scholarly journals In Defense of the “Conventional Account” of the Jus ad Bellum

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 102-107
Author(s):  
Tess Bridgeman

States sometimes choose to break the law. International lawyers should seek to understand instances of illegality, particularly when they involve the unlawful use of force. But should we also shift our understanding of legality itself in an attempt to bring state conduct within the fold? In particular, what should we make of uses of force that seem to enjoy some degree of international political support while straying from the law governing the resort to force, or the jus ad bellum? Monica Hakimi asks this timely, and indeed timeless, question in her thought-provoking article arguing for a reconceptualization of “The Jus ad Bellum’s Regulatory Form.” Hakimi argues that we must carefully examine state engagement with the UN Security Council, including when it is not authorizing force, to fully understand state behavior. This claim is uncontroversial. However, she also argues that Council activity short of authorizing force can nevertheless establish legality and the Council's “institutional processes can deprive the general standards [that constitute the jus ad bellum] of their legal effect.” The empirical validity and normative desirability of this more provocative claim deserve close interrogation.

Author(s):  
Ben Saul

International law has struggled to regulate terrorism for over a century, beginning with efforts to cooperate in the extradition and prosecution of suspects, including through unsuccessful League of Nations efforts to define and criminalize terrorism as such. Until 2001 most international attention focused on transnational criminal cooperation against terrorism, through the development of method-specific “prosecute or extradite” treaties (concerning, for instance, violence against aircraft or ships, hostage taking, or attacks on diplomats) but without defining terrorism as a general concept or crime. It may, however, be possible to qualify some terrorist acts as war crimes or crimes against humanity. Since the 1970s, there were ambivalent efforts through the UN General Assembly to develop normative frameworks to confront terrorism per se, which often came unstuck on the controversial issues of “state terrorism” and liberation movement violence. Greater consensus was achieved by 1994 with the General Assembly’s adoption of a declaration against terrorism. There appears to exist an international consensus that terrorism per se is wrongful, even if disagreement remains about identifying precisely what constitutes terrorism. The effort to deal with terrorism as such suggests that the international community views terrorism as more than its underlying physical parts, which are already crimes in most national legal systems and under certain transnational treaties. The special wrongfulness of terrorism is perhaps signified by its intimidation of civilian populations, its coercion of governments or international organizations, and its political, religious, or ideological aspect. Terrorist violence has also sometimes raised certain problems under the law of armed conflict and the law on the use of force, as well as occasionally attracted sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Terrorism was generally dealt with, however, through the application of general legal norms rather than through the emergence of terrorism-specific rules. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, sharper international focus was brought to bear on the legal challenges presented by terrorism and counter-terrorism in numerous specialized branches of international law (particularly in the law of state responsibility, the law on the use of force, and international humanitarian law), as well as in the institutional practices of the UN Security Council and the impacts of counter-terrorism measures on international human rights law. By 2011 the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon even declared the existence of an international customary law crime of transnational terrorism, although that decision has proven highly controversial as not supported by state practice. Efforts to negotiate a comprehensive international convention against terrorism have continued since 2000, with disagreement remaining over the scope of exceptions. There is also now increasing debate about whether a field of international anti-terrorism law is emerging.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 113-117
Author(s):  
Ian Johnstone

Monica Hakimi's article probes the legal significance of an interesting phenomenon: the UN Security Council condoning the use of force, as opposed to authorizing it. She offers an innovative perspective on this little-studied dimension of how the Council contributes to the development of jus ad bellum. While I applaud much in the article, I question her characterization of what the Council is condoning in the cases she reviews. She claims these are “fact-specific decisions,” whereas I argue that the Council is endorsing controversial interpretations of the law on the use of force. This disagreement does not detract from Hakimi's observations about the policy implications of the practice, or about the Council's role as a site for deliberation and argumentation about the content of international law. But it does cast doubt on her conceptual claim that there are two distinct “regulatory forms,” which together provide the content of jus ad bellum, one particularistic and procedural, the other general and substantive. All legal claims and justifications entail the application of general standards to particular facts, either explicitly or implicitly. Most of her case studies can be explained in those terms. Thus, while the Council's practice of condoning the use of force is important to understand, the “conventional account” she derides provides a more persuasive and parsimonious explanation of that phenomenon.


