STOCK LIQUIDITY AND CORPORATE TRADE CREDIT STRATEGIES: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This study investigates the nexus of stock liquidity and trade-credit policies in China from 2002 to 2017. The estimates are robust to alternative proxies, various fixed-effects, and the exogenous impact of Chinese split share structure reforms (SSSR) 2005-06 is investigated through the difference-in-difference analysis. The results validate that stock liquidity significantly impacts firms’ capacity to produce more trade credit supplies and less reliant on trade credit demand. The study applied SUEST analysis to investigate the effect of the Chinese institutional setting. The nexus of stock liquidity and trade credit strategies is substantial in state-owned enterprises. Additional analysis revealed that the said association is more visible to credit-constrained and equity-reliant enterprises. The policymakers should focus on market liquidity because it elevates firms’ capacity to mobilize capital through trade credit provisions. The micro aspect of this study suggests that stock liquidity allows managers to shape non-price competitive strategies and avoid excessive usage of trade credits.

Firm Performance, Financial Constraints, and Dual-Class Share Structure

<p><b>This thesis addresses two aspects of financial constraints focusing, firstly, on the impact of financial constraints on firm performance and, secondly, on the impact of dual-class share structure on financial constraints. The first issue has been addressed in a large number of research studies, but the results are mixed. This study, therefore, conducts a meta-analysis of those earlier studies to provide a summary view of the results which, in contrast to narrative reviews of the empirical literature, provides an objective overview. The second issue examines the impact of dual-class share structures on financial constraints. The period of the global financial crisis is used to test the impact of the state of the economy on that relationship. To examine the impact of financial constraints on firm performance, 26 empirical studies with 189 effect sizes representing listed firms have been analysed. The study finds that overall there is a positive relationship between financial constraints and firm performance. The study also shows that the set of market-based measures of firm performance has a significant negative impact on the relationship, compared with the set of accounting-based measures. In terms of the financial constraints measure, the set of external financial constraints measures have a positive and highly significant impact on the relationship. The meta-regression analysis suggests that the choice of measure, regional difference, journal quality and publication status all have a significant impact on the relationship, and explain the variation in the association.</b></p> <p>To examine the impact of dual-class share structures on financial constraints the study analyses a sample of non-financial US firms over the period 2002-2018. Share structure is measured by the existence of a dual-class structure and also by excess voting rights and the proximity of the superior class shareholders in such structures. The study also shows that if financial constraints are measured by the WW index, irrespective of how dual-class share structure is measured, it increases the level of financial constraints. Similar results are obtained where financial constraints are measured by the KZ and SA indexes, except where dual-class share structure is measured by the proximity of superior class shareholders. The study also finds that if financial constraints are measured by the WW index, dual-class had a reduced impact during the period of the global financial crisis, thus, providing support for the propping theory. However, if financial constraint is measured by the SA index, dual-class share structure appears to have an increased impact during the GFC years. </p> <p>Among the additional tests, the HM index has been used as a measure of financial constraints, and the findings show that the impact of dual-class structures on financial constraints appears to be driven by their effect on debt constraints. The study also shows that firm age moderates the impact of dual-class share structures if financial constraints are measured by the WW index. The KZ, WW, and SA indexes are based on firm characteristics and, therefore, the study also tests for an impact of dual-class structures when financial constraint is measured by a text-based index, the BLM index. However, the results do not provide evidence of an impact in that case.</p>

