scholarly journals On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representation

2013 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 475-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Betzler ◽  
A. Slinko ◽  
J. Uhlmann

We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Chamberlin Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each voter so that the "sum of misrepresentations" is minimized. The winner determination problem for both systems is known to be NP-hard, hence this work aims at investigating whether there are variants of the proposed rules and/or specific electorates for which these problems can be solved efficiently. As a variation of these rules, instead of minimizing the sum of misrepresentations, we considered minimizing the maximal misrepresentation introducing effectively two new rules. In the general case these "minimax" versions of classical rules appeared to be still NP-hard. We investigated the parameterized complexity of winner determination of the two classical and two new rules with respect to several parameters. Here we have a mixture of positive and negative results: e.g., we proved fixed-parameter tractability for the parameter the number of candidates but fixed-parameter intractability for the number of winners. For single-peaked electorates our results are overwhelmingly positive: we provide polynomial-time algorithms for most of the considered problems. The only rule that remains NP-hard for single-peaked electorates is the classical Monroe rule.

Author(s):  
Marko Samer ◽  
Stefan Szeider

Parameterized complexity is a new theoretical framework that considers, in addition to the overall input size, the effects on computational complexity of a secondary measurement, the parameter. This two-dimensional viewpoint allows a fine-grained complexity analysis that takes structural properties of problem instances into account. The central notion is “fixed-parameter tractability” which refers to solvability in polynomial time for each fixed value of the parameter such that the order of the polynomial time bound is independent of the parameter. This chapter presents main concepts and recent results on the parameterized complexity of the satisfiability problem and it outlines fundamental algorithmic ideas that arise in this context. Among the parameters considered are the size of backdoor sets with respect to various tractable base classes and the treewidth of graph representations of satisfiability instances.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uéverton Souza ◽  
Fábio Protti ◽  
Maise Da Silva ◽  
Dieter Rautenbach

In this thesis we present a multivariate investigation of the complexity of some NP-hard problems, i.e., we first develop a systematic complexity analysis of these problems, defining its subproblems and mapping which one belongs to each side of an “imaginary boundary” between polynomial time solvability and intractability. After that, we analyze which sets of aspects of these problems are sources of their intractability, that is, subsets of aspects for which there exists an algorithm to solve the associated problem, whose non-polynomial time complexity is purely a function of those sets. Thus, we use classical and parameterized complexity in an alternate and complementary approach, to show which subproblems of the given problems are NP-hard and latter to diagnose for which sets of parameters the problems are fixed-parameter tractable, or in FPT. This thesis exhibits a classical and parameterized complexity analysis of different groups of NP-hard problems. The addressed problems are divided into four groups of distinct nature, in the context of data structures, combinatorial games, and graph theory: (I) and/or graph solution and its variants; (II) flooding-filling games; (III) problems on P3-convexity; (IV) problems on induced matchings.


2022 ◽  
Vol 73 ◽  
pp. 231-276
Author(s):  
Dominik Peters ◽  
Lan Yu ◽  
Hau Chan ◽  
Edith Elkind

A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped with a tree structure so that the preferences of each voter are decreasing from their top candidate along all paths in the tree. This notion was introduced by Demange (1982), and subsequently Trick (1989b) described an efficient algorithm for deciding if a given profile is single-peaked on a tree. We study the complexity of multiwinner elections under several variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule for preferences single-peaked on trees. We show that in this setting the egalitarian version of this rule admits a polynomial-time winner determination algorithm. For the utilitarian version, we prove that winner determination remains NP-hard for the Borda scoring function; indeed, this hardness results extends to a large family of scoring functions. However, a winning committee can be found in polynomial time if either the number of leaves or the number of internal vertices of the underlying tree is bounded by a constant. To benefit from these positive results, we need a procedure that can determine whether a given profile is single-peaked on a tree that has additional desirable properties (such as, e.g., a small number of leaves). To address this challenge, we develop a structural approach that enables us to compactly represent all trees with respect to which a given profile is single-peaked. We show how to use this representation to efficiently find the best tree for a given profile for use with our winner determination algorithms: Given a profile, we can efficiently find a tree with the minimum number of leaves, or a tree with the minimum number of internal vertices among trees on which the profile is single-peaked. We then explore the power and limitations of this framework: we develop polynomial-time algorithms to find trees with the smallest maximum degree, diameter, or pathwidth, but show that it is NP-hard to check whether a given profile is single-peaked on a tree that is isomorphic to a given tree, or on a regular tree.


Author(s):  
Yongjie Yang

We study the complexity of several manipulation and control problems for six prevalent approval based multiwinner voting rules. We show that these rules generally resist the proposed strategic types. In addition, we also give fixed-parameter tractability results for these problems with respect to several natural parameters and derive polynomial-time algorithms for certain special cases.


