scholarly journals National Pension Reform and Old-Age Security System in KoreaNational Pension Reform and Old-Age Security System in Korea - -

2007 ◽  
Vol null (28) ◽  
pp. 55-74
Author(s):  
김진수 ◽  
이승영(한국보건사회연구원 연구원)
2002 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernd Raffelhüschen ◽  
Johann Eekhoff ◽  
Markus Jankowski ◽  
Michael Voigtländer ◽  
Bert Rürup

AbstractIn this paper Bernd Raffelhüschen gives some insights into the political decision making process which changed the latest German pension reform from a fundamental step towards sustainability into a reform to be reformed. Nevertheless, he explains that the pension reform still bears a fundamental change, since it reduced transfers and at the same time opened for tax-preferred private and occupational pension plans. Hence, his paper investigates how these measures are developing presently and will develop in the future. Finally, some educated guesstimates are derived concerning those further reform steps to be undertaken in order to ensure the sustainability of a reduced pay-as-you-go scheme in future Germany.In their contribution, Johann Eekhoff, Markus Jankowski and Michael Voigtländer discuss the pros and cons of the Riester pension scheme. This so called “Riesterrente” involves a taxation scheme which can be regarded as a first step towards a consumption based taxation and can be justified in order to maintain intertemporal neutrality. The additional financial support for families and low-income earners, however, is neither based on efficiency grounds nor on a reasonable way of redistribution. The financial advantages are only granted if the capital investment is made in approved types of financial services. These restraints on capital investment will distort the functioning of the capital market which might lead to reduced economic growth and unemployment. Therefore, the authors conclude that the favouring of certain types of private saving should be abolished for the benefits of introducing consumption based taxation.Bert Rürup argues that central issues of last year’s pension legislation were a limitation of the growth of expenditures and as a result also a limitation of the expansion of the contribution rate as well as a redistribution in favour of younger generations as a precondition for intergenerational justice. The simultaneous reduction of the pay-as-you-go financed first pillar of old-age security while strengthening the funded pillars of old-age security helped to reach those targets.In his paper he argues that at the same time it was politically decided to melt down - in relative terms - the extent of the first pillar while simultaneously preserve the function of the old-age security system as an instrument to secure the standard of living after retirement. That also meant not to cut back the statutory pension insurance to a flat rate system in the long run. It should together with benefits from private systems guarantee - on the average - to keep up the income position reached in the period of professional activity also after retirement. This specific target makes state subsidization of private old-age security plans inevitable. The only alternative would be to turn the mandatory system into a compulsory one which would be the “cheaper” solution. The author states that compulsory saving for old-age security purposes versus targeted subsidization has distributive disadvantages and would hamper basic rules of market economy. And it would in Germany be impossible to be introduced due to political reasons.If for normativ reasons (“lean state”) the state organized old-age security system should be reduced e.g. like in Great Britain to the level of a system that provides protection against poverty, consequently state subsidization of private saving for old age purposes must be rejected. The first question to be answered is: Should state old-age security policy be directed towards maintaining the standard of living reached in working life or should it create only something like basic security? If that question is being answered in favour of the first, then a discussion on the nature and extent of state subsidization of private saving for old age purposes makes sense.


2020 ◽  
pp. 68-82
Author(s):  
Tianhong Chen

In the process of transforming from planned economy to market economy, both China and Russia faced the issue of pension reform. There are similarities in the reform and development process and the system model of the pension security system in China and Russia. Transition from planned economy to market economy and aggravation of population aging are main reasons for the reform of pension system in both countries. Under the influence of the World Bank and other international organizations, China and Russia have gradually established a multi-tier pension system, with the state, enterprises and individuals sharing the pension costs. Differences also exist in the old-age security system of China and Russia.


2000 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Hinrichs

Among OECD countries there are two clusters of old-age security systems: (1) ‘Social insurance’ countries had, by the end of the 1960s, fashioned the core of old-age security as public, contributory, earnings-related and unfunded insurance schemes; (2) a diverse collection of countries that, after 1970, topped up their basic pension arrangements with funded occupational pension schemes with (almost) universal coverage. ‘Social insurance’ countries, on which this essay focuses, reveal at least six common trends in pension reform, all about improving the financial sustainability of public schemes. Although the repertoire of incremental adjustment strategies is quite limited, policy changes since the early 1980s have not led to a clear convergence among ‘social insurance’ countries (or across the two clusters). Their original diversity has been somewhat diminished, but it has for the most part merely taken a different form. Public pension reforms regularly harmed (future) beneficiaries. Nevertheless, most reforms were actually based on broad political consensus. The success of attempts to introduce retrenchment policies depends on prior negotiation with – and support obtained from – collective actors above and beyond a simple parliamentary majority. This peculiar prerequisite ensures success in the sense of a sustained implementation of the measures taken and of actual improvement in public trust in ‘reliable’ pension schemes.


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