A Study on the Enactment of Dual Class Shares in Korea - Focusing on the comparison with Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai -

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 192-252
Author(s):  
Shinyoung Kim
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Dual Class

Price Effects of Dual-Class Shares

1986 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vijay M. Jog ◽  
Allan L. Riding
Keyword(s):  
Price Effects ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Dual Class

Founding Family Ownership and the Selection of Industry Specialist Auditors

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fei Kang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Structure And Agency ◽  
Founding Family ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
Industry Specialist

SYNOPSIS This study examines how family firms' unique ownership structure and agency problems affect their selection of industry-specialist auditors. Using data from Standard & Poor's (S&P) 1500 firms, the results show that family firms are more likely to appoint industry-specialist auditors than non-family firms, which suggests that family firms have strong incentives to signal the quality of financial reporting. Additional analysis indicates that due to the potential entrenchment problems, family firms with family member CEOs or with dual-class shares have even a higher tendency to hire industry-specialist auditors to signal their disclosure quality.

Dual-Class Firms and Innovation after NAFTA

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050007
Author(s):  
Lei Gao ◽  
Andrey Zagorchev
Keyword(s):  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Operating Efficiency ◽  
Firm Innovation ◽  
Exogenous Shock ◽  
Managerial Entrenchment ◽  
Innovation Activities ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
Improve Operating

We examine the effect of dual-class shares on U.S. firm innovation after the exogenous shock of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which intensified international competition. Using difference-in-differences models, we find that dual-class structure firms become less innovative but improve operating efficiency following NAFTA. We show that dual-class firms in many manufacturing industries reduce innovation, but marginally increase capital expenditures after the agreement, and thus substitute risky innovation with safer, long-term investments. The findings indicate that firms with dual-class structures facing lower competition decrease their stock market related innovation activities. We find that dual-class firms with entrenched managers decrease innovation and improve operating efficiency following NAFTA. Based on the robust results, agency costs and managerial entrenchment could explain these changes in innovations, efficiency, and investments.

scholarly journals Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial Markets

2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 191-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen A Lamont ◽  
Richard H Thaler
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Financial Economic ◽  
Law Of One Price ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Country Funds ◽  
The Law ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
Corporate Spinoffs

The Law of One price states that identical goods (or securities) should sell for identical prices. In financial markets the law of one price is thought to hold almost exactly, and is the basis for much of financial economic theory. We present evidence on several examples of violations of this law, including closed-end country funds, twin shares, dual class shares, and corporate spinoffs. We analyze the causes of these violations, and show they all stem from some limits on the extent to which rational arbitrageurs can intervene.

Revisiting the viability to allow dual-class share structure companies to list in the financial market of Hong Kong

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 167-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Kong Shan Ho
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Hong Kong ◽  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Financial Market ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
The One ◽  
Public Offering ◽  
The Right ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
Share Structure

The request of Alibaba, China’s largest e-commerce company, to allow a self-selected group of its past and present management known as the ‘partners’ the right to nominate a majority of the directors in its negotiation with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) for an initial public offering (IPO) in 2013 reignited a new round of debate over the one share, one vote policy, which has survived for three decades in Hong Kong. Alibaba’s IPO application to list on the HKEx was eventually rejected which ultimately led to the company’s decision to list on the New York Stock Exchange. In late 2017, the debate on whether companies with dual-class share (DCS) structure should be allowed to list in Hong Kong re-emerged as the HKEx has announced that it would amend its listing rules to enable companies with DCS structure to list on its exchange, subject to certain safeguards and restrictions. This article examines what measures Hong Kong could adopt to allow companies with DCS structure to list on its exchange despite legal and institutional shortcomings of its financial market. In doing so, it will also make reference to other major financial markets in the world and examine how other jurisdictions have handled the issue of DCS structure companies.

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