2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanna Furmańczyk ◽  
Andrzej Jastrzębski ◽  
Marek Kubale

AbstractIn many applications in sequencing and scheduling it is desirable to have an underlaying graph as equitably colored as possible. In this paper we survey recent theoretical results concerning conditions for equitable colorability of some graphs and recent theoretical results concerning the complexity of equitable coloring problem. Next, since the general coloring problem is strongly NP-hard, we report on practical experiments with some efficient polynomial-time algorithms for approximate equitable coloring of general graphs.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 1838-1845
Author(s):  
Robert Bredereck ◽  
Piotr Faliszewski ◽  
Andrzej Kaczmarczyk ◽  
Dušan Knop ◽  
Rolf Niedermeier

We extend the work of Skowron et al. (AIJ, 2016) by considering the parameterized complexity of the following problem. We are given a set of items and a set of agents, where each agent assigns an integer utility value to each item. The goal is to find a set of k items that these agents would collectively use. For each such collective set of items, each agent provides a score that can be described using an OWA (ordered weighted average) operator and we seek a set with the highest total score. We focus on the parameterization by the number of agents and we find numerous fixed-parameter tractability results (however, we also find some W[1]-hardness results). It turns out that most of our algorithms even apply to the setting where each agent has an integer weight.


2009 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 275-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Faliszewski ◽  
E. Hemaspaandra ◽  
L. A. Hemaspaandra ◽  
J. Rothe

Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Constructive control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins. Destructive control refers to attempts by an agent to, via the same actions, preclude a given candidate's victory. An election system in which an agent can sometimes affect the result and it can be determined in polynomial time on which inputs the agent can succeed is said to be vulnerable to the given type of control. An election system in which an agent can sometimes affect the result, yet in which it is NP-hard to recognize the inputs on which the agent can succeed, is said to be resistant to the given type of control. Aside from election systems with an NP-hard winner problem, the only systems previously known to be resistant to all the standard control types were highly artificial election systems created by hybridization. This paper studies a parameterized version of Copeland voting, denoted by Copeland^\alpha, where the parameter \alpha is a rational number between 0 and 1 that specifies how ties are valued in the pairwise comparisons of candidates. In every previously studied constructive or destructive control scenario, we determine which of resistance or vulnerability holds for Copeland^\alpha for each rational \alpha, 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1. In particular, we prove that Copeland^{0.5}, the system commonly referred to as ``Copeland voting,'' provides full resistance to constructive control, and we prove the same for Copeland^\alpha, for all rational \alpha, 0 < \alpha < 1. Among systems with a polynomial-time winner problem, Copeland voting is the first natural election system proven to have full resistance to constructive control. In addition, we prove that both Copeland^0 and Copeland^1 (interestingly, Copeland^1 is an election system developed by the thirteenth-century mystic Llull) are resistant to all standard types of constructive control other than one variant of addition of candidates. Moreover, we show that for each rational \alpha, 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1, Copeland^\alpha voting is fully resistant to bribery attacks, and we establish fixed-parameter tractability of bounded-case control for Copeland^\alpha. We also study Copeland^\alpha elections under more flexible models such as microbribery and extended control, we integrate the potential irrationality of voter preferences into many of our results, and we prove our results in both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model. Our vulnerability results for microbribery are proven via a novel technique involving min-cost network flow.


2021 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
pp. 993-1048
Author(s):  
Niclas Boehmer ◽  
Robert Bredereck ◽  
Klaus Heeger ◽  
Rolf Niedermeier

We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering  several manipulative actions as well as several manipulation goals. For instance, one goal  is to make sure that a given pair of agents is matched in a stable solution, and this may be  achieved by the manipulative action of reordering some agents' preference lists. We present  a comprehensive study of the computational complexity of all problems arising in this way.  We find several polynomial-time solvable cases as well as NP-hard ones. For the NP-hard  cases, focusing on the natural parameter "budget" (that is, the number of manipulative  actions one is allowed to perform), we also conduct a parameterized complexity analysis  and encounter mostly parameterized hardness results. 


Author(s):  
P. Renjith ◽  
N. Sadagopan

For an optimization problem known to be NP-Hard, the dichotomy study investigates the reduction instances to determine the line separating polynomial-time solvable vs NP-Hard instances (easy vs hard instances). In this paper, we investigate the well-studied Hamiltonian cycle problem (HCYCLE), and present an interesting dichotomy result on split graphs. T. Akiyama et al. (1980) have shown that HCYCLE is NP-complete on planar bipartite graphs with maximum degree [Formula: see text]. We use this result to show that HCYCLE is NP-complete for [Formula: see text]-free split graphs. Further, we present polynomial-time algorithms for Hamiltonian cycle in [Formula: see text]-free and [Formula: see text]-free split graphs. We believe that the structural results presented in this paper can be used to show similar dichotomy result for Hamiltonian path problem and other variants of Hamiltonian cycle (path) problems.


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