than their predecessors. Consequently, equilibrium complexity and rents gradually increase beyond what is optimal for the principal and for society.


1982 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 429
Author(s):  
Paul D. Evans ◽  
Laurence H. Meyers

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