The Other Half Votes: A Guide to Public Opinion Polls . George Gallup. ; The People's Choice. How the Voter Makes up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign . Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, Hazel Gaudet. ; Mandate from the People . Jerome S. Bruner.

1945 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-124
Author(s):  
Franklin Fearing
2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022097903
Author(s):  
Alexander P. Landry ◽  
Elliott Ihm ◽  
Jonathan W. Schooler

Metadehumanization, the perception that members of an outgroup dehumanize your group, has been found to exacerbate intergroup conflict by inspiring reciprocal dehumanization of the offending outgroup. Moreover, metadehumanization is distinct from metaprejudice (i.e., the perception that an outgroup hates your group). Given the mutual animosity reported in public opinion polls toward the other side, we believed US–Russia relations would be a worthwhile context in which to extend this model. Therefore, we measured Americans’ levels of metadehumanization and metaprejudice of Russians to determine the association between these perceptions and their hostility toward Russians (Study 1). In this novel intergroup conflict, metadehumanization remained a consequential predictor of outgroup hostility over and above metaprejudice, suggesting that it can exacerbate a broader range of intergroup conflicts than those heretofore examined. Given these findings, we then sought to experimentally differentiate between metadehumanization and metaprejudice. In Study 2, we manipulated both metadehumanization and metaprejudice to (a) determine whether one or both cause greater outgroup hostility and (b) elucidate the underlying mechanisms by which they may produce this effect. Whereas metadehumanization produced greater hostility, metaprejudice did not. Moreover, although both metaperceptions inspired greater prejudice, only metadehumanization led to greater dehumanization. We conclude that metadehumanization may be a particularly potent fomenter of hostility because it inspires reciprocal dehumanization over and above more general negative bias.


2013 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 48-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oren Yiftachel

Israel’s 2013 Knesset elections, in which the incumbent ruling party was returned to power for the first time in a quarter-century, were noteworthy in several respects. The basic divisions of Israeli politics into geopolitical and socioeconomic blocs were unchanged, only small electoral shifts being registered. On the other hand, as this report shows, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu barely achieved an electoral victory despite his overwhelming preponderance in public-opinion polls. Due to the rise of the new, personality-driven Yesh Atid party and the latter’s unlikely alliance with the settler-based Jewish Home, which together garnered as many Knesset seats as the winning Likud-Yisrael Beitenu list, for the first time in decades ultra-Orthodox parties were excluded from the governing coalition. The elections were marked by the near-invisibility of the Palestinian issue and Palestinian citizens of Israel. The report concludes that the continuing governing consensus in favor of “liberal colonialism” is unsustainable, although exploiting the “cracks” in that consensus is difficult and unlikely in the short term.


2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Anderson ◽  
Frank Brettschneider

Although the German constitution does not provide for the directelection of the head of the executive branch by the people, the preeminentposition of the federal chancellor has long tempted commentatorsto describe the German political system as a “chancellordemocracy.”1 Based on this characterization, one might be temptedto assume that the German election of 2002 was therefore aboutelecting a chancellor. To be sure, if voters could have voted for thechancellor directly in 2002, Gerhard Schröder would have easilydefeated Edmund Stoiber. Yet, despite public opinion polls that neveronce showed the challenger outpolling the chancellor throughout theentire election year, the election turned out to be a cliffhanger.


2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirill Kalinin

This study sheds new light on whether responses to public opinion polls, namely, preference falsification, can affect the level of election fraud by employing Kuran’s model of preference falsification, which is empirically tested on the data collected from the most recent presidential campaign in Russia (2012). My research findings reveal the presence of a statistically significant effect of preference falsification on election fraud, thus enabling me to conclude that preference falsification is, indeed, conducive to election fraud. My findings can be generalised to a broad set of electoral autocracies, enabling scholars to get a better understanding of the mechanism by which survey polls can incentivise officials to commit election fraud.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-75
Author(s):  
Alexey Levinson

The 2018 Russian presidential election was effectively a contest not between Vladimir Putin and the other seven candidates on the ballot paper, but between Putin and the level of election turnout. Anything less than a large majority based on a respectable level of turnout would have undermined Putin’s legitimacy to serve for a further six-year term. In the event, Putin achieved his goal. Through the analysis of public opinion polls conducted by the Levada Center, we examine the background to the election. Putin’s success can be traced, first to long-standing patterns of differential turnout across the regions and, second, administrative initiatives by the election authorities which created a renewed confidence in the integrity of the election process.


2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger W. Lotchin

Public opinion polls taken between 1939 and 1945 questioned Americans’ attitudes toward Japan and Germany and toward the people of Japan and Japanese Americans. The polls’ quantified responses provide previously overlooked data that should be taken into account by scholars of Japanese American and World War II history.


1950 ◽  
Vol 19 (10) ◽  
pp. 101-103
Author(s):  
Arthur N. Feraru

2018 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 266-273
Author(s):  
Ivan S. Palitai

The article is devoted to the modern Russian party system. In the first part of the article, the author shows the historical features of the parties formation in Russia and analyzes the reasons for the low turnout in the elections to the State Duma in 2016. According to the author the institutional reasons consist in the fact that the majority of modern political parties show less and less ability to produce new ideas, and the search for meanings is conducted on the basis of the existing, previously proposed sets of options. Parties reduce the topic of self-identification in party rhetoric, narrowing it down to “branded” ideas or focusing on the image of the leader. In addition, the author shows the decrease in the overall political activity of citizens after the 2011 elections, and points out that the legislation amendments led to the reduction of the election campaigns duration and changes in the voting system itself. The second part of the article is devoted to the study of the psychological aspects of the party system. The author presents the results of the investigation of images of the parties as well as the results of the population opinion polls, held by the centers of public opinion study. On the basis of this data, the author concludes that according to the public opinion the modern party system is ineffective, and the parties don’t have real political weight, which leads to the decrease of the interest in their activities and confidence in them. The author supposes that all this may be the consequence of the people’s fatigue from the same persons in politics, but at the same time the electorate’s desire to see new participants in political processes is formulated rather vaguely, since, according to the people, this might not bring any positive changes.


Author(s):  
William W. Franko ◽  
Christopher Witko

Here the authors present the variation that exists in income inequality across the states, and variation in public awareness or concern about income inequality as measured by public opinion polls. Though politicians may decide to tackle income inequality even in the absence of public concern about inequality, the authors argue that government responses are more likely when and where there is a growing awareness of, and concern about, inequality, which is confirmed in the analyses in this book. To examine this question in subsequent chapters, a novel measure of public awareness of rising state inequality is developed. Using these estimates, this chapter shows that the growth in the public concern about inequality responds in part to objective increases in inequality, but also that state political conditions, particularly mass partisanship, shape perceptions of inequality.


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