scholarly journals Constitutional approach of the relationship between fundamental rights and international human rights law

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 207-236
Author(s):  
이승택
2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 817-838 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathryn McNeilly

Human rights were a defining discourse of the 20th century. The opening decades of the twenty-first, however, have witnessed increasing claims that the time of this discourse as an emancipatory tool is up. Focusing on international human rights law, I offer a response to these claims. Drawing from Elizabeth Grosz, Drucilla Cornell and Judith Butler, I propose that a productive future for this area of law in facilitating radical social change can be envisaged by considering more closely the relationship between human rights and temporality and by thinking through a conception of rights which is untimely. This involves abandoning commitment to linearity, progression and predictability in understanding international human rights law and its development and viewing such as based on a conception of the future that is unknown and uncontrollable, that does not progressively follow from the present, and that is open to embrace of the new.


2020 ◽  
pp. 159-181
Author(s):  
Lea Raible

The very term ‘extraterritoriality’ implies that territory is significant. So far, however, my argument focuses on jurisdiction rather than territory. This chapter adds clarifications in this area. It examines the relationship of jurisdiction in international human rights law, whether understood as political power or not, and title to territory in international law. To this end, I start by looking at what international law has to say about jurisdiction as understood in international human rights law, and territory, respectively. The conclusion of the survey is that the two concepts serve different normative purposes, are underpinned by different values, and that they are thus not the same. Accordingly, an account of their relationship should be approached with conceptual care.


Author(s):  
Sandesh Sivakumaran

This chapter examines international humanitarian law, the principal body of international law which applies in times of armed conflict, and which seeks to balance the violence inherent in an armed conflict with the dictates of humanity. International humanitarian law protects the civilian population from the ravages of conflict, and establishes limitations on the means and methods of combat. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the nature of international humanitarian law and identifies some of its cardinal principles and key rules. Section 3 explores the similarities and differences between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, comparing and contrasting their historical origins and conceptual approaches. Given that international humanitarian law applies during armed conflict, Section 4 considers whether there is a need for international human rights law also to apply. Section 5 ascertains the relationship between the two bodies of law and Section 6 considers some of the difficulties with the application of international human rights law in time of armed conflict.


Global Jurist ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oche Onazi

This article aims to provide the justification for a subaltern theory of human rights. It explains the desirability of interpretative strategies that reveal the role, knowledge, contributions and sources that depict subaltern human rights perspectives. In particular, it considers the work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos, whose various writings directly or indirectly address the central issues relating to human rights from these perspectives. It subsequently explores the relationship between Santos and other protagonists, such as Upendra Baxi. These perspectives are then correlated with the view that the optimism for subaltern human rights may seem an insurmountable challenge given that this is hinged on the possibilities of a relationship with law. The justification or indeed legitimacy of subaltern views of human rights rests squarely on the degree to which such claims can be concretized into law. For instance, the state-centric nature of international human rights law is closed to initiatives that fall beyond its scope. As a consequence, the final preoccupation in this article is to propose the deconstruction of human rights into a plural discourse of its law and jurisprudence. This, to me, rests on the possibility of extrapolating a view of human rights from the notion of legal pluralism. The article is structured into the following parts. The first fleshes out an understanding of the subaltern concept. The second part locates the subaltern within the context of Santos' work on globalization; here, an attempt is made to correlate the relationship between globalization and human rights, particularly from the perspectives of the subaltern. The third part considers the loose connection of previous sections with the prospective theory of subaltern human rights and, ultimately, how legal pluralism supports this endeavor.


2017 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Fowkes

AbstractModern peacekeeping is increasingly expansive, and much of it occurs in Africa. The African Union's attitude to the challenges of regulating this modern peacekeeping is therefore an important source for the associated legal debates, but one that is often neglected (in part because the sources are limited and often in draft form). This article seeks to articulate and then critique the AU's emerging view on the application of international humanitarian law and international human rights law to peacekeeping activity and the relationship between the two bodies of law in this context. It argues that the AU's emerging position treats international humanitarian law as a narrowed lex specialis, only displacing international human rights law in relation to peacekeepers while they are actively engaged in armed conflict. Even this position, however, underestimates the extent to which the pervasive rights-based concerns in AU sources imply a still more pervasive application of international human rights law to its peacekeeping activities.


Author(s):  
Melanie Studer ◽  
Kurt Pärli

In Switzerland, the participation in certain work programmes is an eligibility criterion to social assistance benefits and the constitutionally granted right to the financial means required for a decent standard of living. This chapter examines whether the implementation of these programmes is in accordance with fundamental rights and more precisely, whether they respect the normative framework elaborated in Chapter 4. As will be shown, the right to financial assistance when in need has close links to human dignity. Therefore, the evaluation of the mentioned work programmes against the human rights background leads to some critical conclusions on their compatibility with international human rights law in general and human dignity in particular. Especially, the authors argue that the Swiss Federal Supreme Court’s case law lacks a comprehensive approach for the evaluation of human rights infringements in this context.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 924-939
Author(s):  
Pierre Thielbörger

AbstractWhile the “essence” of EU fundamental rights has received much attention following the CJEU’s Schrems decision, the concept of “essence” remains much less examined in international human rights law. Nonetheless, a concept of “essence” for human rights can also be found in international law. This Article discusses different aspects of the “essence” concept in international human rights law, namely non-derogability, non-restrictability, and minimum core, in three steps. First, the Article looks at civil political rights and socioeconomic rights separately and identifies two different approaches to the concept of essence for each of the two categories: While for civil and political rights the concept of essence is mainly linked to the notions of non-derogability and non-restrictability, for socioeconomic rights, the concept refers mainly to the states’ obligation to guarantee an essential level of protection independent of their resource limitations. Second, the Article continues by reading the two approaches together and identifies certain elements of an overarching “essence” concept. Finally, the Article discusses the relationship between the CJEU’s “essence” jurisprudence and the related concepts in international law and concludes with two theses: First, international law deserves more attention when reflecting on the EU’s concept of essence. It equally employs concepts of “essence” and also informs the development and interpretation of EU law. Second, when engaging with the question of whether the EU law should draw lessons from its international counterpart on the notion of “essence,” one must contemplate drawbacks for EU law that the concept has presented for international law.


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