scholarly journals Jonathan Levin: 2011 John Bates Clark Medalist

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-222
Author(s):  
Liran Einav ◽  
Steve Tadelis
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Market Design ◽  
Estimation Methods ◽  
Microeconomic Theory ◽  
Econometric Methods ◽  
Economics Of Contracts

Jonathan Levin, the 2011 recipient of the American Economic Association's John Bates Clark Medal, has established himself as a leader in the fields of industrial organization and microeconomic theory. Jon has made important contributions in many areas: the economics of contracts and organizations; market design; markets with asymmetric information; and estimation methods for dynamic games. Jon's combination of breadth and depth is remarkable, ranging from important papers in very distinct areas such as economic theory and econometric methods to applied work that seamlessly integrates theory with data. In what follows, we will attempt to do justice not only to Jon's academic work, but also try to sketch a broader portrait of Jon's other contributions to economics as a gifted teacher, dedicated advisor, and selfless provider of public goods.

scholarly journals Nędza koncepcji globalnych dóbr publicznych

Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (3(60)) ◽  
pp. 269-287
Author(s):  
Dominik Kopiński ◽  
Andrzej Polus
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Academic Community ◽  
Microeconomic Theory ◽  
Earth Atmosphere ◽  
Global Public Goods ◽  
Global Citizens ◽  
True Meaning ◽  
Definition Of

The Poverty of the Concept of Global Public Goods The concept of global public goods (GPG) reflects an attempt to replicate a microeconomic theory of public goods to the domain of international relations (IR). According to economic definition of public goods, which have two properties – non-rivalry and non-exclusivity, pure GPG can be consumed universally and simultaneously by (ideally) all global citizens; at the same time, no society can be excluded from its consumption. Classic examples of GPG include earth atmosphere, knowledge or financial stability. Notwithstanding the fact that pure public goods are incredibly rare, the very definition of GPG is highly problematic. This article is intended as an intervention in a critical debate about the true meaning of the GPGs. Its authors argue that to date the academic community has failed to agree on an intersubjective understanding of GPG. They also claim that the current functioning of the concept in the discourse within IR is “poor”, i.e. it is insufficiently rigorous, blurred and methodologically inconsistent. On the flip side, the way GPG has found its way to IR reflects some of the main problems that the field has been recently immersed in.

Economy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Koch
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
Economic Systems ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
Exogenous Factor ◽  
Neoclassical Economic Theory ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Religious Economies

Religion is in many ways an economic phenomenon and can be analyzed as such. By economy most economists understand systems for the allocation of resources. In this light, this chapter notes various ways in which religious organizations are engaged in sectoral markets and produce private and public goods, entailing products and services. Religion and economy are interdependent and relate to each other in distinct ways across societal subsystems. Economy both permeates religious structures and is a co-system. This is generally studied by political economy: recent moves beyond neoclassical economic theory (which saw culture as an exogenous factor) emphasize the economy’s embeddedness in social relationships and its variation across cultures. The chapter considers ways in which religious phenomena reflect recent changes in capitalist systems and ways in which religious economies function as explicit economic systems.

Designing Ecolabels In Order To Mitigate Market Failures

2005 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douadia Bougherara ◽  
Gilles Grolleau
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Qualitative Study ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Cognitive Support

For the market for ecofriendly characteristics of agrofood products to function effectively, means of mitigating asymmetric information, informational overload and public goods properties are necessary. Ecolabel success requires a design and an implementation capable of mitigating simultaneously these three sources of market failures. Our contribution differs from many to date by (1) introducing and analyzing the informational overload as a source of market failure and (2) considering the ecolabel, not only as a tool to re-establish information symmetry between the producer and consumer but also as a way to overcome informational overload and public goods problems. We analyze how these sources of market failures may be mitigated by providing information perceived as trustworthy, tying credence and public attributes to verifiable and private attributes and designing the ecolabel as a cognitive support for consumers. We provide an exploratory qualitative study of several French ecolabels to stress how they more or less succeed in attenuating the identified sources of market failures. Several implications for policymakers and managers are stressed. We conclude by suggesting several issues requiring further investigations. JEL Classification Numbers: D11, D21, L15

scholarly journals Transparency, asymmetric information and cooperation

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-294
Author(s):  
Gianna Lotito ◽  
Matteo Migheli ◽  
Guido Ortona
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Relative Performance ◽  
The Other ◽  
Competitive Environment ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Per Se

