Agreeing to Disagree with Conditional Probability Systems

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elias Tsakas
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Interactive Epistemology ◽  
Agreeing To Disagree ◽  
Conditioning Event

Abstract In this note, we extend Aumann’s agreement theorem to a framework where beliefs are modelled by conditional probability systems à la Battigalli, P., and M. Siniscalchi. 1999. “Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games.” Journal of Economic Theory 88: 188–230. We prove two independent generalizations of the agreement theorem, one where the agents share some common conditioning event, and one where they may not.

scholarly journals Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies

2018 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 737-763 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Battigalli ◽  
Pietro Tebaldi
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Interactive Epistemology

scholarly journals Jonathan Levin: 2011 John Bates Clark Medalist

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-222
Author(s):  
Liran Einav ◽  
Steve Tadelis
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Market Design ◽  
Estimation Methods ◽  
Microeconomic Theory ◽  
Econometric Methods ◽  
Economics Of Contracts

Jonathan Levin, the 2011 recipient of the American Economic Association's John Bates Clark Medal, has established himself as a leader in the fields of industrial organization and microeconomic theory. Jon has made important contributions in many areas: the economics of contracts and organizations; market design; markets with asymmetric information; and estimation methods for dynamic games. Jon's combination of breadth and depth is remarkable, ranging from important papers in very distinct areas such as economic theory and econometric methods to applied work that seamlessly integrates theory with data. In what follows, we will attempt to do justice not only to Jon's academic work, but also try to sketch a broader portrait of Jon's other contributions to economics as a gifted teacher, dedicated advisor, and selfless provider of public goods.

scholarly journals Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games

1999 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 188-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Battigalli ◽  
Marciano Siniscalchi
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Interactive Epistemology

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

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