Managerial quality tends to be lower in family-owned firms

Keyword(s):  
2012 ◽  
pp. 100-130
Author(s):  
Laurence J. Jr OToole ◽  
Kenneth J. Meier

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achyuta Adhvaryu ◽  
Anant Nyshadham ◽  
Jorge Tamayo

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (suppl_3) ◽  
Author(s):  
R Rugulies ◽  
LM Jakobsen ◽  
IEH Madsen ◽  
V Borg ◽  
IG Carneiro ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (83) ◽  
pp. 555-579
Author(s):  
Claudia N. Avellaneda ◽  
Ricardo Corrêa Gomes

Abstract We test the influence of managerial quality on organizational performance using a panel data set on 827 (out of 853) Brazilian municipalities of the state of Minas Gerais over a six-year period (2005-2010). The intra-country and intra-state comparison controls for potential institutional, historical, and cultural variables. Local managerial quality is assessed in terms of mayoral education and experience (public and reelection), and municipal performance is operationalized as property tax collected per capita and property tax collected as a percentage of total revenue. The study covers the four years of the 2005-2008 mayoral administration and the first two years of the 2009-2012 administration. After testing the effect of political, economic, and ideological factors and controlling for other municipal factors, we find, contrary to our expectations, that mayoral quality fails to explain variance in property tax collection. Rather, political factors (legislature support and electoral cycle) seem to be more strongly correlated with municipal property tax collection. Specifically, municipalities in which the mayor enjoys more partisan support on the city council tend to collect more property tax. Moreover, compared to the first three years of mayoral administration, in the last year of mayoral administration – that is, during the mayoral election year – municipalities tend to reduce their property tax collection.


ILR Review ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M. Kahn

This paper uses 1969–87 major league baseball data to investigate the impact of managerial quality on team winning and individual player performance. Managerial quality and player performance are measured as predicted pay based on salary regressions; these market-based measures permit conclusions about costs and benefits of managerial quality. There are two major findings. First, when player inputs are controlled for, higher-quality managers lead to higher winning percentages. Second, players tend to play better, relative to their prior performance levels, the higher the manager's quality. These findings suggest that, as emphasized by the human resource management literature, the quality of management makes an important difference in the performance of organizations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reiner Rugulies ◽  
Louise M. Jakobsen ◽  
Ida E.H. Madsen ◽  
Vilhelm Borg ◽  
Isabella G. Carneiro ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
George O. Aragon ◽  
Vikram Nanda

We use a novel database to study the timeliness of hedge fund monthly performance disclosures. Managers engage in strategic timing: poor monthly returns are reported with delay, sometimes clustered with stronger subsequent performance, suggestive of “performance smoothing.” We posit that propensity to delay could reveal operational risk and/or poor managerial quality. Consistent with this, a portfolio strategy that buys (sells) funds with historically timely (untimely) reporting delivers 3% annual-style-adjusted returns. Investor flows are lower following reporting delays, although there are potential benefits to managers from delaying reporting when performance is sufficiently poor. We conclude that timely disclosure is an important consideration for hedge fund managers and investors.


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