Intersubjectivity at Close Quarters: How Dancers of Tango Argentino Use Imagery for Interaction and Improvisation

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-124
Author(s):  
Michael Kimmel

Abstract The article explores the prerequisites of embodied ‘conversations’ in the improvisational pair dance tango argentino. Tango has been characterized as a dialog of two bodies. Using first- and second-person phenomenological methods, I investigate the skills that enable two dancers to move as a super-individual ensemble, to communicate without time lag, and to feel the partner’s intention at every moment. How can two persons - walking in opposite directions and with partly different knowledge - remain in contact throughout, when every moment can be an invention? I analyze these feats through the lens of image schemas such as BALANCE, FORCE, PATH, and UP-DOWN (Johnson 1987). Technique-related discourse - with its use of didactic metaphor - abounds with image-schematic vectors, geometries, and construal operations like profiling. These enable the tango process: from posture, via walking technique and kinetics, to attention and contact skills. Dancers who organize their muscles efficiently - e.g., through core tension - and who respect postural ‘grammar’ - e.g., a good axis - enable embodied dialog by being receptive to their partners and being manoeuvrable. Super-individual imagery that defines ‘good’ states for a couple to stick to, along with relational attention management and kinetic calibration of joint walking, turns the dyad into a single action unit. My further objective is a micro-phenomenological analysis of joint improvisation. This requires a theory to explain dynamic sensing, the combining of repertory knowledge with this, and the managing of both in small increments. Dancers strategically sense action affordances (Gibson 1979) or recognize and exploit them on the fly. Dynamic routines allow them to negotiate workable configurations step-wise, assisted by their knowledge of node points where the elements of tango are most naturally connected and re-routed. The paper closes with general lessons to learn from these highly structured and embodied improvisational skills, especially regarding certain blind spots in current social cognition theory.

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 434-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Søren Overgaard ◽  
Joel Krueger

AbstractWe resist Schilbach et al.'s characterization of the “social perception” approach to social cognition as a “spectator theory” of other minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the crucial role interaction plays in enabling social understanding. We also highlight a dilemma Schilbach et al. face in attempting to distinguish their second-person approach from the social perception view.


2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 424-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-François Gariépy ◽  
Steve W. C. Chang ◽  
Michael L. Platt

AbstractIn the target article, Schilbach et al. defend a “second-person neuroscience” perspective that focuses on the neural basis of social cognition during live, ongoing interactions between individuals. We argue that a second-person neuroscience would benefit from formal approaches borrowed from economics and behavioral ecology and that it should be extended to social interactions in nonhuman animals.


2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonhard Schilbach ◽  
Bert Timmermans ◽  
Vasudevi Reddy ◽  
Alan Costall ◽  
Gary Bente ◽  
...  

AbstractIn spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could – paradoxically – be seen as representing the “dark matter” of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations that allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies, and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really “go social”; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd Oakley

AbstractMuch social cognition and action is dialogical in nature and profitably understood from a second-person perspective. The elemental social roles of “debtor” and “creditor” are of great importance in explaining the structure and history of a wide range of social facts and institutions. Yet these person-level experiences of indebtedness and the mental spaces they engender are not sufficient to account for complex social facts. Sovereign money systems are a leading example where our person-level experiences of exchange lead us astray by actively hindering our ability to grasp money’s macroeconomic functions. This article provides a comprehensive account of money as a distributed cognitive phenomenon. It summarizes and critiques a prior analysis of money as a conceptual blend enabling


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 165-170
Author(s):  
A. Bioy ◽  
B. Lionet

La douleur chronique atteint le sujet dans sa globalité. Par le passé, les études en psychologie se sont principalement intéressées aux facteurs de vulnérabilité : les facteurs individuels, les facteurs psychopathologiques et les facteurs émotionnels. Dorénavant, la recherche s’intéresse aux aspects protecteurs en tant qu’alternatives aux effets délétères de la douleur chronique. Nous présentons ici les résultats de notre étude sur la notion de mobilité psychique. Nous envisageons la mobilité psychique comme un mouvement du côté du sujet défini comme sa capacité à bouger dans ses représentations, ses investissements et son rapport à la douleur. La méthode est celle d’une recherche non interventionnelle portant sur le vécu de 14 personnes atteintes de douleur chronique. Deux entretiens de recherche sont réalisés à deux mois d’intervalle en amont de la prise en charge par une équipe douleur. Les données d’entretien sont exploitées en utilisant l’Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. La structuration de la relation d’objet est appréciée à travers la Social Cognition Object Relation Scale. Le vécu de la douleur est évalué à l’ENS et à l’EVA. Les résultats montrent que l’impact délétère de la douleur chronique domine l’expression du vécu spontané. La mobilité psychique est malgré tout présente chez la majorité des répondants. Deux voies sont repérables. Elles passent toutes les deux par la demande de soin et l’investissement actif dans les soins. La première voie « identitaire » se poursuit à travers la capacité à se représenter dans l’avenir et à intégrer son identité de douloureux chronique. La seconde voie est celle de l’incertitude. Elle concerne le fait de ne plus chercher à contrôler systématiquement sa douleur pour faire face à l’incertitude et à l’angoisse qu’elle génère. La qualité de structuration de la relation d’objet est globalement corrélée avec la mobilité psychique, mais elle n’est pas une condition suffisante. L’absence de mobilité psychique est effectivement liée à un vécu d’aggravation des pics douloureux évalués à l’EVA. La prise en compte de la mobilité psychique est une dimension pertinente pour les psychologues exerçants en équipe douleur. Elle peut être intégrée à leur évaluation et constituer un levier intéressant dans le cadre des psychothérapies.


2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Redcay ◽  
Katherine Rice ◽  
Rebecca Saxe

AbstractAlthough a second-person neuroscience has high ecological validity, the extent to which a second- versus third-person neuroscience approach fundamentally alters neural patterns of activation requires more careful investigation. Nonetheless, we are hopeful that this new avenue will prove fruitful in significantly advancing our understanding of typical and atypical social cognition.


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