scholarly journals Delphi object files decompiler

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 105-116
Author(s):  
A.A. Mikhailov ◽  
A.E. Hmelnov
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. J. Green
Keyword(s):  

2005 ◽  
Vol 58 (5) ◽  
pp. 931-960 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin W. Tatler ◽  
Iain D. Gilchrist ◽  
Michael F. Land

Object descriptions are extracted and retained across saccades when observers view natural scenes. We investigated whether particular object properties are encoded and the stability of the resulting memories. We tested immediate recall of multiple types of information from real-world scenes and from computer-presented images of the same scenes. The relationship between fixations and properties of object memory was investigated. Position information was encoded and accumulated from multiple fixations. In contrast, identity and colour were encoded but did not require direct fixation and did not accumulate. In the current experiments, participants were unable to recall any information about shape or relative distances between objects. In addition, where information was encoded we found differential patterns of stability. Data from viewing real scenes and images were highly consistent, with stronger effects in the real-world conditions. Our findings imply that object files are not dependent upon the encoding of any particular object property and so are robust to dynamic visual environments.


2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (9) ◽  
pp. 916-916 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Gao ◽  
B. Scholl
Keyword(s):  

Analysis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-301
Author(s):  
Ian Phillips

Abstract A wealth of cases – most notably blindsight and priming under inattention or suppression – have convinced philosophers and scientists alike that perception occurs outside awareness. In recent work (Phillips 2016a, 2018; Phillips and Block 2017, Peters et al. 2017), I dispute this consensus, arguing that any putative case of unconscious perception faces a dilemma. The dilemma divides over how absence of awareness is established. If subjective reports are used, we face the problem of the criterion: the concern that such reports underestimate conscious experience (Eriksen 1960, Holender 1986, Peters and Lau 2015). If objective measures are used, we face the problem of attribution: the concern that the case does not involve genuine individual-level perception. Quilty-Dunn (2019) presents an apparently compelling example of unconscious perception due to Mitroff et al. (2005) which, he contends, evades this dilemma. The case is fascinating. However, as I here argue, it does not escape the dilemma’s clutches.


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