U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-engagement after Years of Benign Neglect

Asian Survey ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 622-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diane K. Mauzy ◽  
Brian L. Job

American foreign policy in Southeast Asia from 1975 to the present can be characterized as exhibiting varying degrees of benign neglect, with episodic attention to perceived security threats. Current policies are narrowly focused on anti-terrorism; their perceived anti-Muslim overtones, while engendering instrumental cooperation, have tended to alienate Southeast Asian publics. U.S. influence in Southeast Asia appears to be waning, with China capitalizing on opportunities to expand its influence.

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (03) ◽  
pp. 84-100
Author(s):  
Kei KOGA

While the Suga administration has managed Japan’s foreign policy towards ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) relatively well on the basis of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” that former Prime Minister Abe had envisioned, the administration left a task for the next prime minister to creatively devise a foreign policy strategy to manage the three main challenges in the Indo-Pacific region concerning ASEAN Centrality, Indo-Pacific institutional arrangement and value-based diplomacy.


2020 ◽  
Vol SEAA20 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-76
Author(s):  
Daljit Singh ◽  

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 252-255
Author(s):  
Stanislav Gennadyevich Malkin ◽  
Sergey Olegovich Buranok ◽  
Dmitriy Aleksandrovich Nesterov

The following paper analyzes the characteristics of the US foreign policy decision-making process at the beginning of the Cold War, due to the active appeal of representatives of the political establishment, the military and the countrys expert community to the colonial experience of the European powers in terms of the prospects of applying their experience in ensuring colonial control in Southeast Asia before and after the end of the World War II as part of the US political course in this region. In addition, it is concluded that more attention should be paid to the role and, therefore, to the prosopographic profile of the experts (in the broad sense of the word), who collaborated with the departments responsible for the development of American foreign policy, such as the Department of State and the Pentagon, and formulated many of the conclusions, which, at least rhetorically, formed the basis of Washingtons course in Southeast Asia after 1945. Special attention is paid to interpretations of the role of colonial knowledge in the light of the unfolding Cold War in the third world, proposed by British diplomats and the military to their American colleagues in the logic of the special relations between Great Britain and the United States.


Author(s):  
Serhii Averianov ◽  

The article analyzes the the People's Republic of China (PRC) influence on the activities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the security sector. It outlines the specifics of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China in the region and its connection to the formation of the Southeast Asia (SA) security architecture processes. The article highlightes modern trends and tendencies of China's geostrategic positioning in the region, the pros and cons of the Chinese foreign policy concept at both regional and global levels. For many years China was seen as a threat to Southeast Asian countries due to its political ideology and active support for the uprisings in those countries. In 1967, when ASEAN was founded, China had serious doubts about the motives of this newly formed international union. Beijing was deeply concerned that the organization could have a hidden military connotation that would consolidate anti-Chinese sentiment in Southeast Asia. Formal relations between China and the Association were established in 1991. In July 1994 China became a «consultative partner» within ASEAN Regional Forum on Peace and Security. In 1996 by signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976 China became a full dialogue partner. The transformation of the system of international relations, as well as the global rebalance of power in the post-bipolar era have contributed to the strengthening of China`s positions in world politics. On the one hand the end of the Cold War minimized the risks of a nuclear catastrophe, but at the same time it actualized and accelerated trade and economic cooperation tendencies. In such circumstances most of ASEAN member states sought brand new approach towards China, willing to benefit from its economic upswing. For its part, China's growing dependence on energy forces it to engage in solving regional security issues more actively. Nowadays China's foreign policy is represented by the Belt and Road Initiative, formerly known as the One Belt One Road. It is a global infrastructure development strategy that includes 2 large-scale projects: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Participating in those projects seems lucrative for most Southeast Asia countries, due to their close economic ties with China being nearly the main driver of their own economies. After all, China still remains a key trading partner among ASEAN member states. However, on the other hand, many of the political elites fear that participation in China's projects will put them in a position of dependence on Beijing. That`s why ASEAN tries to maintain the SA as a peaceful, neutral region, free from the dominance of any regional or non-regional state.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Rachel Myrick

Abstract A common explanation for the increasing polarization in contemporary American foreign policy is the absence of external threat. I identify two mechanisms through which threats could reduce polarization: by revealing information about an adversary that elicits a bipartisan response from policymakers (information mechanism) and by heightening the salience of national relative to partisan identity (identity mechanism). To evaluate the information mechanism, study 1 uses computational text analysis of congressional speeches to explore whether security threats reduce partisanship in attitudes toward foreign adversaries. To evaluate the identity mechanism, study 2 uses public opinion polls to assess whether threats reduce affective polarization among the public. Study 3 tests both mechanisms in a survey experiment that heightens a security threat from China. I find that the external threat hypothesis has limited ability to explain either polarization in US foreign policy or affective polarization among the American public. Instead, responses to external threats reflect the domestic political environment in which they are introduced. The findings cast doubt on predictions that new foreign threats will inherently create partisan unity.


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