Abstract We inquire experimentally whether asymmetric information in competitive settings and competition per se influence individual social behaviour. Participants perform a task and are remunerated according to two schemes, a non-competitive and a competitive one, then they play a standard public goods game. In the first scheme participants earn a flat remuneration, in the other they are ranked according to their performance and remunerated accordingly. Information about ranking and income before the game is played varies across three different treatments. We find that competition per se does not affect the amount of contribution. The time spent to choose how much to contribute is negatively correlated with the decision of cooperating fully. The main result is that full information about the relative performance in the competitive environment enhances the cooperation, while partial information reduces it.

scholarly journals Free Riding without Dead Weight Losses

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (19) ◽  
pp. 5168
Author(s):  
Kwon-Sik Kim ◽  
Seong-ho Jeong
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Weight Loss ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Dead Weight ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Weight Losses

Traditional economic theory assumes that dead weight loss due to free riding on public goods is inevitable. This study demonstrates that free riding without dead weight losses can theoretically exist through Bowen’s model. To this end, this study uses the consumer surplus analysis to present the conditions for free-riding that do not involve dead weight losses, as well as to demonstrate that policy choices that satisfy both the value of efficiency and equity in the supply of public goods are possible. This article formularizes the conditions under which such exceptional cases occur and examines what policy implications the presence of such conditions have in making decisions about the provision of public goods. The discussion of possibility and conditions for free-riding without dead weight losses is significant in that it suggests theoretical and policy implications for policies to raise equity as another important value, not just providing a solution to market failure.

Efficient Market Design and Public Goods, Part I: Economic Models

ENERGYO ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Toomey ◽  
William D. Schulze ◽  
Robert Thomas ◽  
James S. Thorp ◽  
Daniel J. Tylavsky ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Market Design ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Efficient Market

Jeremiah Jenks: A Pioneer of Industrial Organization?

2004 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Howard Brown
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Progressive Era ◽  
Gilded Age ◽  
Relative Neglect ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject

Jeremiah Whittle Jenks currently ranks as one of the more obscure academic economists of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. While other prominent economists of the era such as Richard T. Ely and John Bates Clark have been the subject of many books and articles (Everett 1946, Rader 1966, and Henry 1996, for example) Jenks remains almost unknown and unheralded. For instance, he is scarcely mentioned in the relevant volume of Joseph Dorfman's The Economic Mind in American Civilization (Dorfman 1948, III), despite his very substantial scholarly and public roles in the economics of the day. He was likewise below the radar of Joseph A. Schumpeter's (1954) magisterial, History of Economic Analysis, and Mark Blaug's (1985) Economic Theory in Retrospect. Where Jenks's career has attracted scholarly notice, the aspects examined have focused less on his economic scholarship and more on his public policy roles. (Green 1956, Weinstein 1968, Furner 1975, Parrini and Sklar 1983) The reasons for Jenks's relative neglect are unclear, although several hypotheses will be entertained below.

Symposium on Amartya Sen's philosophy: 2 Unstrapping the straitjacket of ‘preference’: a comment on Amartya Sen's contributions to philosophy and economics

2001 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Individual Behavior ◽  
Microeconomic Theory ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Individual Welfare ◽  
Philosophy And Economics

The concept of preference dominates economic theory today. It performs a triple duty for economists, grounding their theories of individual behavior, welfare, and rationality. Microeconomic theory assumes that individuals act so as to maximize their utility – that is, to maximize the degree to which their preferences are satisfied. Welfare economics defines individual welfare in terms of preference satisfaction or utility, and social welfare as a function of individual preferences. Finally, economists assume that the rational act is the act that maximally satisfies an individual's preferences. The habit of framing problems in terms of the concept of preference is now so entrenched that economists rarely entertain alternatives.

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