2004 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 51-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Chesterman

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been the subject of much discussion for its impact on the use of force outside of UN Security Council authorization. Less commented upon is the fact that the so-called “Operation Iraqi Freedom” resurrected a body of international law that had been dormant through the second half of the twentieth century: the law of military occupation. Developed at a time when war itself was not illegal, this doctrine became something of an embarrassment after the UN Charter established a broad prohibition on the use of force. Nevertheless, through the 1990s the United Nations itself had become involved in operations in Kosovo that looked distinctly like military occupation. Even the most liberal reading of the instruments governing occupation law, however, finds it hard to reconcile this law with military intervention and post-conflict occupation premised on regime change. This article first surveys the law of military occupation before briefly examining the role of the UN Security Council in post-conflict administration. It then turns to the ambiguous responsibilities accorded to the United States and Britain as occupying powers in Iraq in 2003–2004.


2021 ◽  
pp. 251-272
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter discusses the regulation of when and for what purpose a state may use force against another state jus ad bellum. It provides an overview of the legal framework in the 1945 UN Charter. It analyses the content of the prohibition on the use of force in article 2(4) of the Charter; discusses the competences of the UN Security Council; and examines the right to self-defence. The Security Council is entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council may authorize the use of force if required to maintain and/or restore the peace. Article 51 of the Charter allows a state to defend itself in the case of armed attack.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monica Hakimi

AbstractThis article argues that a form of legal regulation is embodied in decisions at the UN Security Council that condone but do not formally authorize specific military operations. Such decisions sometimes inflect or go beyond what thejus ad bellumpermits through its general standards—that is, under the prohibition of cross-border force and small handful of exceptions. Recognizing that this form of regulation is both part of the law and different in kind from regulation through the general standards should change how we think about thejus ad bellum.


2019 ◽  
pp. 254-278
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter discusses the regulation of when and for what purpose a state may use force against another state—jus ad bellum. It provides an overview of the legal framework in the 1945 UN Charter. It analyses the content of the prohibition on the use of force in article 2(4) of the Charter; discusses the competences of the UN Security Council; and examines the right to self-defence. The Security Council is entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council may authorize the use of force if required to maintain and/or restore the peace. Article 51 of the Charter allows a state to defend itself in the case of armed attack.


Author(s):  
Rob McLaughlin

This chapter examines UN Security Council practice with respect to the use of force in no-fly zones and maritime exclusion zones. It considers whether the law governing the zone is based or not based on the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and whether the law on the use of force inside the zone is essentially the same as that outside it. It also assesses the effect of the Security Council’s act of declaring or acquiescing in the zone on the law that is normally applicable in the ocean or airspace enclosed by the zone. The chapter also analyses whether the Security Council can authorize the use of lethal force for the purpose of enforcing a mandate despite the absence of LOAC authorization. It discusses the notion of a ‘third paradigm’ for use of lethal force and the concept of ‘self-defence’ endorsed by the Security Council (and the UN more generally).


Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter discusses the regulation of when and for what purpose a state may use force against another state — jus ad bellum. It provides an overview of the legal framework in the 1945 UN Charter. It analyses the content of the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter; discusses the competences of the UN Security Council; and examines the right to self-defence. The Security Council is entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council may authorize the use of force if required to maintain and/or restore the peace. Article 51 of the Charter allows a state to defend itself in the case of armed attack.


Author(s):  
Enzo Cannizzaro

The chapter discusses the philosophical foundations of the current regulation of the use of force. The chapter argues that, in correspondence with the emergence of a sphere of substantive rules protecting common interests of humankind, international law is also gradually developing a system of protection against egregious breaches of these interests. This conclusion is reached through an analysis of the law and practice governing the action of the UN Security Council as well as the law of state responsibility concerning individual and collective reactions to serious breaches of common interests. This system is based on positive obligations imposed upon individual states as well as UN organs, and it appears to be still rudimentary and inefficient. However, the chapter suggests that the mere existence of this system, these shortcomings notwithstanding, has the effect of promoting the further development of the law in search for more appropriate mechanisms of protection.


2005 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inger Österdahl

AbstractIn recent years the UN Security Council has entered the scene of action several times after a unilateral military intervention has already taken place. The Security Council has adopted comprehensive schemes for the reconstruction of the countries intervened in and has authorised both civil and military international presences. Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of such recent situations, and Liberia is an example from the early 1990s. This article makes the argument that, through its resolutions, the Security Council contributes to the legalisation ex post facto of the unilateral interventions, whether it wants to or not. The Security Council is caught in a trap set by those who undertake the intervention without prior Security Council authorisation.The only way the Security Council could escape the retroactive legalising effect of its resolutions would be by clearly stating in the resolution its intention not to authorise the preceding intervention. Even then, it may be that the Security Council could not escape the power of its own practice. A persistent practice of adopting reconstruction resolutions ex post facto would carry greater legal weight than the professed intention not to legalise the preceding unilateral intervention.Still, authorisation ex post facto may be better than no authorisation at all.


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