scholarly journals Health Insurance Tax Credits and Health Insurance Coverage of Low-Earning Single Mothers

Author(s):  
Merve Cebi ◽  
Stephen A. Woodbury
Author(s):  
Lawrence Zelenak

This paper describes a new system of tax credits to help low-income workers pay for health insurance. The system would be designed to subsidize health insurance coverage for workers who are currently uninsured, or who pay high premiums for nongroup insurance. Anyone age 19 or older who is not covered by Medicaid, Medicare, or employer-sponsored health insurance would be eligible for a health insurance tax credit (HITC), administered through the Internal Revenue Service. The base amount of the proposed credit would be $2,000 per year for each covered individual, but this amount would be adjusted for the individual's age and sex, according to the effect of age and sex on the cost of insurance coverage. The base amount of the credit would be reduced by $150 for every $1,000 by which a person's income exceeded 200% of the federal poverty level, thus limiting HITC eligibility to lower-income workers. To encourage participation in the credit program, most of the credit would be available through an advance payment system, with final reconciliation after year's end.


2017 ◽  
Vol 180 ◽  
pp. 28-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberly Narain ◽  
Marianne Bitler ◽  
Ninez Ponce ◽  
Gerald Kominski ◽  
Susan Ettner

Author(s):  
Beth C. Fuchs

The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) could be combined with health insurance tax credits to extend coverage to the uninsured. An extended FEHBP, or “E-FEHBP,” would be open to all individuals who were not covered through work or public programs and who also were eligible for the tax credits on the basis of income. E-FEHBP also would be open to employees of very small firms, regardless of their eligibility for tax credits. Most plans available to FEHBP participants would be required to offer enrollment to E-FEHBP participants, although premiums would be rated separately. High-risk individuals would be diverted to a separate high-risk pool, the cost of which would be subsidized by the federal government. E-FEHBP would be administered by the states, or if a state declined, by an entity that contracted with the Office of Personnel Management. While E-FEHBP would provide group insurance to people who otherwise could not get it, premiums could exceed the tax-credit amount and some people still might find the coverage unaffordable.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michaele Morrow ◽  
Shane R. Stinson ◽  
Marcus M. Doxey

ABSTRACT The Affordable Care Act (ACA) employs personal income tax credits and surcharges to enforce its mandate for health insurance coverage. This initiative depends largely on the use of tax incentives to increase participation by young adults who are relatively healthy and have voiced concerns over the expected costs and benefits of obtaining mandated coverage. Consistent with these concerns, we find in an experimental setting that so-called “young invincibles” largely base their decisions to purchase insurance on the expected costs of coverage and the perceived likelihood of illness or injury, but are relatively unmotivated by tax incentives in the forms featured in current legislation. Tax incentive structures not featured in the ACA show some ability to motivate young invincibles, but the effect is not incremental to simple price reductions. In contrast, older and more experienced participants exhibit less sensitivity to premium costs and respond favorably to tax incentives, regardless of form. JEL Classifications: H20; H24; I13.


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