Firm Performance, Financial Constraints, and Dual-Class Share Structure

<p><b>This thesis addresses two aspects of financial constraints focusing, firstly, on the impact of financial constraints on firm performance and, secondly, on the impact of dual-class share structure on financial constraints. The first issue has been addressed in a large number of research studies, but the results are mixed. This study, therefore, conducts a meta-analysis of those earlier studies to provide a summary view of the results which, in contrast to narrative reviews of the empirical literature, provides an objective overview. The second issue examines the impact of dual-class share structures on financial constraints. The period of the global financial crisis is used to test the impact of the state of the economy on that relationship. To examine the impact of financial constraints on firm performance, 26 empirical studies with 189 effect sizes representing listed firms have been analysed. The study finds that overall there is a positive relationship between financial constraints and firm performance. The study also shows that the set of market-based measures of firm performance has a significant negative impact on the relationship, compared with the set of accounting-based measures. In terms of the financial constraints measure, the set of external financial constraints measures have a positive and highly significant impact on the relationship. The meta-regression analysis suggests that the choice of measure, regional difference, journal quality and publication status all have a significant impact on the relationship, and explain the variation in the association.</b></p> <p>To examine the impact of dual-class share structures on financial constraints the study analyses a sample of non-financial US firms over the period 2002-2018. Share structure is measured by the existence of a dual-class structure and also by excess voting rights and the proximity of the superior class shareholders in such structures. The study also shows that if financial constraints are measured by the WW index, irrespective of how dual-class share structure is measured, it increases the level of financial constraints. Similar results are obtained where financial constraints are measured by the KZ and SA indexes, except where dual-class share structure is measured by the proximity of superior class shareholders. The study also finds that if financial constraints are measured by the WW index, dual-class had a reduced impact during the period of the global financial crisis, thus, providing support for the propping theory. However, if financial constraint is measured by the SA index, dual-class share structure appears to have an increased impact during the GFC years. </p> <p>Among the additional tests, the HM index has been used as a measure of financial constraints, and the findings show that the impact of dual-class structures on financial constraints appears to be driven by their effect on debt constraints. The study also shows that firm age moderates the impact of dual-class share structures if financial constraints are measured by the WW index. The KZ, WW, and SA indexes are based on firm characteristics and, therefore, the study also tests for an impact of dual-class structures when financial constraint is measured by a text-based index, the BLM index. However, the results do not provide evidence of an impact in that case.</p>

Blockholders and corporate governance: evidence from China’s split-share-structure reform

Purpose Proper empirical tests of the effect of blockholders’ monitoring incentives on corporate governance are scant in the literature because the relationship between ownership structure and enforcement of corporate governance mechanisms is bidirectional. This study aims to address the endogeneity issue by examining the effect of blockholding on executive turnover–performance sensitivity, using the split-share-structure (SSS) reform in China as an exogenous shock to blockholders’ monitoring incentives. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a logit model for estimating the change in executive turnover–performance sensitivity around the SSS reform. Sub-sample analysis is conducted to examine whether the impact of SSS reform on the turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger for firms with more contestable blockholders who might consider stock liquidity, risk sharing and diversification in their monitoring/trading decisions. Findings Top executive turnover, defined as CEO or board chair turnover, becomes less sensitive to firm operating performance after the reform, mainly for firms with contestable blockholders prior to the reform. Stock liquidity and blockholders’ demand for diversification can explain the impact of contestable blockholding. Moreover, blockholding is sensitive to firm operating performance after the reform but not before it. Originality/value With few exceptions, most studies in the blockholding literature focus on the effect of blockholder monitoring on firm value. Examining an exogenous shock to blockholding, this paper provides a set of new evidence for the impact of blockholding on executive turnover–performance sensitivity. The results call for more evidence of the impact of blockholding on executive turnover from other markets.

Analysis on Improvement of Ownership Structure and Dividend—Take Apple as an Example

Equal equity is not a suitable pathway to control the corporations. For Apple Company, due to Jobs’ equal equity, the most important reason that he quitted his company is that at the first step of the company, he had the same shares as other members of the board, but he did not have the absolute control of his company. Also, after the corporation was listed, the shares have been diluted gradually. Losing the control right, Jobs cannot make wise decisions or seek for strategic chances to make a huge profit, when members of the board held diverse opinions. Therefore dual-class share structure and ownership systems are the better choice for founders and entrepreneurs to operate and control the company. Managers have absolute control of the corporations so that they could make intellectual decisions without disturbance and intervention. Companies, accumulating a large amount of money, could pay dividends to shareholders and buy stocks.