scholarly journals Grounding Personal Persistence

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harriet E. Baber
Keyword(s):  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Ordinary Objects ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Temporal Properties ◽  
What Matters In Survival ◽  
What Matters

Abstract Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34 in this journal endorses modal counterpart theory but holds that temporal counterpart theory is untenable because it does not license the ascription of the intuitively correct temporal properties to ordinary objects, and hence that we should understand ordinary objects, including persons, as transtemporal ‘worms’. I argue that the worm theory is problematic when it comes to accounting for what matters in survival and that temporal counterpart theory provides a plausible account of personal persistence.

Counterpart Theories: The Argument from Concern

Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harriet E. Baber
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Ordinary Objects ◽  
Modal Fictionalism ◽  
The Way

Abstract Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory, the stage view, according to which people and other ordinary objects are instantaneous stages, identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Both counterpart theories invite what has been called ‘the argument from concern’ (Rosen, G. 1990. “Modal Fictionalism.” Mind 99 (395): 327–54). Why should I be concerned about my counterparts at other possible worlds or other times? I care about how things might have gone for me—not how they go for other people at other possible worlds; I care about my prospects—not the way go for other people at other times. Jiri Benovsky has argued that while modal counterpart theory can be defended against this style of argument, temporal counterpart theory cannot (Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34). I argue that temporal counterpart theory, like modal counterpart theory, resists the argument from concern.

Parfit on what matters in survival

1993 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Brueckner
Keyword(s):  
What Matters In Survival ◽  
What Matters

On What Matters in Survival

Mind ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol LXXXIX (355) ◽  
pp. 406-411
Author(s):  
NICHOLAS MEASOR
Keyword(s):  
What Matters In Survival ◽  
What Matters

What Matters in Survival

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Ehring
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Special Kind ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Normative Reason ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Motivating Reasons ◽  
What Matters In Survival ◽  
Extreme View ◽  
What Matters

This work is about what matters in survival, that is, about what relation to a future individual gives you a reason for prudential concern for that individual. For common sense there is such a relation and it is identity, but according to Parfit, common sense is wrong in this respect. Identity is not what matters in survival. In this work, it is argued that this Parfitian thesis, revolutionary though it is, does not go far enough. The result is the highly radical view, “Survival Nihilism,” according to which nothing matters in survival. Although we generally have motivating reasons to have prudential concern, and perhaps even indirect normative reasons for such concerns—such as a commitment to find a vaccine for the Covid-19 virus—there is no relation that gives you a basic, foundational normative reason for prudential concern. This view goes beyond what Parfit calls the Extreme View. It is the More Extreme View, and is, in effect, something like an error theory about prudential reason as a special kind of normative reason.

Classical theism and modal realism are incompatible

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHAD VANCE
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Special Case

AbstractThe classical conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds – no different in kind from the actual world. But, modal realism is equipped to accommodate the existence of a necessary being in only one of three ways: (1) By way of counterpart theory, or (2) by way of a special case of trans-world identity for causally inert necessary beings (e.g. pure sets), or else (3) causally potent ones which lack accidental intrinsic properties. I argue that each of these three options entails unacceptable consequences – (1) and (2) are incompatible with theism, and (3) is incompatible with modal realism. I conclude that (at least) one of these views is false.

Is Connectedness Necessary to What Matters in Survival

Ratio ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scot Campbell
Keyword(s):  
What Matters In Survival ◽  
What Matters

Fission and Indeterminacy

2021 ◽  
pp. 73-95
Author(s):  
Douglas Ehring
Keyword(s):  
Fission Product ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
What Matters In Survival ◽  
What Matters

In Chapter 3, the assumption that facts about personal identity are always fully determinate is put to one side so as to consider mappings of identity onto fission according to which it is indeterminate that the fissioner is identical to each fission product. In this chapter, the suggestion that what matters in survival is a relation that is “identity-based” but compatible with such indeterminacy is examined and rejected. In addition, an alternate claim is discussed according to which it is indeterminate, but nearly true that fissioner is identical to each fission product and it is that nearness to identity that really matters. This claim is rejected. It is concluded that identity and “identity-based” relations do not matter in fission.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Douglas Ehring
Keyword(s):  
Critical Part ◽  
Positive Argument ◽  
What Matters In Survival ◽  
What Matters

In the Introduction, the main questions and line of argument of this work are outlined. A summary of the critical part of this work is presented, the focus of which is on improving upon Parfit’s “Divergence Argument” for the thesis that identity is not what matters in survival, but showing that this argument still fails. Second, the positive argument of this work, the “triviality argument,” is outlined. This argument appeals to the idea that the important cannot depend on the trivial. According this argument, identity never matters in survival but neither does any other relation. The result is what I call “survival nihilism.”

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