scholarly journals Do Countries Use Foreign Aid to Buy Geopolitical Influence? Evidence from Donor Campaigns for Temporary UN Security Council Seats

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernhard Reinsberg
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Aid ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Aid Effectiveness ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Limited Experience ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Media Reports ◽  
Delivery Channel ◽  
Donor Interest ◽  
Section Analysis

In recent years, donor countries have increasingly used different aid allocation channels to boost aid effectiveness. One delivery channel that has grown tremendously is ‘multi-bi aid’—contributions to multilateral organizations earmarked for specific development purposes. This article examines whether donors use multi-bi aid to further their selfish goals—specifically, to garner political support for their ambition to become a temporary member of the UN Security Council. In this context, multi-bi aid is particularly beneficial to countries with limited experience as foreign aid donors; whose governance quality is weak; and which are more internationalized. Using a sample of OECD/DAC donor countries in 1995–2016, time-series cross-section analysis corroborates these arguments. The analysis draws on a new dataset of media reports proxying for donor interest in winning a temporary seat in the UN Security Council and extended data on multi-bi aid flows. The findings demonstrate that multi-bi aid may be a tool for geopolitical influence, with yet unexplored consequences for aid effectiveness.

scholarly journals In Defense of the “Conventional Account” of the Jus ad Bellum

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 102-107
Author(s):  
Tess Bridgeman
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Political Support ◽  
State Behavior ◽  
Institutional Processes ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Legal Effect ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The Law ◽  
State Engagement

States sometimes choose to break the law. International lawyers should seek to understand instances of illegality, particularly when they involve the unlawful use of force. But should we also shift our understanding of legality itself in an attempt to bring state conduct within the fold? In particular, what should we make of uses of force that seem to enjoy some degree of international political support while straying from the law governing the resort to force, or the jus ad bellum? Monica Hakimi asks this timely, and indeed timeless, question in her thought-provoking article arguing for a reconceptualization of “The Jus ad Bellum’s Regulatory Form.” Hakimi argues that we must carefully examine state engagement with the UN Security Council, including when it is not authorizing force, to fully understand state behavior. This claim is uncontroversial. However, she also argues that Council activity short of authorizing force can nevertheless establish legality and the Council's “institutional processes can deprive the general standards [that constitute the jus ad bellum] of their legal effect.” The empirical validity and normative desirability of this more provocative claim deserve close interrogation.

Navigation by Judgment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Honig
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Aid ◽  
Aid Effectiveness ◽  
Field Worker

When should foreign aid organizations empower actors on the front lines of delivery to rely on their judgment to guide aid interventions, and when should distant headquarters lead? Understanding how best to manage the implementation of aid projects matters both for aid effectiveness and for what it tells us about the more general tension between central versus field worker control in organizations.

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